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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT     
      Contextual Universalisms investigates the “universal” ideas and values that 
define Enlightenment humanism-- such as secular rationality, individual freedom, and the 
capacity for democratic thought—and argues that these notions are also instantiated 
within colonized cultures relatively independently from European versions of these 
concepts, in context-specific forms. I explore marginalized articulations of these values, 
and the discourses of human rights they develop, through Indian and South African 
literatures.  
I probe these indigenous manifestations of “universalisms,” or “modern” 
constructs through which cultures define humanity, by focusing on exemplary literary 
texts from the Global South that show how theoretical and philosophical notions of 
universal humanity and “human rights” have been developed. They reveal that these 
ideas are not colonial imports, or even products of the colonial encounter, and that 
they become self-evident through context-specific forms of local literary traditions. 
Furthermore, the subaltern authors of these texts reflect and produce a grassroots 
populism that defines itself through “indigenous” universalizing notions of rights. 
They create movements of popular resistance through distinct local and intellectual 
cultures and institutions very different from those used by colonialists or even by 
hegemonic nationalist groups in their own societies.   
 
The recognition of “modern” humanist values in indigenous texts as both 
“contextual” and “universalizing” revises previous understandings of colonized 
societies as “pre-modern” and of modernity as a European import. Instead, these 
“contextual universalisms” testify that the discourse of European colonial modernity 
is not the only discourse of modernity through which to view the colonial past, 
thereby rethinking current ways of reading Anglophone Indian and South African 
texts. Indeed, these indigenous literatures redefine modernity as a descriptive word 
for any period of radical rupture and resistance against past orthodoxies, a way of 
questioning the present that insists on a radical humanism. In doing so, these texts 
destabilize widely accepted scholarly binaries between “tradition” and “modernity,” 
and the “religious” and the “secular,” suggesting that modern ideals may well have a 
more complex history than is often imagined. 
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Preface 
 
  In ancient India, the saint poet Vyasa wrote an extensive mythological history 
called the Mahabharata, now considered one of the founding texts of Hinduism. In it, 
one of his principal characters stated that the supreme human being should be defined, 
regardless of their caste, according to their capacity for  “truth, charity, forgiveness, good 
conduct, benevolence, kindness, observance of the rites of his order, and mercy.” 
1 
Centuries later, in pre-colonial South Africa, Zulu tribes measured the worth of a human 
according to their generosity and kindness towards others, proclaiming that “a person is a 
person through other people.”
2 And later still, in early twentieth century India, a young 
anti-colonial revolutionary called Mohandas Gandhi resisted the racist statements of his 
colonizers with the words: “gentleness, self-sacrifice and generosity are the exclusive 
possession of no one race or religion.”
3  
 
All these statements were uttered in very different times and places by singular 
personalities whose lives were defined completely independently of colonialism, or 
wholly through the lens of the colonial encounter. Nevertheless, what unifies them is a 
conviction that underlying the diversity of human experience it is possible to discern a 
rational, universal and given human nature possessing qualities such as “kindness, 
                                                        
1 From the conversation between Yudhisthira and Naga Nahusha in Ved Vyasa, The 
Mahabharata of Krishna-Dwaipayana Vyasa, trans. Kisari Mohan Ganguli (Calcutta: Bhārata 
Press, 1894), Book 3 of 18: Vana Parva. 
  
2 This is translated from the popular Zulu maxim umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu. 
 
3 Mahatma Gandhi, Young India 10 (August 30
th, 1928): 292. 
   vii 
generosity, freedom, and justice.” And, these diverse thinkers turned to this belief to fuel 
their popular movements of resistance against those who would deny them “human” 
status. These statements were all made towards the crafting of ethical social orders, 
whether to contest the ancient, feudal systems of caste in South Asia, to create communal 
systems of agriculture in pre-colonial South Africa, or anti-colonial movements against 
foreign oppressors in the colonized global South.  
Ironically, in the post-colonial and globalized world, humanisms of any kind have 
been dismissed precisely because of these universalizing tendencies. Post-colonial critics 
such as Enrique Dussel have rightly pointed out that universalizing Enlightenment 
discourses of the human were used against colonized subjects; the European white male 
embodied the supreme “human” and classified oppressed natives as never quite attaining 
human status.
4 Other scholars, including feminists such as Carol Quillen, have argued 
that modern universalisms are imperialist;
 since they arose out of Enlightenment Europe’s 
liberal humanist ideology, they are incapable of taking into account cultural differences 
when imposed on to non-Western contexts.
 5 Post-modernist thinkers such as Michel 
Foucault have in turn noted that because power is all encompassing, universalizing ideas 
of rights are always already implicated in hegemonic ideological systems and the power 
relations they generate, as Enlightenment humanist discourses were; even when 
                                                        
4 Enrique Dussel, The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor and the Philosophy 
of Liberation, trans. Eduardo Mendieta, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996). 
   
5 Citing feminist theorists Marnia Lazreg, Rey Chow, and Uma Narayan as positive examples, Quillen 
suggests that in writing about “the human self” one must convey a self embedded in human relations and 
social structures. This means that one should “write about a part of the ‘non-West’ from a perspective that 
sees a historical connection between Western liberal humanism and European domination.” See Carol 
Quillen, “Feminist Theory, Justice and the Lure of the Human,” Signs, 21:1 (Fall, 2001), 100.   
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universalizing humanisms posit themselves as transcendent, they always vary according 
to the vested interests within which they are articulated.
 6  
As I argue in my introduction, the dismissal of modern humanisms because of 
their supposedly inevitable implication in relations of colonial power ignores the 
presence of alternative non-imperialist humanisms of the kind outlined by Vyasa or pre-
colonial Zulu tribes. Instead, due to an exclusive focus on nationalist humanisms such as 
Gandhi’s, all non-Western modern universalizing constructions are assumed to be 
derivative discourses, products of the appropriation of hegemonic ideologies by the 
colonized.
7 Such an assumption reduces non-Western histories solely to homogenized 
relations of colonial power, with colonial rule seen as bringing about a complete rupture 
from the past; local power relations originating from pre-colonial times, and regional 
movements of subaltern resistance against them, suffer a historiographical 
disappearance.
8 The corollary is that modernity itself is seen as a Western import into 
colonized societies, a set of ideas and ways of life that must be appropriated by the 
                                                        
6 Foucault argues that modern humanist ideas have always already “been invented…as 
instruments of a certain political and economic power.” See Noam Chomsky, Michel Foucault, 
The Chomsky-Foucault Debate: On Human Nature, (New York: New Press, 2006), 54. 
 
7 See Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist thought and the colonial world: a derivative discourse? (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1986) for an example of a text that focuses on the ways that 
nationalist thinking based itself on colonial discourses even while it pretended to return to a pure 
indigenous past. While this is a fair critique of nationalist thought, I argue that the overwhelming 
focus on colonialist discourses has led to the overlooking of those indigenous thinkers that did not 
draw on them. 
 
8 For a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon see Sumit Sarkar, “The Decline of the 
Subaltern in Subaltern Studies” in Reading Subaltern Studies, ed. David Ludden, (Delhi: 
Permanent Black, 2002). 
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colonized and made their own through a creative cultural syncretism.
9 This dissertation 
responds to these debates by highlighting the value of alternative indigenous 
universalisms to Indian and South African movements for social justice. I demonstrate 
how subaltern writers conceptualized modern universalisms independently of 
Enlightenment European influence, from within the cultural epistemes that permeated 
their consciousnesses, and harnessed them against the powerful groups in pre-colonial 
and colonial societies. Following Antonio Gramsci, I define “subalterns” as marginalized 
peoples who inhabit liminal spaces and who have little or no social, political, cultural, or 
geographic access to, or influence on, those who exercise hegemonic power.
10 
Drawing on these subaltern writings and oral literatures, I attempt to recuperate a 
critical humanism for the work of literary critics and philosophers, in the process pointing 
to ways of studying non-western colonized societies and cultures that are not implicated 
in colonialist knowledge systems. I do so by classifying marginalized universalizing 
philosophies as “contextual universalisms.” These were universalizing discourses that 
reflected shared understandings of values such as individual freedom, rationality, and 
democracy but were manifested differently according to historical and cultural 
specificities. They were universalizing because they posited transcendent concepts of the 
human that sought to include rather than exclude difference within the category of 
“humanity.” And they were contextual because they were rooted in local cultures and 
                                                        
9 Amitav Ghosh argues something similar to what I am asserting in reaction to Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s theorization of alternative modernities along these lines in Provincializing Europe. 
Amitav Ghosh and Dipesh Chakrabarty, “A Correspondence on Provincializing Europe,” in 
Radical History Review 83, (Spring 2002). 
 
10 Antonio Gramsci argues that subalterns suffer under the hegemonic domination of a ruling elite class 
that is part of the “state.” The latter denies them participation in, and access to, the local history and 
culture of nation. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell 
Smith, (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), 52.   x 
arose in response to local networks of power, not solely in relation to European 
colonialist hegemonic discourses that were imposed from above.    
Along with “contextual universalisms,” this project explores another closely 
related theme, that of “indigenous modernities.” Any exploration of modernity must also 
consider its ideological underpinnings, or the universalizing manifestations of humanist 
concepts such as rationality, individual freedom, and democratic ideals with which 
Enlightenment philosophers buttressed their visions of new social orders. My assertion 
that these modern humanisms were also “contextual,” arising in non-Western locations 
independently of European influence, complicates the idea of modernity itself;  
“contextual universalisms” suggests that humanist modernities can no longer be seen as a 
Western import into pre-colonial societies, but as regional phenomena tied to local 
relations of power and resistance. I contend, then, that a set of radical humanisms, in 
context specific manifestations but nevertheless comparable to Enlightenment 
understandings of universalisms, were producing alternative modernities in pre-colonial 
and colonial India and South Africa.  
Universalizing Humanisms 
As I demonstrate in this dissertation, these “contextual universalisms” were 
universalizing because they outlined an inclusive category of the human that did not 
differentiate people according to social, religious, and racial specificities. Nineteenth 
century subaltern devotional poetry crafted a deliberately progressive category of the 
“human” in resistance to the discrimination that tribals and lower castes in colonial 
Orissa faced from entrenched caste systems. According to this humanist episteme, people   xi 
had to be valued based on their actions rather than their pre-ordained religious or social 
status. This devotional poetry thus legitimized all types of mindful labor over socially 
sanctioned hierarchies; even the previously “inhuman” low caste toilet cleaner and tribal 
laborer was just as human as the high caste, literate Brahmin valorized by the colonial 
and nationalist authorities. In South African praise poetry, the category of humanity was 
also galvanized to posit a radical universalism. Nineteenth century praise poets used 
communal performances to insist that “ a chief was a chief through other people” because 
“a person was a person through other people,” thereby maintaining a system of 
democratic universal participation in the political sphere. The defining of the self through 
recognizing the humanity of everyone else also extended to the creation of inclusive, 
communal agricultural economies and systems of property ownership. Finally, nineteenth 
century Indian feminist bildungsromane posited a universalizing conception of humanity 
that explicitly went beyond gender, race, skin color, or religion. Instead, a person was 
“human” simply by virtue of their physical presence and a capacity to register emotion. 
Unlike other humanisms that were universalizing only in name, these subaltern value 
systems and the movements of popular resistance they spawned were truly so; they were 
radical humanisms.  
These alternative universalisms suggest that we take the universalizing potential 
of rights, the idea that they are universal capacities, - as opposed to any claim that they 
are always already universally valid - seriously. As Noam Chomsky puts it: “I think it 
would be a great shame to put aside entirely the somewhat more abstract and 
philosophical task of trying to draw the connections between a concept of human nature 
that gives full scope to freedom and dignity and creativity and other fundamental human   xii 
characteristics, and to relate that to some notion of social structure in which these 
properties could be realized and in which meaningful human life could take place.…one 
can and must give the argument that the social revolution that you’re trying to achieve is 
in the ends of justice, is in the ends of realizing fundamental human needs.”
11 
Contextual Humanisms 
The radical humanisms I analyze in Indian devotional poetry, South African 
praise poetry, and the Indian epic-bildungsroman were contextual because they reflected 
shared discursive understandings of core humanist concepts that nevertheless arose in 
culturally specific manifestations. In separating humanist concepts from the different 
ways they are manifested in instrumental relations, I contest post-structuralist assertions 
that universalizing notions, like any language, are inextricable from the ends they are put 
to. Instead, I argue that core humanist ideas are not intrinsically contaminated by power, 
although they may be put to imperialist ends.  The indigenous literatures I examine 
therefore reflect shared understandings of core ideas like individual freedom, rationality, 
and democracy that differ in their specificities according to the instrumental relations 
within which they are conceptualized and articulated. 
For instance, in Chapter Four, I demonstrate that there was a shared understanding 
of individual freedom in both 18
th century Europe and pre-colonial India as the ability to 
act without constraint. However, in Kantian thought, the capacity for free action was 
based on a conscious will harnessed against the mystifying religious hierarchies of Kant’s 
time, while in much indigenous Indian thought it was formulated in relation to the effects 
                                                        
11 See Noam Chomsky, Michel Foucault, The Chomsky-Foucault Debate: On Human Nature, 
(New York: New Press, 2006), 57.   xiii 
of a will, that resided outside one’s consciousness, on the physical body. Similarly, as I 
demonstrate in Chapter Two, the core idea of rationality in 19
th century tribal India and 
Enlightenment Europe was the ability to distinguish magical, mythical ways of being in 
the world from those that were not. However, in secular Europe this rationality was 
instrumentalized solely through the mind, while in some Indian philosophical thought, 
such rational distinctions could be embodied in ritual. And, in Chapter Three, I 
demonstrate that Enlightenment philosophers and South-African Zulu tribes had shared 
but independently developed understandings of democracy as a political system in which 
subjects decided who ruled them, and how. However, while democratic decision-making 
in much of the West was understood as a majoritarian system, the Zulus continued debate 
until a consensus-based resolution was achieved; in the very different instrumental 
context of pre-colonial South Africa, the chief carried out a “democratic” decision 
making process by consulting with, and heeding, the opinions of other leaders and his 
subjects. These indigenous epistemes, then, clearly demonstrate shared understandings of 
core universalizing concepts such as individual freedom, rationality, and democracy even 
through they are contextually grounded in the terminologies and cultural specificities of 
different instrumental relations.  
These universalisms were also contextual because they were grassroots responses 
to local relations of power, not imposed from above as Enlightenment humanisms were in 
the colonies. The indigenous universalisms I consider were cultural constructions just like 
European humanisms were but were subject to very different historical investments; they 
were harnessed against entrenched religious hierarchies and local dictatorships in 
peripheral areas where colonial power had not taken hold, as well as against nationalist   xiv 
and colonialist groups in more central areas. Their birth in response to local power 
structures and cultural realities is most evident in the unique literary genres through 
which they were articulated. Indian devotional poetry, South African oral praise poetry, 
and the Indian epic-bildungsroman were precisely tailored to produce movements of 
popular resistance against the various oppressions their subaltern authors faced. Anti-
caste Indian devotional poems, and anti-dictatorial South African praise poems generated 
collective action because they were easily memorized and chanted communally, by virtue 
of their rhyming patterns, alliteration, and uniform meters, quickly building crowds and 
adding to their movements’ support. The epic-Indian bildungsroman, meanwhile, used 
the subcontinental, centuries old, kavya
12 genre of epic poetry to complicate the linear 
narrative of the bildungsroman, and appeal to indigenous structures of feeling familiar to 
subaltern psyches. 
Indigenous Humanist Modernities 
In the chapters that follow, I demonstrate how understanding these indigenous 
humanisms as “contextual universalisms” has implications for current understandings of 
modernity. I argue that these contextual universalisms problematize previous 
understandings of modernity as a colonial import into non-Western societies. They reveal 
that distinctly “modern” universalisms such as rationality, individual freedom and 
democratic ideals were arising in pre-colonial and colonized societies relatively 
                                                        
12 Kavya refers to the Sanskrit literary style used by Indian court poets flourishing from the first 
half of the seventh century AD. This literary style is characterized by abundant usage of figures 
of speech, metaphors, similes, and hyperbole to create its emotional effects. The end result is a 
short lyrical work, court epic, narrative or dramatic work. "Kavya" can refer to the style or the 
completed body of literature. Asvaghosa (c. 80-150 AD), a philosopher and poet considered the 
father of Sanskrit drama, is attributed with first using the word. 
   xv 
independently from much Enlightenment thought, in forms usually denigrated as pre-
modern and insignificant. 
Charles Taylor has theorized modernity as consisting of a “moral order” 
constituted by ideas about ethical ways of being and systems of social organization. He 
argues that the project of modernization entailed the translation of this moral order into 
social imaginaries, or into the understandings, background practices, and common 
expectations that give people a sense of a shared group life. For the first time, politics 
began to create economic, public, and social spheres that were meant to work in the 
service of individuals’ rights. The new moral principle of a general equality among 
individuals spread to ever more areas of social life, transforming  “the social imaginary,” 
the collective life of the people.
13   
 I demonstrate that a moral order of modernity, which consisted of universalizing 
constructions of humanity in the West, also existed in the non-West at different geo-
historical moments, relatively independently from Western humanisms. This alternative 
radical moral order in pre-colonial and colonized societies, grounded in indigenous forms 
of knowledge, makes a case for the presence of alternative modernities, or the 
development of indigenous public and economic spheres that also emphasized the 
collective good rather than powerful vested interests.  
In the process of revealing these alternative modern social orders, the South 
African and Indian “contextual universalisms” I examine function not simply as aesthetic 
forms but philosophical modes that produced rational political and social action towards 
                                                        
13 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2004).   xvi 
the creation of “modern” societies. Thus they force readers to take seriously the epistemic 
categories posed by the milieus themselves. For instance, “religious” devotional poetry 
that theorizes rational social organization allows us to rethink previous scholarly 
divisions between philosophy and literature, “tradition” and “modernity” and the 
“religious” and “secular,” revealing modern, secular, and philosophical ideas occurring in 
texts usually considered traditional, religious folklore by Western knowledge systems.  
A serious critical debate about the epistemic validity of universalizing humanisms 
requires clarity about what forms universalisms took in the Western as well as non-
Western world, and about how these non- European universalisms conceptualized ideas 
of moral modern social orders from within their own cultural realities. In the process of 
outlining these alternative universalisms, I hope to develop a post-enlightenment, 
historically grounded, critical humanism for the work of scholars in the humanities. My 
notion of contextually universalist modernities also casts renewed light on the transitions 
that marked the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – the colonization and decolonization 
of the non-Western world, the setting up of modern institutions such as democracy in 
these regions, and the kinds of essentialist identity categories used to describe non-
Western peoples in the process; what alternative modern histories were subsumed to 
produce these colonialist narratives? How does one talk about the alternative humanisms 
that buttressed these alternative modernities without resorting to cultural or historical 
relativism? And how can the remnants of these alternative modernities inform debates 
about social justice today? The answers to these questions, I believe, can help us better 
realize the truly “modern” societies that human rights instruments seek, and too often fail, 
to produce.    1 
 
Introduction 
 
1It was a frigid day in Ithaca, New York, in November 2008. I had been glued to the 
television screen in my small student apartment for hours, taking breaks only to watch the 
hordes of students who ran past my window every few minutes, shouting joyfully and 
waving the American flag. America had just elected its first black president. However, 
the unprecedented elation of that moment was reversed for me when, a few months later, 
I realized that not much had changed; listening to the radio, I heard an influential, 
conservative American radio host, political commentator, and opinion leader, Rush 
Limbaugh, assert that Obama was "more African in his roots than American" and that he 
was "behaving like an African colonial despot."
2 Limbaugh was drawing on a common 
colonial stereotype, that Africans were incapable of creating and maintaining fair and 
equal systems of political rule, and of sustaining the democracy that was one of the 
qualities of being truly “human.” These kinds of prejudices confirm Africanist scholar 
Achille Mbembe’s assertion that  “Africa is never seen as possessing things and attributes 
properly part of “human nature.” Or, when it is, its things and attributes are generally of 
lesser value, little importance, and poor quality. It is this elementariness and 
primitiveness that makes Africa all that is incomplete, mutilated, and unﬁnished, its 
history reduced to a series of setbacks of nature in its quest for humankind.”
3 Limbaugh’s 
                                                        
 
2 “The Rush Limbaugh Show,” Rush Limbaugh, accessed June 26 2009, 
http://thinkprogress.org/2009/06/26/limbaugh-obama-colonial-despot/. 
 
 
3 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 1.   2 
assertion and Mbembe’s commentary reminded me of the charges of oriental despotism 
with which colonial authorities in a very different time and place had stereotyped their 
Indian subjects, also denying them of “fully human” or “modern” status. Together, they 
renewed my interest in how African and Indian cultures had envisioned their own 
“humanity” before and during colonial rule, and dealt with the “inhuman” charges 
leveled against them.   
It was with these unresolved questions in mind that I revisited Dipesh Chakrabarty’s 
account of modernity in India, Provincializing Europe, a widely-cited work of 
“postcolonial studies,” and came across the following passage: “modern social critiques 
of caste, oppressions of women, the lack of rights for laboring and subaltern classes in 
India, and so on – and, in fact, the very critique of colonialism itself” is “unthinkable 
except as a legacy, partially, of how Enlightenment Europe was appropriated in the 
subcontinent.  The Indian constitution tellingly begins by repeating certain universal 
Enlightenment themes celebrated, say, in the American constitution. And it is salutary to 
remember that the writings of the most trenchant critic of the institution of 
‘untouchability’ in British India refer us back to some originally European ideas about 
liberty and human equality.”
4 Were these assumptions about African despotism on one 
hand, and “liberty and human equality” being “originally” Euro-American ideas on the 
other, justified? How could I reconcile characterizations of African despotism with what I 
had been reading about pre-colonial Zulu democratic systems? How could I make sense 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
4 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 
4-5. 
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of Chakrabarty’s claims about ideas of “liberty” and “human equality” being colonial 
imports in light of the pre-colonial movements for religious and social equality that I had 
come across on my annual visits to Rajasthan? What, for instance, of the medieval female 
saint, Mirabai, who used a vernacular language to harness a mass movement against the 
wealth, ignorance, self-interest and pride of the upper castes, temple hierarchies, and 
patriarchal social structures? These historical figures and events sounded to me just as 
“modern” as Enlightenment ideas about human equality. They did not, then, fit scholarly 
accounts of alternative modernities as colonial imports into “traditional” societies. 
 This dissertation concerns itself with precisely these fissures in current accounts 
of “modernity,” with alternative, indigenous notions of that same phenomenon, as well as 
with the humanisms that buttressed these alternative modernities. Drawing in part on 
such scholars as Sanjay Subrahmanyam, V.Narayana Rao, David Shulman, and Satya 
Mohanty, I redefine modernity as a descriptive word for any period of radical rupture and 
resistance against past orthodoxies.
 5 Furthermore, I add that such modernities are periods 
that question the present by insisting on radical humanist values. I do so by investigating 
the modern “universal” ideas and values that define Enlightenment humanism-- such as 
secular rationality, individual freedom, and the capacity for democratic thought —and 
argue that contextualized versions of these notions are also articulated by subalterns 
                                                        
5 I am following the example of other efforts in this vein such as V. Narayana Rao, David 
Shulman and Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s readings of South Indian folk epics, courtly poetry, and 
prose narratives to argue the existence of modern historical narrative in pre-colonial India. V. 
Narayana Rao, Sanjay Subrahmanyam, David Shulman, Textures of Time, (London: Other Press, 
2003) I am also referring to Satya Mohanty’s literary reading of the Oriya Lakshmi Purana for a 
theorization of a pre-colonial modernity containing both a feminist message and a radical 
message of caste equality. See Satya Mohanty, “Alternative Modernities and Medieval Indian 
Literature: the Oriya Lakshmi Purana As Radical Pedagogy,” Diacritics 38.3 (Fall 2008): 3–21 
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within colonized cultures independently of Enlightenment epistemes. I thereby add to 
emerging discussions of “indigenous,” “alternative” modernities that aspire to 
“provincialize” European accounts of historical progress without resorting to cultural or 
historical relativism. As Sanjay Subrahmanyam, V. Narayana Rao, David Shulman, and 
Satya P. Mohanty have argued,
6 such indigenous texts reveal that these modern ideas are 
not colonial imports, or even necessarily products of the colonial encounter. This means 
that modernity, as Susan Stanford Friedman puts it, “need no longer reside solely in a 
specific set of institutional, ideological, or aesthetic characteristics emergent in the post-
Renaissance West, radiating globally along the pathways of empire and postcoloniality, 
and appearing as pale copies of western genius. Instead, a particularized modernity 
located in space and time could potentially emerge wherever there was rapid change or a 
consciousness of newness.”
7 Instead of starting with the question, “How were 
Enlightenment ideas appropriated in India to produce an alternative modernity that was 
just as Indian as it was European?” as Chakrabarty does, I therefore reverse the critical 
itinerary. Along with Subrahmanyam,
8 I ask: “Where else might accelerated societal 
                                                        
6 See previous footnote. 
 
7 Susan Stanford Friedman, “Definitional Excursions: The Meanings of 
Modern/Modernity/Modernism,” Modernity/Modernism 8.3 (September 2001): 503. 
 
8 Sanjay Subrahmanyam writes that modernity is “historically a global and conjunctural 
phenomenon, not a virus that spreads from one place to another. It is located in a series of 
historical processes that brought hitherto relatively isolated societies into contact, and we must 
seek its roots in a set of diverse phenomena—the Mongol dream of world conquest, European 
voyages of exploration, activities of Indian textile traders in the diaspora.”  Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam, “Hearing Voices: Vignettes of Early Modernity in South Asia, 1400-1750,” 
Daedalus 127. 3 (1998): 99 –100.  See also the other essays in this volume: Shmuel N. Eisenstadt 
and Wolfgang Schluchter (eds.), “Early Modernities.” The volume critiques the idea that the 
Western modernity was the only one, and the one through which other cultural modernities must 
be evaluated. See also a follow up special issue of the journal,  “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus 
129, no. 1 (2000). For another similar argument see Charles S. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth 
Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” American Historical Review 105,   5 
change brought about by a combination of new technologies, knowledge revolutions, 
state formations, and expanding intercultural contacts contribute to radical questioning 
and dismantling of traditional ontologies, epistemologies, and institutional structures?”
9 
What were the indigenous humanist ideas that lay behind these alternative modernities? 
What power structures were they arising in response to? And how did they challenge and 
change colonialist epistemologies? The answers to these questions in many Indian and 
South African texts reveal that the humanist ideas that buttressed modernity were 
scattered, interactive, and multiple. They suggest that universalizing, “modern” ideals 
may have preceded the Enlightenment temporally and spatially, existing in various geo-
historical locations, in context specific forms, or as “contextual universalisms.” 
Alternative Indigenous Humanisms 
I develop this suggestion by arguing that these alternative modernities are defined 
through “indigenous” universalizing notions of rights, grounded in distinct local and 
intellectual cultures, very different from those used by colonialists or even by hegemonic 
nationalist groups in their own societies. For instance, Bhīma’s radical devotional verse 
expressed its rational theory of social equality by drawing on centuries old literary and 
“religious” social currents such as tantric Nagarjuna Buddhism, articulated in the pre-
medieval “intentional,” or “twilight language” (sandhya basha) of “upside down” 
expressions (ulta-bamsi). These indigenous cultures were very different from the 
rationalities imposed from above in the esoteric Sanskrit of the higher castes, or the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
no. 3 (2000): 1–47. 
 
9 Friedman, “Definitional Excursions: The Meanings of Modern/Modernity/Modernism,” 507. 
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scholarly scientific English of nationalist discourses. Similarly, Zulu poets drew on 
indigenous folk literatures, grounded in pre-colonial, communal traditions of oral story-
telling, to produce widespread cultures of critique that endorsed democratic rule and 
challenged misuses of political power. Thus the proverb “a person is a person through 
other people,” was intimately linked to the lesser known saying “a chief is a chief through 
other people,” reflected in praise poetry as well as widely circulated folk tales about 
chiefs who were deemed inadequate to rule because they did not share crops, milk, and 
cattle – metaphors of power and resources -- with their subjects. And finally, Krupabai 
Satthianadhan’s idea of embodied agency, imagined as residing in the universal physical 
body, drew on universalizing, affective depictions of the natural world in the ancient, 
mythological kavya genre of indigenous literature to challenge the Christian valences of 
Enlightenment ideas, colonialist missionary narratives, and nationalist Hindu ideologies 
of individual freedom. In drawing on these indigenous cultural currents, these subaltern 
authors were differentiating hegemonic reformist ideologies that were imposed on them 
from above, from those that permeated their aesthetic epistemes and consciousnesses and 
were not. 
 
I elaborate that these modern “contextual universalisms” in Indian (Oriya) 
devotional poetry, Zulu folk tales and praise poetry, and the Indian Bildungsroman in 
English, are instantiated through literary devices that reflect their universalizing humanist 
assertions of rationality, democratic ideals and individual freedom. The Indian mystical 
“upside down” language asserts its rationality by deliberately posing contradictions only 
to logically resolve them. Zulu praise poems testify that “a chief is a chief through other   7 
people” through a democratic, repetitive multivocality that enacts the consensus based, 
rather than individualistic, decision-making process it propagates and supports. And the 
linear yet spiraling epic narrative of the Indian Bildungsroman posits conceptions of 
individual freedom by structurally undermining limiting colonial and nationalist 
assumptions about agentive action. The formal features of these literary expressions, 
then, are continuous with their social and philosophical messages, suggesting progressive 
ideas about the human condition that emerge from within indigenous traditions. 
Producing Popular Resistance through Alternative Humanisms 
Importantly, these subaltern authors employ specific literary devices to engender 
movements of popular resistance. Collectively chanted 19
th century Oriya devotional 
poetry, for instance, engenders mass opposition to the idea that one’s fate is pre-
determined through a blunt bhakti style that widened grassroots supports for a radical 
humanism by facilitating communal memorizing and chanting.  In a similar way, the 
communal performance of Zulu praise poetry and folktales creates a sanctioned culture of 
democratic critique. Praise poems used repetition to create a democratic multivocality, 
emphasizing the mingling of different vocal registers to present a forceful unified 
criticism. These praises communally spoke a chief into being, commenting on his 
embodiment of defining character traits in response to the entire audience’s calls to 
“Speak Him!” The recital’s fast-paced elimination of downdrift intonation also created a 
seemingly never-ending text to which criticisms could be continually added by whoever 
wished to, creating customs of democratic evaluation by eternally holding the subject 
accountable for his actions. And the Indian “epic bildungsroman” points to the masses   8 
left out by missionary and nationalist discourses of rights alike by choosing to tell her 
story in the popular literary mediums that even illiterate Indian women were familiar 
with; Satthianadhan disrupts the linear, Christianizing narrative of individual 
development in bildungsromane like Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre, instead developing 
her character using long flashbacks and spiraling narrative reminiscent of popular Hindu 
epic storytelling. These literatures, then, demonstrate that ideas of the human as they are 
crystallized in literature do not exist separately from political arenas; “the political” is 
inclusive of moral, aesthetic, and ethical aspects of culture so that universal ideas of the 
human can offer modes of resistance to colonized subjects by enabling non-hegemonic 
re-articulations of universality. In doing so, these universalizing ideas serve as powerful 
tools for the historically marginalized, including women and religious, racial and class 
minorities. 
 
To conclude, my project outlines a post-enlightenment idea of the “universal 
human” that does not conflate the core idea of the universal human with its misuses, and 
that is not limited by the parameters of Enlightenment conceptualizations of the 
“universal human.” I investigate such a post-enlightenment “universal human” through 
Indian and South African texts that assert ideas of individual freedom, rationality, and 
democratic ideals as the qualities that make one properly ‘human,’ but do so from within 
indigenous contexts independently of European humanisms. They demonstrate that the 
transcendent capacities or potentials of the “universal human” can only be realized, or 
made self-evident, through context specific, cultural mediums. While the universal 
human is imagined as being transcendent or self evident, as existing outside culture and   9 
instrumental relations, it can only come into existence in meaningful ways within specific 
cultural contexts. Joseph Slaughter makes this point to articulate what he considers the 
universal human’s inability to transcend unequal power relations, stating that “although 
human rights are presupposed to be self evident, they must be publicly and officially 
articulated as such, named as self evident to be made self evident.”
10  According to 
Slaughter human rights discourses cannot be taken for granted as “self evident” because 
they are articulated as such through the very power relations and ideologies they purport 
to overcome. In contrast, I suggest that Slaughter’s quote is a promising 
conceptualization for a different reason. Instead of demonstrating the inescapability of 
power, inadvertently, it allows for the making self-evident of multiple “contextual 
universalisms,” or articulations of the “universal human” that arise in liminal, subaltern 
spaces not rooted in any imperialist tradition. 
 
Colonialist Humanisms and Modernities in India and South Africa 
 
Any critical engagement with humanisms must first grapple with its various 
critiques. Perhaps the most well known dismissals of humanism have come from leading 
critics within the humanities such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak who have pointed out 
how universalizing humanist modernities have long been implicated in imperial civilizing 
missions.
 11 I explore the role of the colonialist “universal human” in the remaking of 
                                                        
10 Joseph Slaughter, Human Rights Inc. (Fordham: Fordham University Press, 2007), 16. 
 
11 See for example Gayatri Spivak, “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography” Subaltern 
Studies IV (Delhi: Oxford, 1985) in which Spivak highlights the colonial aggression which 
accompanied the spread of Western humanism, and comments on the use of Western humanism 
as an alibi for the development of markets and the establishment of western democracy under   10 
Indian and South African histories now. Through a critique of anti-humanist arguments, I 
then point out that the misuses of Enlightenment ideas of the human in these colonial 
contexts does not warrant the dismissal of universalizing humanisms altogether; to 
demonstrate this point, I highlight the presence of alternative, progressive “universal 
humans” in these regions before, during, and after colonialism. 
 
What is the modern discursive figure of the “universal human” that underlies 
humanisms? The “universal human” is a symbolic person who, in the Kantian 
Enlightenment tradition, is an end within him/herself, born with “inalienable rights” by 
virtue of being inherently rational and freedom loving. The “universal human” is 
imagined as being outside culture and history, and was a central force through which 
“discourses of modernity,” the scientific, rational, universalizing ideas of the “human” 
that accompanied political and industrial modernization in eighteenth and nineteenth 
century Europe, acquired their power. These discourses were considered “colonialist” 
because they were often used to justify imperialism; they were implicated in constructing 
hierarchies of racial difference between Europeans and “inferior” others who supposedly 
needed civilizing. As Ania Loomba asserts, “the growth of modern Western knowledge 
systems and the history of most ‘disciplines’ can be seen to be embedded within and 
shaped by colonial discourses.” And because these discourses of modernity were 
“colonialist,” or, as Foucault would put it, disciplinary regimes of power,
12 “the central 
                                                                                                                                                                     
imperial authority. 
  
12 Ania Loomba here draws on Michel Foucault’s claim in Discipline and Punish that “there is no 
power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowlegde, nor any knowledge that 
does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.” This means that the 
discourses that shaped the modern bourgeois European individual were made up of disciplinary   11 
figure of Western humanist and Enlightenment discourses, the humane, knowing subject 
of these regimes, now stands revealed as a white male colonialist.”
13 
 
Imperialist manifestations of the “universal human” were certainly evident in both 
South Africa and India; both had long colonial histories in which the “human” functioned 
as a colonizing tool, an ambivalent mode of resistance, a violent shaping force on 
indigenous epistemologies, and a central tool through which liberal-humanist narratives 
of modernity acquired their power. The “universal human” was appropriated by colonial 
discourses of modernity that sought to civilize the “savages,” and by nationalist 
discourses that sought to assert their own right to “universality” in their quest to remake 
themselves in line with European modernity. In doing so, nationalist groups completely 
redefined their cultures and histories because of the colonial judgment that they were not 
fully “human.”  
 
Colonialist discourses of modernity in India, such as James Mill’s History of 
British India, often characterized India as pre-modern. Indians lacked “universal” human 
qualities; they were irrational and despotic. These Orientalist discourses therefore 
periodized Indian history as culminating in the “liberating” arrival of the British. This 
temporality was buttressed by the production of numerous studies of philosophy that 
pointedly excluded any intellectual, rational thought from the non-West. Histories of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
power relations that molded bodies into agents of the state’s repressive functions. See Michel 
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, (New York: Vintage, 1995): 27 
 
13 Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 60. 
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Western philosophy invariably began with the Greeks and avoided the issue of African 
and Oriental influences on Greek philosophical ideas. The result is a sharp distinction, 
still alive in the academy today, between modern/philosophy/rational/the West, in other 
words the qualities of the “universal human,” and, pre-modern/mysticism/irrational/the 
non-West. In South Africa, the Dutch and British colonists created similar binaries in 
their characterization of Africans as less than human, a state of affairs that led anti-
apartheid activist, Steve Biko, to point out that African cultures had been painted as 
irreconcilably Other and inhuman, with both colonists and nationalists producing “the 
thickest of volumes on some of the strangest subjects – even “the feeding habits of the 
Urban Africans.”
14   
 
Such characterizations changed Indian and South African religions and cultures 
dramatically. As Richard King has shown, the current categorization “Hinduism” is a 
construct of western scholars who, upon encountering Indian culture, created what they 
perceived as a more “human” religion along the lines of Christian conceptions of religion. 
Orientalist scholars sought out Indian equivalents of their own Christian culture (i.e. 
sacred texts and authority figures), and from these (largely the Vedas and the Brahmin 
caste, respectively) created the "religion" of the Hindus, or "Hinduism." Colonial 
authorities and the upper caste nationalist groups they buttressed classified other vibrant 
subcontinental religious and cultural traditions as “superstitious,” undeveloped forms of 
religiosity.  In doing so, they abetted the colonial exploitation of Indians who did not fit 
                                                        
14 Steve Biko, “Some African Cultural Concepts” in I Write What I Like, (London: Heinemann, 
1987), 40. 
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into the Christianized Hinduism.
15 In a similar vein, Paul Landau argues that missionaries 
used Christian notions to highlight the “falsity” of African practices, reducing them to 
pale and faulty imitations of a Christian original.
16 
The result in both places was a nationalist attempt to reclaim a lost humanity by 
redefining themselves in light of colonialist cultures and by trying to parse out exactly 
how they were also human but different. In South Africa, apartheid rule triggered the 
Black Consciousness Movement, led by Steve Biko, which urged blacks to reclaim their 
“humanness.” Biko proclaimed to his black brothers that "man, you are okay as you are, 
begin to look upon yourself as a human being."
17 Part of the insight of the Black 
Consciousness Movement was, then, that black liberation could not only come from 
imagining and fighting for structural political changes, as older movements like the ANC 
did, but, as Dan Magaziner has argued, also from a psychological transformation in the 
minds of black people themselves, backed by theological arguments about individual 
self-worth.
18 Ironically, however, such movements often also led to nativist and 
                                                        
15 Richard King, Orientalism and Religion, (London: Routledge, 1999). 
 
16 Landau, Paul, “‘Religion’ and Christian Conversion in African History: A New Model,” 
Journal of Religious History, 23, 1 (February 1999), 8-30. See also Leon De Kock, Civilising 
Barbarians, (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1996).    
17 The term Black Consciousness stems from American educator W. E. B. Du Bois's insistence 
that black people take pride in their blackness as an important step in their personal liberation. 
This line of thought was also reflected in the Pan Africanist, Marcus Garvey, as well as Harlem 
Renaissance philosopher Alain Locke and in the salons of the Nardal sisters in Paris. Biko's 
understanding of these thinkers was further shaped through the lens of postcolonial thinkers such 
as Frantz Fanon, Léopold Senghor, and Aimé Césaire who articulated a Black nativism called 
Negritude in response to colonialism. The aim of this global movement of black thinkers was to 
restore black consciousness and African consciousness, which they felt had been suppressed 
under colonialism.  
 
18 Daniel Magaziner, The Law and the Prophets: Black Consciousness in South Africa, 1968-
1977, (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2010).   14 
essentializing conceptions of Black selfhood. Biko emphasized that “a sincere attempt 
should be made at emphasizing the authentic cultural aspects of the African people by 
themselves…in essence even today one can easily find the fundamental aspects of the 
pure African culture in the present day African.”
19 Ironically, the need to discover an 
“authentic” pre-colonial past that represented a “pure” African culture remained stuck in 
the very same essentializing colonialist categories that colonized groups strove to break 
free of.  
A similar essentializing attempt at achieving “humanness” was made by Hindu 
nationalists in India. As I demonstrate in Chapter Two, in the late nineteenth century, the 
Hindu reform organization, the Brahmo Samaj, and thinkers such as Vivekananda, set out 
to challenge characterizations of India as pre-modern and lacking in “universal” values 
such as rationality and freedom through “an invention of tradition” that sought to 
highlight the inherent rational monism that was supposedly central to Hinduism. They 
also sought to contest colonial charges that Indian women were oppressed by Hindu 
tradition by asserting that women were the goddesses of their homes. These ideologies, 
while remaining entrapped in colonialist logic, also adversely affected women and lower 
caste and tribal groups who had to fit into them at any cost. As Janaki Nair points out, the 
result was that popular female worlds of culture which did not fit this frame of femininity 
and which had long been the location of a robust critique of patriarchy, as well as 
expressions of female desire, were sidelined.
20 For example, upper caste women’s 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
19 Biko, “Some African Cultural Concepts,” 40. 
 
20 Janaki Nair, Women and Law in Colonial India, (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1996), 149. 
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eroticism in song was attacked by the Bengali bhadralok, the upper caste middle class, 
who wished to minimize contact between their women and these.
21 Partha Chatterjee thus 
suggests that “the new patriarchy which nationalist discourse set up as a hegemonic 
construct culturally distinguished itself not only from the West but also from the masses 
of its own people.”
22  
 
Recuperating the Universal Human: Contesting Foucauldian Anti-Humanist Claims  
 
While the universal human has been implicated in such colonialist paradigms, and 
while postcolonial critiques of these misuses have been insightful, I argue against the 
complete dismissal of humanisms by post-structuralist Foucauldian critics. The latter 
have insisted that universalizing discourses can never transcend the subjective, unequal 
relations between individuals and nations.  One of the most recent variations of this 
argument has been Pheng Cheah’s Inhuman Conditions which argues that the humanities 
should “question” the idea of the universal human and even “give it up”
23 because the 
terms dignity, freedom and rationality which constitute the “human” change their 
meaning according to social, political and economic contexts and according to the people 
who have the power to realize them, people who are themselves products of the 
                                                        
21 Sumanta Banerjee, “Marginalization of Women’s Popular Culture in Nineteenth Century 
Bengal,” in Recasting Women, ed. Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid, (New Delhi: Kali for 
Women, 1989), 127 – 179. See also her book, Sumanta Banerjee, The Parlour and the Streets: 
Elite and Popular Culture in Nineteenth Century Calcutta, (Calcutta: Seagull Books, 1998). 
 
22  Partha Chatterjee, “Nationalist Resolution of the Woman Question,” in Recasting Women, 
edited by Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid, 251.  
 
23 Pheng Cheah, Inhuman Conditions, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 9. 
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inequality engendered by power.
24 Demonstrating the arbitrariness of the meaning of the 
terms that make up the “human,” Cheah draws on Saussure to claim that language itself is 
“arbitrary.” “It is radically mutable for no reason at all.”
25 “The arbitrariness of its signs” 
renders it inhuman.
26 And since humans are constituted by language, Cheah argues that 
the human cannot be produced without the inhuman; the human is itself a product effect 
of the inhuman.
27  
 
However, arguments that the “universal human” should be abandoned because the 
“arbitrariness of its signs” produces radical differences in its social use overlook the fact 
that all linguistic meanings, not just that of the “universal human,” change according to 
differing social contexts. Does that mean, then, that all language should be abandoned? 
Since the answer is obviously no, the real question that emerges is: does the term 
“human” completely cease to refer to any common or “universal” idea when socially 
contingent meanings are attached to it in varying ways and in different contexts? My 
analysis of indigenous literary texts shows that the universal human does have common 
referents in South African and Indian cultures. The imagining of universal human 
                                                        
24 Cheah shows how Asian governments, Western powers and NGOs all subscribe to the notion of ‘dignity’ 
but all see very different outcomes as realizations of it, each discrediting the other by pointing out that the 
opponent’s vision of human rights is in fact contaminated by its particular site of emergence. However, 
while Cheah’s contestation that rights terms like ‘dignity’ and ‘freedom’ have no fixed meaning relies on 
the idea that different people all have varying understandings of ‘dignity’ according to their own 
positionality, the three examples of global actors that Cheah cites to support the emptiness of the term 
‘dignity’ in fact do have a shared understanding of ‘dignity;’ all argue that their version is the most true to 
‘dignity;’ ‘all are grounded in the Kantian notion of moral respect for dignity as an end in itself and 
something of absolute worth… as the supreme value that transcends all material interests or empirical 
inclinations.’ (158) Shared discourses, then, do amount to some level of shared meaning that gesture to an 
acceptance of what constitutes the ‘universal human.’ Cheah, Inhuman Conditions, 157-158. 
 
25 Cheah, Inhuman Conditions, 9. 
 
26 Cheah, Inhuman Conditions, 9. 
 
27 Cheah, Inhuman Conditions, 230. 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capacities and potentials suggest shared understandings of concepts such as “individual 
freedom” and “dignity” even though their exact constituents and the terms used to 
express them may vary according to cultural contexts. For instance, as I mention in my 
preface, Zulu praise poets clearly think of democratic rule, similar to Western 
conceptions, as a system where power is shared between the governor and governed, and 
where subjects have a right to decide how they are ruled. However, Zulu praise poets 
envision democratic behavior as a consensus based system of decision making as 
opposed to the majoritarian ways of determining political outcomes in the West. Both are 
clearly “democratic” modes of government but differ in their contextual manifestations. 
As I argue, such a concept of “universal humanity” that manifests itself differently 
according to various historical and social contexts suggests exciting ways of 
reconceptualizing the field of Postcolonial Studies by recognizing certain Enlightenment, 
as well as non-European, universalizing humanisms as valuable instantiations of 
progressive modernities in their own right.  
 
Recuperating the Universal Human: Going Beyond the Colonial Discourse Model in 
Postcolonial Studies 
 
However, postcolonial scholarship has also dismissed universalizing indigenous 
humanisms on the grounds that colonial power was so totalizing that it was impossible to 
theorize colonized lives outside its framework. This “colonial discourse model” of 
analysis also draws on post-structuralist Foucauldian approaches that claim that all 
cultural texts can only be derived from the dominant colonial discourses, as the   18 
nationalist discourses that arose in response to them were. Edward Said’s Orientalism, in 
which the Orient is reduced to a linguistic discourse produced by the West, initiated, and 
is perhaps the most influential example of, this trend. 
Following Said, much post-colonial theory has mainly concerned itself with the 
analysis of colonial discourse, particularly the ways it wholly shaped the resistance of, 
and relationships between, the colonized and the colonizers. Thus, Gayatri Spivak 
famously answers the question “Can the Subaltern Speak?” negatively, claiming that the 
subaltern cannot speak because her attempts at resistance are always circumscribed by, 
and articulated within, discourses of power.
28 Homi Bhabha has also focused on the all -
encompassing nature of colonial discourse, arguing that in the process of being 
“civilized” into the “universal humans” represented by their colonizers, the colonized 
appropriated colonial discourse to mimic their oppressors. In Bhabha’s account, the 
colonized represent authorized versions of otherness, and "end up emerging as 
inappropriate colonial subjects...[who], by now producing a partial vision of the 
colonizer's presence,” de-stabilize the discursive centrality and purity of colonial 
subjectivity.
29 This mimicry results in a hybridity that subverts the narratives of colonial 
power and dominant cultures, contaminating the latter with the linguistic and racial 
differences of the native self. Resistance can thus be seen, in Bhabha's interpretation, as a 
                                                        
28 As Spivak writes of an Indian female independence fighter who kills herself rather than undertake 
a political assasination, “the subaltern as female cannot be heard or read” because she is read 
“through the discourse of the male leaders and participants in the independence movement” or, by 
her female family members, “ as a case of illicit love.” The latter proves that “there is no space from 
which the sexed subaltern subject can speak.” Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern 
Speak?” in Colonial Discourse/Post­colonial Theory, ed. Laura Chrisman and Patrick Williams, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 104. 
 
29 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, (New York: Routledge, 1994), 126. 
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counter-narrative that is produced from within colonialist discourses, a critique of the 
canon from within, rather than arising from pre-colonial cultural sources and realities.  
Even critics such as Parama Roy, who have extended the latter studies of the 
colonial condition, have still concerned themselves primarily with colonial subjectivities 
that were defined in relation to elite colonialist and nationalist power groups. For 
example, Roy examines a Muslim actress's emulation of a Hindu/Indian mother goddess 
alongside an Irishwoman's assumption of Hindu feminine celibacy to consider the ways 
in which questions of power, originality, and impersonation function, not just for the 
"western" or "westernized" subjects of Bhabha’s analysis, but across a range of identities. 
In doing so, she demonstrates how examples of colonial mimicry cut across hierarchies of 
power in ways very different from the trajectories suggested by Bhabha.
30 Nevertheless, 
even Roy’s approach examines the popular nationalist reinventions of Hindu “tradition” 
by those who had most access to colonial power, rather than the modes of resistance to 
power employed by vast swathes of marginalized humanity where these colonialist 
discourses had not taken hold. As Sumit Sarkar has argued, the approach has meant that 
the colonized “were virtually robbed of agency and held to have been capable of only 
‘derivative discourses.’”
31 
This is not to say that all post-colonialists have employed the singular “colonial 
discourse analysis” approach to the study of colonized societies. Theorists such as Anne 
                                                        
30 Parama Roy, Indian traffic: identities in question in colonial and postcolonial India, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998). 
 
31 See Sumit Sarkar, “The Decline of the Subaltern in Subaltern Studies” in Reading Subaltern 
Studies, ed. David Ludden, (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2002). 
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McClintock have carried out a critique of the discipline from within, pointing out the 
variety of agencies represented by the colonized that did not stem from the discursive and 
physical presence of the colonizers. McClintock notes the inability of existing 
disciplinary frameworks to give these marginalized subjectivities critical attention; while 
postcolonial theory aims to pluralize histories so that the colonized have an epistemically 
just place within it, the field has too often ended up subsuming heterogeneous histories to 
the single, linear and Eurocentric narrative of global imperial expansion. Along with 
other post-colonial scholars, and scholars of alternative modernities,
32 she argues that 
even the term “post-colonialism” confers on colonialism the status of universal history, 
while defining non-European cultures only in relation to that history. 
33 
Learning from Early Subaltern Studies 
Subaltern historians such as Rosalind O’Hanlon, David Washbrook, Sumit Sarkar, 
and Ranajit Guha have also complained about how “Said’s views regarding the 
                                                        
32 For another critique of the term “post-colonial,” see Ella Shohat, "Notes on the Post‐Colonial," Social 
Text 31/32 (1992): 99‐113. Shohat raises questions about the term’s ahistorical and universalizing 
deployments, and its potentially depoliticizing implications. Arif Dirlik’s well known critique of   
post‐colonial studies also points out the discipline’s “excluding from its scope most of those who 
inhabit or hail from postcolonial societies. It does not account for the attractions of modernization 
and nationalism to vast numbers in Third World populations, let alone to those marginalized by 
national incorporation in the global economy.” See Arif Dirlik, “The Postcolonial Aura” in 
Postcolonialisms: An Anthology of Cultural Theory and Criticism, ed. Supriya Nair, Gaurav Gajanan 
Desai, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 568.  
 
Alternative modernities scholars (see footnote 8) have also made critiques of post-colonial 
studies’ epistemic centering of the Western world even as it seeks to do the opposite, and used 
these insights as a springboard to outline global modernities. This dissertation builds on their 
work. See also Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar “On Alternative Modernities” and Charles Taylor 
“Two Theories of Modernity” in Alternative Modernities, ed. Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, 
(Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2001)  
 
33 Anne McClintock, 'The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term “Postcolonialism,”' Social Text 
32/32 (1992): 84–98. 
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overwhelming nature of post-Enlightenment colonial power-knowledge” have ended up 
obscuring the complexity of pre-colonial cultures and societies. This historiography, 
“dominated by elitism – colonialist elitism and bourgeois- nationalist elitism,”
34 has had a 
negative effect on understandings of local power dynamics within pre-colonial societies 
and peripheral colonial territories; it has not been able to capture nuances in how power 
worked within the boundaries of the nation state, and the differences in how it percolated 
down to various colonized populations, areas, and cultures. As Sarkar elaborates 
“colonial cultural domination, stripped of all complexities and variations, faces an 
indigenous domain eroded of internal tensions and conflicts. The possibility of pre-
colonial forms of domination, however modified, persisting through colonialism, helping 
to mediate colonial authority in vital ways, maybe even functioning autonomously at all 
times – for all of which there is ample evidence – is simply ignored.”
35 Sarkar suggests 
here that the singular study of the effects of colonial rule on Indian society distorts 
understandings of colonial power as bringing about an “absolute rupture;” when “the 
colonized subject is taken to have been literally constituted by colonialism alone,” power 
becomes abstracted, it appears to reside everywhere, maintaining complete control over 
everyone, and in the same ways.  
                                                        
34 See Rosalind O’Hanlon, David Washbrook, “After Orientalism, Culture, Criticism, and Politics 
in the Third World,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 34.1 (1992). See also Ranajit 
Guha, ed., Subaltern Studies I (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982). Finally, see Sumit Sarkar, 
“The Decline of the Subaltern in Subaltern Studies” in Reading Subaltern Studies, ed. David 
Ludden, (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2002). 
 
35 Sarkar, “The Decline of the Subaltern in Subaltern Studies,” 407 – 408. 
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As a corrective, I follow the lead of earlier Subaltern Studies historians such as 
Gautam Bhadra
36 and David Hardiman, who, led by Ranajit Guha, outlined narratives of 
collective political action by low caste and adivasi subalterns that were autonomous from 
nationalist narratives of anti-colonial struggle and self-improvement. As Hardiman notes: 
“I write a history of the adivasis in which they are the subject…to understand the 
consciousness that informed and still informs political actions taken by the subaltern 
classes on their own, “independently of any elite initiative.”
 37  Indeed, “the subaltern 
classes and groups constituting the mass of the laboring population...formed an 
autonomous domain, for it neither originated from elite politics nor did its existence 
depend on the latter… There were vast areas in the life and consciousness of the people 
which were never integrated into their hegemony.”
38  
However, my use of the early Subaltern Studies “history from below” approach is 
not a return to what critics often called the naïve positivist empiricism of early Subaltern 
Studies; it is not an attempt to go beneath the shell of colonialism to reveal a pure 
indigeneity inside, one that is its pre-colonial “essence.” My use of the word 
“indigenous” does not imply that there is such a thing as a pre-discursive pre-colonial 
past or subjectivity that can be redeemed. Instead, I contend that the discourse of 
European colonial modernity is not the only discourse of humanist modernity through 
which to view the colonial past. Rather, there were multiple discourses of modernity 
                                                        
36 See Gautam Bhadra, “The Mentality of Subalternity: Kantanama or Rajdharma,” A Subaltern 
Studies Reader 1986-1995, ed. Ranajit Guha, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
 
37 See David Hardiman, “Origins and Transformations of the Devi” in A Subaltern Studies Reader 
1986-1995, ed. Ranajit Guha, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 105-106. 
 
38 Ranajit Guha, Subaltern Studies I, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 4-6. 
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being harnessed by subaltern subjects through regional language literatures. I therefore 
begin not with colonial power, but with the analysis of how acolonial humanist 
discourses of modernity from below, which I call “indigenous,” were responding to the 
confluence of local and global power structures. As I demonstrate in my account of 
Orissan tribal theorizations of rational social equality in Chapter Two, this approach 
allows new insights into how subalterns and their humanist epistemes dealt with the 
challenge that these irreducibly complex, intersecting networks of power posed to their 
“humanity.”  
 
In analyzing universalizing discourses of rights through the lens of localized 
domains of power and privilege, I also hope to add to an African scholarship on rights in 
the postcolony that attempts to go beyond the placing of universalizing rights and cultural 
realities as absolute binaries. Mahmood Mamdani, for instance, asks: “Can a culture of 
individual rights coexist with the right of every individual to practise one's culture?”
39 
His edited collection of essays gauges the complexity of the question by examining the 
different ways that global rights discourses are implicated within local networks of 
control. I assert that a positive response to Mamdani’s introductory question is more 
likely if we also examine how localized rights discourses are harnessed in resistance to 
local and global power relations. In both South Africa and India, it was local rather than 
global rights discourses that provided alternatives to oppressive networks of power.  
 
 
                                                        
39 Mahmood Mamdani, Beyond Rights Talk & Culture Talk, (Cape Town: David Philip 
Publishers, 2000).  
   24 
Reconfiguring Global Literary Studies 
 
It is my hope that a fine-grained understanding of local networks of resistance to 
power can be achieved through careful readings of marginalized subaltern, folk, and oral 
literatures. As I demonstrate, these yield valuable insights into indigenous humanisms 
harnessed by subaltern movements of popular resistance. These marginalized responses 
to power construct a larger frame for literary studies that pays attention to previously 
overlooked pre-colonial and colonial vernacular texts alongside colonial regional 
language literatures and the Anglophone novel.  
Literary critics such as Meenakshi Mukherjee carried out the first step towards a 
diversification of postcolonial reading practices in suggesting that scholars needed to 
consider regional language novels within the colonized world, including elite nationalist 
works by writers such as Rabindranath Tagore, as products of local cultural and social 
conditions during the colonial period, and not simply derived from Western literary 
traditions.
40 Mukherjee thus paid attention to how regional novels reconciled the demands 
of Western realism with the representation of colonial realities in native societies, 
including colonial politics, religious and ideological tensions, and economic and social 
exploitations.  
I take Mukherjee’s groundbreaking attempts to level the epistemic playing field a 
step further by suggesting we do not just begin with analyses of elite regional language 
colonial texts. Doing only this, still results in skewed readings of colonial writing. This is 
                                                        
40 Meenakshi Mukherjee, Realism and Reality: The Novel and Society in India, (New Delhi: 
Oxford India Paperbacks, 1996). 
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evident in Krupabai Satthianadhan’s English language bildungsroman, Kamala, which I 
analyze in Chapter Four; I demonstrate how framing Indian regional and Anglophone 
literatures primarily through the lens of the hegemonic groups present during the colonial 
encounter has led to their interpretation as reflections of colonialist value systems. 
Kamala has been read by critics as nothing but an expression of the incomplete ways in 
which Western New Woman ideologies, and the nationalist ideologies that arose in 
reaction to them, were appropriated or resisted in India by Indian women. In other words, 
the “colonial discourse” lens of reading these texts has resulted in crucial blind-spots so 
that texts are interpreted solely through nationalist and colonialist binaries. 
 
Instead, I suggest we start with the vast majority of subaltern pre-colonial literary 
forms, the vernacular oral literatures that were produced by the bottom echelons of 
colonized societies. I argue that these remained relatively untouched by colonialist 
influences, utilizing humanist ideas within literary traditions that had permeated the 
collective cultural consciousness of their regions for centuries, and which were also 
important literary influences on the “educated” writers of the Indian novel that had 
emerged in more central areas of the colonial encounter. Studying Anglophone texts such 
as Kamala, and regional language texts influenced by nationalist discourse, in 
conjunction with indigenous literary genres such as the kavya, demonstrates how the 
latter were also a crucial part of the period’s intertextual universe. 
 Such readings demonstrate that colonialist power was not the only discourse at 
work at the time; there were multiple indigenous discourses articulating universalizing 
humanist ideas in 19
th century India and South Africa. And these indigenous humanist   26 
discourses were drawing on pre-colonial indigenous cultural currents as well as 
colonialist ones to mobilize against colonialist modernity, and produce their own 
universalizing assertions of modernity that were radically humanist.  
The Chapters 
 
My theoretical first chapter explores the idea of “contextual universalisms” as the 
theoretical thrust behind my outlining of alternative indigenous modernities. I argue 
against Pheng Cheah’s post-structuralist critiques of universalizing human rights 
discourses, claiming that misuses of the “universal human” do not render the core 
concepts themselves inherently suspect or theoretically unjustifiable. I elaborate that it is 
possible to empirically distinguish pre-colonial manifestations of ideas like the South 
African humanist ideal ubuntu from its abuses in instrumental relations. Therefore such 
humanisms, including concepts such as “individual freedom,” “democracy” and 
“rationality,” still remain constant regulative ideals through which people understand 
themselves and produce contextualized cultures of popular resistance.  
This is evident in the 19
th century verse of the subaltern “tribal” Indian “saint-
poet,” Bhīma Bhoi. My second chapter, “Radical Religious Rationalities in Colonial 
Indian Poetry” reads Bhīma’s religious poetry to examine how a supposedly European 
construct like “rationality” arises in colonized contexts through distinct, local, and 
intellectual cultures. Bhīma’s devotional verse is radical in both form and content, 
expressing its rational theory of social equality in the centuries old “intentional,” or 
“twilight language” (sandhya basha) of “upside down” expressions (ulta-bamsi), and in a 
blunt bhakti style that widened grassroots supports for his ideas by facilitating communal   27 
memorizing and chanting. This was very different from the esoteric Sanskrit of the higher 
castes, or the scholarly English of famous nationalist reformers like Bhīma’s 
contemporary, Swami Vivekananda, who drew on Enlightenment discourses of science to 
bolster hegemonic colonial and Brahminical arguments about Hindu “rationality.” 
Bhīma's local literary language, meanwhile, logically defines selfhood through one’s 
actions and capabilities instead of through one’s caste or gender, and also makes secular 
distinctions between myth and magic, and rational understandings of the world, in his 
tribal religious thought. Thus, Bhīma decolonizes the “secular” by highlighting the 
possibility of alternative non-Western secularisms, legitimizing subaltern intellectual 
legacies as ‘modern’ in their own right. 
While my chapter on Oriyan devotional poetry charts how subaltern subjects 
disrupt colonial and nationalist narratives of Enlightenment reason through secular 
rationalities embedded in sacred narratives, my third chapter, ‘“A Chief is a Chief 
through Other People:’ Ubuntu and Notions of Democracy in 19
th Century Zulu 
Literature,” shows that such “contextual universalisms” are only fully grasped through 
understanding the material conditions that spawn them. I argue that Zulu folk literature, 
grounded in agricultural metaphors about crops and cattle, produced widespread cultures 
of critique that endorsed democratic rule and challenged misuses of political power. 
Ubuntu, the Bantu word for humane-ness, in which “a person is a person through other 
people,” was intimately linked to the lesser known saying “a chief is a chief through other 
people,” in which a chief’s rule was judged by how readily he shared crops, milk, and 
cattle – metaphors of power and resources -- with his subjects. Praise poetry and folk 
tales, therefore, comment on a chief’s sustenance of his subjects through descriptions of   28 
his eating habits, publicly monitoring the ruler who “overate” and “overflowed” with 
milk. Furthermore, these popular folk idioms, highly regarded as a form of history, 
deconstructed unethical political systems through specific literary forms. Praise poems 
used repetition to create a democratic multivocality, mingling different vocal registers to 
present a forceful unified criticism. These praises were forms of social control, with 
subjects communally speaking a chief into being as embodying defining character traits 
in response to the audience’s calls to “Speak Him!” The recital’s fast-paced elimination 
of downdrift intonation also created a seemingly never-ending text to which criticisms 
could be continually added, creating customs of democratic evaluation by eternally 
holding the subject accountable for his actions.  
Chapter four, “Affective Agencies: Contextualizing Individual Freedom in the 
Colonial Indian bildungsroman” extends my analysis of how material conditions 
engender “contextual universalisms,” arguing that manifestations of “universal” ideas 
also depend on how an individual’s relationship to their material conditions is staged on 
the physical body. I read a 19th century colonial bildungsroman by Krupabai 
Satthianadhan, acclaimed as the “first Indian woman writing in English,” as positing a 
theorization of individual freedom grounded in an embodied agency. Kamala: the Story 
of a Hindu Child Wife bases this agency upon the universal capacity for affect, or feelings 
that precede the subject’s will and consciousness, unlike the ideological emotions 
propagated by nationalist and colonialist discourse, and register as bodily sensation. 
Affective agency “moves” the subject away from oppressive surroundings, enabling her 
to exceed the terms that constitute her. Satthianadhan therefore disrupts the linear, 
Christianizing narrative of individual development in bildungsromane like Charlotte   29 
Bronte’s Jane Eyre, instead developing her character using long flashbacks and spiraling 
narrative reminiscent of Hindu epics. By emphasizing the ways that the contextually 
grounded, universal physical body negotiates oppressions, this chapter points to ways 
beyond the culturally relativist vs. universalism binaries haunting comparative feminist 
methodologies.   
Each of my chapters, then, is a thematic exploration of a “contextual 
universalism;” each explores universalizing discursive assertions of rationality, 
democratic ideals, and individual freedom, while demonstrating one way in which these 
universalizing discourses of rights were also “contextual.” My reading of Bhīma Bhoi’s 
devotional poetry demonstrates that universalizing assertions of rationality were 
articulated through local, pre-colonial intellectual cultures; Bhīma was drawing on a 
literary language that had for centuries sustained the tribal and low caste peripheries of 
Orissa, itself an overlooked region bordering the colonial metropolis of Bengal. My 
reading of Zulu praise poetry demonstrates that humanisms such as democratic ideals 
were contextually grounded in, and produced through, very specific material conditions, 
such as the institutions of agriculture that stressed the communal sharing of crops and 
cattle between a chief and his people. Finally, Krupabai Satthianadhan’s universalizing 
ideas of individual freedom contextualize themselves in the physical body. The subject’s 
physical sensations interpret hegemonic nationalist and colonialist ideologies so that the 
body is “moved” to act against them through local structures of feeling.  
 
Furthermore, each of my case studies tests out “contextual universalisms,” that 
are nevertheless articulated independently from colonial humanisms, in different   30 
temporal contexts. The Zulu praise poetry I examine is an indigenous literary form from a 
pre-colonial society; while British and Dutch forces were making rapid incursions into 
Zulu territories in the early nineteenth century, government still lay in the hands of Zulu 
tribal chiefs. My focus on Bhīma Bhoi’s devotional poetry, meanwhile, turns to the 
height of the colonial period in India to analyze indigenous, medieval humanisms as they 
are articulated in peripheral tribal regions both geographically and epistemologically 
removed from colonial metropolises. Finally, Satthianadhan’s bildungsromane was also 
written at the height of the colonial period but in the centre of the colonial metropolis and 
in English. Unlike the other South African and Indian literatures I read, Satthianadhan’s 
writing represents an internalization of colonial literary cultures and ideologies but 
nevertheless consciously tries to lay out humanist ideas independently of colonialist 
frameworks. In doing so, she demonstrates that Anglophone Indian texts cannot be 
understood independently of regional literary traditions such as the kavya, and that 
regional language texts had profound intertextual connections with Anglophone texts.  
 
Finally, I make my argument about these alternative indigenous modernities by 
focusing each chapter on one structural or epistemological component that produced 
them. In doing so, I bring us back to Susan Stanford Friedman’s question: “Where else 
might accelerated societal change brought about by a combination of new technologies, 
knowledge revolutions, state formations, and expanding intercultural contacts contribute 
to radical questioning and dismantling of traditional ontologies, epistemologies, and 
institutional structures?”
41 My chapter on Bhīma Bhoi’s devotional poetry analyzes just 
such a “knowledge revolution,” the cultural structures of feeling and literary languages 
                                                        
41 Friedman, “Definitional Excursions: The Meanings of Modern/Modernity/Modernism,” 507. 
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that emphasized the defining of individuals, in resistance to local and foreign power 
structures, through their actions rather than through their pre-ordained religious or caste 
status. My chapter on Zulu praise poetry looks at how “unmodern” ontologies were 
undone by, and modern literary epistemologies produced and supported by, “modern” 
institutional structures. I demonstrate how alternative humanist ideas, such as “a chief is a 
chief through other people,” in Zulu praise poetry were produced by a communal 
agricultural economy and an alternative democratic form of government. Finally, my last 
chapter focuses on the impact of “expanding intercultural contacts” in impeding, aiding, 
and altering indigenous modernities. Satthianadhan’s bildungsroman testifies to how 
these different visions of alternative modernities interact with each other and with 
colonial modernity, while holding their own in relation to it and even challenging it. 
 
As I said earlier, this project grows out of the belief that universalizing 
humanisms, while historically implicated in colonialist regimes of power, cannot be 
reduced to their hegemonic misuses, and, therefore, are not intrinsically incompatible 
with emancipatory aims. Furthermore, I claim that modern humanist universalisms are 
not the product of a singular temporal and historical moment and that analyzing modern 
humanisms solely as Enlightenment imports into indigenous societies amounts to 
culturally relativist misreadings of pre-colonial worlds as pre-modern. Instead, I explore 
the ways that the humanist universalisms that define modernity were arising 
independently of Enlightenment ideals, in context-specific forms. Thus I highlight the 
indigenous cultural mediums through which subaltern poets and writers were launching 
their humanist challenges to colonialist hegemony. They propagated their ideas of 
rational social organization, individual freedom, and democratic ideals through   32 
indigenous literary modes, including oral story-telling and ritual and ceremonial poetry 
gatherings, that amassed a populist base. In doing so, these poets and writers demonstrate 
the mutual imbrication of literary form, through texts that enact a multiplicity of voices 
for example, with their messages, which stressed universal rights and inclusiveness. 
These literary humanisms, or contextual universalisms, in traditional indigenous texts, 
developed alternative modernities in conceptual and institutional forms, thereby 
disturbing the binaries of tradition and modernity through which pre-colonial India and 
South Africa have been viewed.  
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Chapter 1: Theorizing Alternative Modernities Differently Through Contextual 
Universalisms 
 
 
In this chapter I argue that, because indigenous knowledge systems have too often 
been evaluated and understood through Enlightenment categories of rationality, non-
Western articulations of reason, and the expressions of individual freedom and 
democratic ideals they produced, have been suppressed and devalued. I ask: “How can 
we prevent non-Western subjects from being colonized by a universalized Enlightenment 
Reason while simultaneously acknowledging their own practices of rationality?” I answer 
this question through my outlines of “contextual universalisms,” or alternative discourses 
of non-colonialist modernity that arose in response to local, material power structures. In 
doing so, I respond to scholars such as Pheng Cheah who dismiss universalisms on the 
grounds that such stable constructions of humanity do not exist across cultural contexts, 
and unpolluted by the power dynamics of real world instrumental relations. Cheah 
therefore argues that it is impossible to separate any universalizing notions from the force 
fields of power in which they are articulated. I contend, however, that one can subtly 
differentiate expressions of core humanist discourses from colonialist manifestations of 
the same humanisms. For instance, I empirically evaluate how central humanist notions 
were expressed, as was the South African humanist ideal, ubuntu, very differently from 
the colonized, globalized versions they became in post-colonial contexts. Finally, I 
outline how the existence and trace-ability of these non-Western, non-colonialist 
discourses testify that humanisms can be both universalizing yet sensitive to contextual 
differences. In the process, these humanisms contest dismissals of universalisms such as   34 
individual freedom on the grounds that the latter lack correlates in other cultures, and are 
necessarily imperialist when transported to other cultural contexts.  
 
Modern Indigenous Rationalities as Responses to Local Realities 
 
In order to prevent non-Western subjects from being colonized by a universalized 
Enlightenment Reason, I identify the core idea of rationality as the ability to think 
critically that is the legacy of human beings in general. This foundational capacity for 
rational thought, as Charles Taylor and Harry Frankfurt have elaborated, consists of, 
among other things, the ability to be logically consistent, to separate oneself from one’s 
immediate context in order to evaluate one’s life and one’s desires in terms of larger 
ideas about the world, and the ability to trace one’s own cognitive thought patterns.
42 I 
maintain that this minimal rationality is manifested differently in varied cultural contexts, 
and that Enlightenment rationality was just one of its expressions, the result of a 
particular movement emerging from the specific historical and spatial location of 
eighteenth century Europe, and associated with key historical figures such as Voltaire and 
Rousseau. I argue that the lack of distinction between a core concept of rationality and its 
particular, culturally specific manifestations has perpetuated the universalization of 
Enlightenment reason as the only assertion of rationality, so that non-Western peoples 
who do not share the legacy of Enlightenment rationality are deemed irrational. This is 
                                                        
42 Charles Taylor, “Rationality,” in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, vol. 2 of Philosophical 
Papers, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will 
and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971). 
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evident, for instance, in Dipesh Chakrabarty and Paul Gilroy’s arguments about 
modernity. 
 
  Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe and Paul Gilroy’s The Black 
Atlantic both concern themselves with colonial manifestations of rational thought. 
Chakrabarty seeks to “provincialize Europe” by “finding a home for Enlightenment 
rationality in histories of Bengali belonging.”
43 On the contrary, Gilroy distinguishes 
between Enlightenment reason and reason as a universal capacity, analyzing slave 
narratives as explicitly rejecting categories of Western Reason to unearth a culture that is 
not specifically African, American, Caribbean, or British, but all of these at once, a black 
Atlantic culture whose themes and techniques transcend ethnicity and nationality to 
produce something new. In both cases, however, the colonized use of reason is conflated 
with their having appropriated Enlightenment rationalities, and any superstitious behavior 
is seen as a rejection of Western Rationality and implicated in a disavowal of the very 
ability of the colonized to think in a logical manner.  
 
Provincializing Europe is an argument about the mythical figure of Europe that is 
often taken to be the original site of the modern in many histories of capitalist transition 
in non-Western countries. This imaginary Europe, Chakrabarty argues, is built right into 
the social sciences so that, as in Hegel, it emerges as the culmination of teleology of 
modernity. Measured against such mythical standards, capitalist transition in the third 
world seems either incomplete or lacking. Chakrabarty’s corrective is finding the 
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different ways European thought manifests itself in non-Western countries and therefore 
“finding the diverse ways of being” modern in the world.
44 As he puts it, then, 
Provincializing Europe is not a project of shunning European thought. “It is a project of 
globalizing such thought by exploring how it may be renewed both for and from the 
margins.”
45 
 
Thus Chakrabarty writes about the predominant influence of European thoughts 
and ideals in shaping the socio-political systems in India and its neighboring countries, 
attempting to portray the integration of non-western minds with western ideals and 
philosophy. In this process of trying to find “diverse ways of ‘being-in-the-world,”
46 
however, Chakrabarty suggests that India became modern solely through Western 
thought, specifically Enlightenment thought with its rationalism, individualism and 
“liberty, equality and fraternity.” In his argument, the categories making up modernity, 
such as rationalism, become attributed to the West; India is pre-modern and therefore not 
rational except for the times when it syncretizes Western modernity’s ways of being 
rational. This is most apparent in Chakrabarty’s slippages between reason as a critical 
faculty that may be asserted in indigenous contexts independently of European influence, 
and rationality as a project that originated out of a particularly European historical and 
spatial moment. At one point he rightly seems to distinguish between the two:  
The project of provincializing Europe cannot originate 
from the stance that the reason/science/universals that 
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45 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, back cover. 
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help define Europe as the modern are simply ‘culture-
specific’ and therefore only belong to the European 
cultures. For the point is not that Enlightenment 
rationalism is always unreasonable in itself, but rather a 
matter of documenting how – through what historical 
process – its ‘reason’ which was not always self evident 
to everyone, has been made to look obvious far beyond 
the ground where it originated.
47  
 
In this account, Chakrabarty suggests that reason and science are universal and not 
culture specific. Enlightenment rationalism, meanwhile, has a ‘reason’ not always self 
evident to the rest of the world but has been held as the fulfillment of a teleology of 
modernity so that it made itself seem the primary subject of everyone’s histories. 
 
However, in his analysis of Bengali history, Chakrabarty goes on to universalize 
Enlightenment reason: “I seek to find a home for post-enlightenment rationalism in the 
histories of Bengali belonging that I narrate.”
48  This does not simply mean examining 
the ways that European thought was taken up in Bengal; Chakrabarty goes on to attribute  
 
modern social critiques of caste, oppressions of women, 
the lack of rights for laboring and subaltern classes in 
India, and so on – and, in fact, the very critique of 
colonialism itself’ as ‘unthinkable except as a legacy, 
partially, of how Enlightenment Europe was 
appropriated in the subcontinent.  The Indian 
constitution tellingly begins by repeating certain 
universal Enlightenment themes celebrated, say, in the 
American constitution. And it is salutary to remember 
that the writings of the most trenchant critic of the 
institution of “untouchability” in British India refer us 
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48 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 22. 
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back to some originally European ideas about liberty and 
human equality.
49  
 
In the passage, Chakrabarty scripts concepts such as liberty and human equality as 
‘originally’ European, attributing Indian conceptions of these ideals to what the colonized 
have learnt from Europe. However, as I argue, ideas which constituted the Enlightenment 
itself were at least asserted in different manifestations by other cultures at the same time, 
or even before the West was experiencing them. As Martin Bernal points out, an entity 
called the European intellectual tradition, uniquely stretching back to the ancient Greeks, 
is a fabrication of relatively recent European history.
50 For instance, the Arab world too 
had a humanistic conceptualization of science and philosophy based in logic. In seeking 
to provincialize Europe primarily by analyzing the ways that European thought is 
appropriated by colonized subjects, then, theorists of alternative modernities often 
approach the histories of colonial and post-colonial cultures through alienating epistemic 
lenses, so that rational action carried out by a non-Western subject is often seen to be a 
corollary of the Enlightenment, rather than a fulfillment of indigenous assertions of 
rationality in response to local cultures and power relations. This is apparent in Paul 
Gilroy’s theorizations of modernity. 
 
Paul Gilroy seeks to provincialize Europe by redefining modernity as a hybrid, 
syncretic form in which non-Western and Western forms of reason co-exist. He also 
argues against the translation of European rationalities into “absolute, universal standards 
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50 Martin Bernal, Black Athena, The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization (The Fabrication 
of Ancient Greece 1785-1985, Volume 1), (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1991). 
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of human achievement, norms, aspirations.” Unlike Chakrabarty, therefore, he does not 
define his project by seeking to “find a home for post-enlightenment rationalism”
51 in 
other cultural histories. However, even as he insists we must not do so, Gilroy, like 
Chakrabarty, reads colonized lives largely through the categories of Enlightenment 
rationality. Thus he ends up claiming that slave communities in the “Black Atlantic” 
reasserted their irrational African selfhood as a weapon to counter racist Enlightenment 
rationalities. The corollary is that these slave communities emerge as incapable of 
exercising their own brand of “rationality in being” in their everyday lives. Take for 
example, Gilroy’s discussion of a slave Margaret, who chooses to murder her daughter 
rather than have her enter into sexual abuse and slavery. Gilroy argues that Margaret acts 
“irrationally” here to gain the “upper hand over the pursuit of modernity by rational 
means:”
52  
 
“It is important to note here that a new discursive 
economy emerges with the refusal to subordinate the 
particularity of the slave experience to the totalizing 
power of universal reason held exclusively by white 
hands, pens or publishing houses.”
53  
 
Thus Margaret’s desperate act of trying to protect her child from a fate she considered 
worse than death, an act that clearly has a rationality of its own, becomes essentialized as 
typical of a black spirituality that Gilroy assumes counters the Hegelian slave’s logic of 
preferring bondage over death:  
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52 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness, (Cambridge: Harvard 
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53 Gilroy, The Black Atlantic, 69. 
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“The repeated choice of death rather than bondage 
articulates a principle of negativity that is opposed 
to the formal logic and rational calculation 
characteristic of modern western thinking and 
expressed in the Hegelian slave’s preference for 
bondage rather than death.”
54   
 
Gilroy’s argument, then, rests on an assumption that western thinking alone has a 
preference for bondage rather than death. It homogenizes and places into binary 
opposition Western/life choosing/rational against non-Western/death choosing /irrational. 
This is apparent in Gilroy’s discussion of a black slave’s ‘bitter trial of strength’ against 
his master. Gilroy argues that Frederick Douglass’s narrative is proof that Douglass is no 
longer solely possessed of a “pre-rational, spiritual mode of African thought.” Now he 
possesses “his own compound outlook – an uneasy hybrid of the sacred and secular, the 
African and the American, formed out of the debilitating experience of slavery and 
tailored to the requirements of abolitionisms.”
55 By essentializing African thought as 
“pre-rational,” and American as rational, Gilroy thus implicitly rejects Douglass’s 
thinking as a form of rationality in its own right. The corollary is that, as in Chakrabarty, 
any trace of rationality shown by the slaves in their resistance becomes attributed to the 
appropriation of an Enlightenment rationality.  
 
Contrary to Gilroy’s reading of Douglass’s narrative, I read Douglass as 
protesting the fact that slaves were refused their own, universalizing legacies of rational 
thinking. Thus the very first sentences with which he begins his autobiography complain 
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that he is refused knowledge of his own age: “I have no accurate knowledge of my age, 
never having seen any authentic record containing it.”
56 This is particularly significant 
when one considers that historical assertions of rationality have often been judged by the 
ability to comprehend and record the passing of time.
57 Thus Douglass’s writing 
continually notes that his lack of knowledge about his age results from “the wish of most 
masters within my knowledge to keep their slaves thus ignorant”
58 and not because of an 
inability to think rationally; he shows that slaves can tell the passing of time by 
remarking that when asked when their birthday is, they respond with allusions to 
“planting-time, harvest- time, cherry-time, spring-time, or fall-time.” A similar sentiment 
is repeated at the end of the paragraph: “the nearest estimate I can give makes me now 
between twenty-seven and twenty- eight years of age. I come to this, from hearing my 
master say, some time during 1835, I was about seventeen years old.”
59  While this 
sentence makes an explicit protest against being denied the information needed for him to 
be able to exercise rationality, it is also a humanist assertion of rationality on his part. 
Implicit throughout, is his belief in the equality of black people and his own right to 
exercise rationality: “The white children could tell their ages. I could not tell why I ought 
to be deprived of the same privilege.”  Such a “want of information concerning my own 
age was a source of unhappiness to me even during childhood.”
60 
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57 See previous note.   
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Chakrabarty in his discussion of Indian scientists, and Gilroy in his analysis of 
slave narratives, take the actions of particular non-Western subjects and essentialize them 
as products of supposedly homogenous Western or non-Western cultures, rather than 
framing their actions as responses to actual, material circumstances guided by context-
specific manifestations of reason. My analysis of Bhīma Bhoi’s assertions of rationality 
in Chapter Two suggests alternative genealogies of rationality, articulated by 
marginalized tribal subjects, who were reacting to colonial as well as local power 
structures. 
 
Tracing Modern, Indigenous Democratic Ideals  
 
I suggest, then, that we approach these pre-colonial universalisms from an 
empirical perspective, asking not simply how European universalisms were being 
appropriated by colonized subjects but what contextual, material circumstances were 
producing these alternative “modern” discourses of humanity. Analyzing these 
universalisms as responses to local realities, and not inevitably appropriations of 
Enlightenment universalisms, allows one to evaluate how pre-colonial humanist 
concepts, such as the South African humanist ideal, ubuntu, differed from the globalized 
versions, implicated in hegemonic discourses of power, that they became in later stages 
of colonialism. This is not to say that pre-colonial humanisms existed in some pure, pre-
discursive space of idealism, but just to stress the importance of capturing the complexity 
of indigenous societies by differentiating hegemonic, globalized discourses of power   43 
from pre-colonial, localized discourses that subaltern discourses of resistance were also 
reacting against. 
 
My hope is that such an empirical genealogy of indigenous humanist concepts 
will complicate the Foucauldian assumption that colonialist modernity was so all-
pervasive that a non-colonial past cannot be traced outside of it. I maintain that this latter 
argument mistakenly assumes that core humanist concepts cannot be discerned 
independently of the unequal instrumental relations within which they are articulated. I 
therefore resist the doing away of universal signifiers like the “human” completely; 
instead, I argue, first, for an in depth analysis of the ways that instrumental nationalist 
and capitalist discourses manipulate this universal signifier for their own ends and 
second, for a historical grounding of alternative non-colonialist manifestations of the core 
concept through an understanding of the latters’ linguistic, literary and cultural contexts. 
As I demonstrate in Chapter Three, the humanist ideology that is called ubuntu in post-
colonial South Africa existed and buttressed particular Zulu democratic behaviors in the 
nineteenth century. In the process, I demonstrate how it is possible to trace ubuntu as 
something other than a post-colonial invention born solely of the colonial encounter.  
 
Ubuntu in Instrumental Relations 
 
Ubuntu appears repeatedly in contemporary discourses as an “invention of 
tradition,” on television, radio, official messages and in the speeches of leading political 
and religious personalities, including Nelson Mandela and archbishop Desmond Tutu, as   44 
a traditional African quality to aspire to and embody.  A Bantu language word, it serves 
as the spiritual foundation of many African societies. It is a unifying vision or worldview 
enshrined in the Zulu maxims umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, i.e. “a person is a person 
through other persons”
61 and Bonk’abantu bayadingana, “everyone needs other people,” 
which are part of a long Zulu cultural tradition that emphasizes interdependence. These 
proverbs define the individual in terms of his/her relationship with others so that “both 
the self and others find themselves in a whole wherein they are already related.”
62  
 
Ubuntu has been much critiqued for being too generalized and not historically 
grounded enough, for essentializing and homogenizing South African culture, and as 
reinstating traditional tribal hierarchies.
63 While ubuntu has been used productively by 
nationalist discourses of racial reconciliation such as those explored in Antjie Krog’s 
novel about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Country of my Skull, they have 
also diluted the concept of much of its specificity and contextual relevance. Even more 
problematically, these generalizations of ubuntu as a “traditional” African concept that 
signifies humanity has turned the notion into a commodity that veils the alienating 
oppressions of the global economy (particularly noticeably during the 2010 FIFA world 
cup).  
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63 There have been various critiques of the popular notion of ubuntu. For instance, Yvonne 
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see it” basis. Mamphela Ramphele, in “Can ubuntu provide a model for citizenship education in 
African democracies?” argues that there is nothing about African morality that signiﬁcantly 
differs from Western morality so the concept of ubuntu as an African concept of morality is 
nativist.  
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This marriage of ubuntu with South African’s discourse of racial reconciliation is 
perhaps best reflected in the context of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
Antjie Krog's Country of My Skull, a fictional yet journalistic memoir interested in 
Ubuntu's role within the TRC interprets the discourse almost completely through the lens 
of racial reconciliation. Krog draws on contemporary South African thinkers such as Jabu 
Sindane and Willie van der Merwe to declare that we should encounter the difference of 
people’s humanness so as to inform and enrich our own.
64 Thus understood, the Zulu 
“umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” translates as: “To be human is to affirm one's humanity by 
recognizing the humanity of others in its infinite variety of content and form.”
65 The 
respect for the particularities of the beliefs and practices of others is especially 
emphasized by a striking, yet lesser-known translation of umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu: 
“A human being is a human being through (the otherness of) other human beings.”
66 For 
post-apartheid South Africans of all colors and cultures, Ubuntu dictates that, if we want 
to be human, we need to recognize the genuine otherness of our fellow citizens. Since, 
the individual or self cannot be conceived without thereby necessarily conceiving the 
other, diversity is essential to community. When diversity is not respected as in apartheid, 
two hostile worlds are created instead of one. Krog describes her experiences of these 
separated worlds: “I’m visiting a friend in town. In their backyard lives a maid. ‘Doesn’t 
she miss her children? I ask. “Maids don’t feel like other people about their children. 
                                                        
64 Jabu Sindane, Ubuntu and Nation Building, (Pretoria: Ubuntu School of Philosophy, 1994), 8-
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65 Willie Van der Merwe, “Philosophy and the multi-cultural context of (post)apartheid South 
Africa,” Ethical perspectives 3:2, (1996),  1. 
66 Van der Merwe, “Philosophy and the multi-cultural context of (post)apartheid South Africa,” 1.  
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They like to be rid of them.” On a previous visit “Why doesn’t she have a heater?” 
“Maids don’t get cold like white people. The reason she stinks – they don’t like 
washing.” She calls these assumptions a “series of comforting delusions” that allow 
people to accommodate two worlds. Instead, this discourse of ubuntu recognizes the 
common humanity of everyone so that differences simply serve as interesting features 
from which everyone can learn, with which community can be enriched. Thus Krog tries 
to describe a space which recognizes all South Africans as part of the same national 
community regardless of their race:  
 
“God. Does he hear us? Does he know what our hearts are 
yearning for? That we all just want to be human – some 
with some colour, some with less, but all with air and sun. 
And I wade into song – in a language that is not mine, in a 
tongue I do not know. It is fragrant inside the song, and 
among the keynotes of sorrow and suffering, there are soft 
silences where we who belong to this landscape, all of us, 
can come to rest. Sometimes the times we live in overflow 
with light.”
67  
 
Krog expresses the common humanity of South Africans by referring to the absolutes 
they all hold in common: “all with air and sun.” Although she learns about her country 
“in a language that is not mine, in a tongue I do not know,” “it is fragrant inside the song” 
because there is a space outside language which belongs to all of them, and it is in these 
“soft silences where we who belong to this landscape, all of us, can come to rest.” The 
emphasis on “all of us” through its separation from the rest of the sentence by commas 
enforces the universality of people’s rights as South Africans. This is obviously an 
                                                        
67 Antjie Krog, Country of my Skull, (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2000), 285. 
   47 
overwhelmingly positive experience, described as “overflowing with light.” Krog turns a 
community out of different people, all South Africans, all humans.  
While this discourse of ubuntu has done valuable work towards reconciliation in 
the post-apartheid context, it has also diluted the concept to the extent that it has been 
amenable to appropriation by capitalist discourses of development. This is aptly 
demonstrated by the sentences that follow Mandela’s description of ubuntu as the sharing 
of food with travelers: “That is one aspect of Ubuntu but it will have various aspects. 
Ubuntu does not mean that people should not enrich themselves. The question therefore 
is: Are you going to do so in order to enable the community around you to be able to 
improve?” In other words, post-apartheid ubuntu is about achieving financial prosperity 
in a way that enables your community to flourish and that percolates into one’s 
surroundings, thus paving the way towards racial reconciliation.
68  
More problematically, these discourses of reconciliation have been conflated with 
the often exploitative ends of global capital, evident in the popular culture surrounding 
the 2010 FIFA World Cup. I explore the transformation of ubuntu into a nationalist and 
                                                        
68 In his attempt to formulate a coherent notion of ubuntu that fits a contemporary South Africa, 
Thaddeus Metz points out how the African distaste of individualist thinking about wealth 
translates into the contemporary context: “It is immoral to create wealth largely on a competitive 
basis, as opposed to a cooperative one. In many traditional African societies land is ultimately 
owned in common and it is held that labor should be undertaken for the sake of the community, 
neither in order to make a proﬁt in light of demand nor simply to care for one’s immediate family. 
The “empire building” of a Warren Buffet is anathema here, where the point of work should not 
be to amass wealth for oneself or for its own sake, but rather to beneﬁt others. That is one reason 
why so many African societies adopted (quasi-)socialist economic systems after independence in 
the post-war era; free markets seemed, if not inherently wrong, then at least something that would 
hinder morally desirable behavior. And one continues to ﬁnd contemporary African thinkers 
railing against Western “brash competitiveness,” “single-minded commercialism,” “unbridled 
individualism,” and “morally blind, purely economic logic,” instead tending to favor certain kinds 
of cooperatives.” See Thaddeus Metz, “Toward an African Moral Theory,” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 15.3 (2007): 321–341. 
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capitalist discourse linked to the development of a global economy through my findings 
from a month’s fieldwork in Johannesburg in July 2010 just after the 2010 world cup 
ended. During my visit, I interviewed about 20 native speakers of Bantu languages such 
as Xhosa and Zulu from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds, ranging from 
gardeners, taxi drivers, tour group operators, waiters and receptionists to graduate 
students in African literature departments. The majority of the people I interviewed had 
been reminded, on radio shows, television, advertisements and in official announcements, 
to treat foreign tourists with ubuntu in the run up to the 2010 FIFA world cup, not letting 
them become targets of crime since they were bringing global capital to the local 
economy. These sentiments were repeatedly enforced by public figures such as Phil 
"Chippa" Masinga, 2010 World Cup ambassador, who expressed the fear that the 
violence may ruin the World Cup altogether: “People from outside the country will not 
want to come and attend these tournaments to avoid possible attacks on them." Majimbos 
coach Teboho "Tebza Ngwana" Moloi added that such violence would not “be good for 
us as Africans. We black South Africans were taught about the spirit of ubuntu when we 
grew up. The African brothers and sisters should be accommodative to each other."
69 
This conflation of discourses of racial reconciliation and global capital through ubuntu is 
also apparent from the images I spotted on the backs and sides of buses all over 
Johannesburg.  
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Figure 1 
 
70 
In this advertisement, Coca Cola, one of the major official sponsors of the FIFA world 
cup, becomes a vehicle of ubuntu through the world cup. Drinking coca cola is to “open 
happiness” by opening oneself to the spirit of ubuntu. The ubuntu logo in the first image 
depicts people of all colors of the rainbow, thereby symbolizing Mandela’s concept of the 
rainbow nation, holding hands whilst standing around a football. The image suggests that 
opening a coke battle while watching the world cup unites people of all races by imbuing 
them with the spirit of ubuntu. The problems with such a message were raised by a 
prominent newspaper, The Nation, which pointed out that “the soccer stars are without 
question courageous in raising their voice against the senseless violence. But it sounds 
somewhat superficial to ask ubuntu from the poor, when the only ubuntu they see exists 
among South Africa's postapartheid elite. It's an elite that demands they silently accept 
the demolition of their communities for the good of both the country as well as the World 
Cup.” Similarly, in May, Le Monde Diplomatique wrote about the World Cup 
preparations that "construction--and corruption--is booming. But almost none of the 
                                                        
70 Photos taken by author in Johannesburg, July 2010.   50 
buildings or the money can be accessed by the poor who live in shantytowns without 
proper water, sanitation or electricity." The article points out the $9.5 billion in state 
deficit spending ($4.3 billion in direct subsidies and another $5.2 billion in luxury 
transport infrastructure) that works out to about $200 per citizen for “a series of policies 
that the citizens of this proud nation would never have accepted if not wrapped in the 
honor of hosting the cup. Meanwhile, housing prices in the twenty-first century have 
gone up 92 percent, while wages have risen a mere 8 percent.” The article concludes that 
this World Cup is not for the poor—it is the soccer elites of FIFA, the elites of domestic 
and international corporate capital and the political elites who are making billions and 
who will be benefiting at the expense of the poor.
71 Ubuntu, then, has become a vehicle 
for the development of a global economy grounded in capitalist modes of production. 
Because it is a symbolic signifier of humanity supposedly grounded in local traditions, 
ubuntu serves as a veil for the actual work of alienation and systematic oppression that 
the global economy does, functioning as a convenient platitude to smooth over racial and 
economic divisions in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Ubuntu as a Contextualized Manifestation of a Core Humanist Concept 
Significantly however, as I elaborate in Chapter Three through my reading of 
nineteenth century Zulu praise poetry, it is possible to trace the ideas of interdependent 
                                                        
71 The article continues to point out that the ANC government calls any dissent from being an 
uncritical World Cup booster, “Afropessimism,” boosting the idea that Africa is not up to hosting 
such an event Danny Jordaan the portentously titled Chief Executive Officer of the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup South Africa, lamented to Reuters, "For the first time in history, Africa really will be 
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humanity central to ubuntu, including “a person is a person through other people,” before 
they were implicated in colonialist discourses of global capital. I demonstrate how “a 
person is a person through other people” extended to political systems and to regulating 
the behavior of rulers. The discourse of ubuntu articulated in traditional Zulu texts 
described and sanctioned the sharing of power in a communal food economy that was 
intra tribal and concentrated in the chief so that the sharing of food and cattle between a 
chief and his subjects served as metaphors for the sharing of power. Zulu praise poems, 
folk tales, proverbs and riddles served as vehicles for these metaphors, functioning as self 
regulating mechanisms that, through the literary devices of a repetitive multivocality, 
enacted the democratic ideal “a chief is a chief through other people.” This connection 
became increasingly clear; I found that the communal ideals that buttressed democratic 
Zulu political systems are still articulated through the trope of sharing food in recognition 
of the humanness of fellow South Africans. For instance, Nelson Mandela explained 
ubuntu in these terms: “A traveler through a country would stop at a village and he didn't 
have to ask for food or for water. Once he stops, the people give him food, entertain 
him.”
72 This kind of generosity is also referred to by Archbishop Desmond Tutu who 
defines ubuntu so: “When we want to give high praise to someone we say, “Yu, u 
nobuntu;” “Hey, so-and-so has ubuntu.” Then you are generous, you are hospitable, you 
are friendly and caring and compassionate. You share what you have. It is to say, “My 
humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up in yours.”
73 
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73Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (New York: Random House, 1999), 31.  
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  Furthermore, in multiple African cultures, metaphors regarding amounts of food 
eaten, distributed, or stolen still serve as a gage for the quality of political rule. For 
instance, the political theorist Jean Francis Bayart demonstrates how the size of the 
politician’s “belly” functions as a critical metaphor for a nepotistic, corrupt African State 
in which government and business elite use their influence to enrich themselves, their 
families or ethnic kinsmen.
74 Use of such metaphors serve as a popular critical 
mechanism by which to sanction democratic rule and challenge the misuse of political 
power. As Achille Mbembe has written, “non official cultures are in fact intrinsic to all 
systems of domination and to the means by which these systems are confirmed or 
deconstructed” and the belly is the “principal locale of the idioms and fantasies used in 
depicting power…the obesity of men in power, their impressive physique or, more 
crudely, the flow of shit which results from such a physique – these appeal to a people 
who can enjoy themselves with mockery and laughter...They thus become part of a 
system of signs that the commandement leaves, like tracks, as it passes on its way, and so 
make it possible for someone to follow the trail of violence and domination that is 
intrinsic to the commandement.”
75 A political vocabulary of critique, replete with eating 
metaphors, still exists in the common idioms of politicized subjects. Furthermore, from 
some of my interviews it also became apparent that, in the rural areas of South Africa, 
ubuntu still has a lot to do with the formation of communal food economies that represent 
a democratic form of rule between a “chief” and his subjects. For instance, one of my 
interviewees, a Xhosa gardener in Johannesburg in his 40s and originally from a village 
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in the Eastern Cape, described ubuntu as integral to a system of electing a “small chief” 
in his village: 
 
The  people  choose  someone  with  ubuntu.  Who  is  not 
selfish. If he changes his behaviour, we remove him and 
choose  someone  else  unless  he  apologizes.  You  can 
criticize him if you don’t like something he does, you can 
call him and sit down with him. He is not allowed to work 
since his primary work is to serve his people, so we pool 
our money and our cows and goats and bring them to him. 
But if you cannot afford to give him anything, that is okay 
too. A chief with ubuntu should never ask for anything. He 
should just take what he is given. We say to him ‘don’t 
treat people badly just because you are a chief, don’t sell 
land  to  them.  Because  we  make  you  responsible  for  the 
whole village, you are just supposed to give it to us. Don’t 
take  money  from  people  who  cannot  afford  to  give  you 
anything.’ If our boys are fighting we take him to the chief, 
not to the police and he decides whether they have to go to 
the police or not. This small chief is our real government, 
not the local government. They have nothing to do with us. 
 
This fascinating oral history, occasioned by my questions about ubuntu, testifies to the 
survival of traditional democracies and communal economies in rural areas based on 
informal systems of giving and taking. As I elaborate in chapter Three, these communal 
systems of giving and taking produced democratic behaviors in which a “chief was a 
chief through other people.” My interviews, then, demonstrated that it is possible to trace 
alternative  indigenous  discourses  of  modernity,  framed  independently  of  colonialist 
paradigms, by empirically evaluating how core humanist concepts were also manifested 
in pre-colonial societies. Ideas such as the South African humanist ideal, ubuntu, were 
“contextual universalisms,” or responses to local discourses and structures of power that 
differed from the colonized, globalized humanisms that such universalizing ideas often 
became in post-colonial contexts.   54 
 
Contextually Universalist Ideals of Individual Freedom and Agency 
 
In this section, I elaborate that the existence and trace-ability of these non-
colonialist indigenous ideas testify that modern humanisms can both universalizing yet 
sensitive to contextual differences. In the process, these humanisms contest dismissals of 
universalisms such as democratic ideals or individual freedom on the grounds that the 
latter lack correlates in other cultures, and are necessarily imperialist imports into other 
cultural contexts. My reading of Krupabai Satthianadhan’s ideas of individual freedom in 
Chapter Four confirms that while the imposition of British discourses of individual 
freedom were imperialist, there were non-colonialist, context specific discourses of 
individual freedom, or “contextual universalisms,” that were being articulated in 
indigenous literatures. 
 
It is my hope that such a recognition provides a valuable way out of the impasse 
reached by feminist debates about individual freedom; these have often formed opposing 
coalitions regarding the usefulness of universalizing categories for emancipatory politics. 
On one side, Nussbaum suggests that humanisms need to be framed as universalizing 
discourses: “all, just by being human, are of equal dignity and worth, no matter where 
they are situated in society, and that the primary source of this worth is a power of moral 
choice within them, a power that consists in the ability to plan a life in accordance with 
one's own evaluation of ends.” Nussbaum defines a free society as one in which “people 
must receive treatment that respects and promotes the liberty of choice, and ...respect and   55 
promote the equal worth of persons as choosers.”
76 She promotes this liberty of choice 
through her “capabilities approach,” which argues that the human is born with certain 
“capabilities” all of which need to be fulfilled for a person to be truly free in the sense of 
having “equal worth as a chooser,” and therefore, to live a fully human life. These 
capabilities include life (normal life expectancy); bodily health; bodily integrity (freedom 
of movement, freedom from violent assault, opportunities for sexual satisfaction, and 
reproductive choices); being able to use the senses, imagination, reason, and thought; 
being able to plan one’s life in accordance with one’s own conception of the good; being 
able to love and to play; being able to shape one’s political environment through the 
rights of political participation, association, and free speech; and through equal 
opportunity for employment that allows one to work as a fully human being ‘exercising 
practical reason.”
77 The ethical force of the capabilities approach lies precisely in its 
universality. According to Nussbaum, all human beings are framed as being born with 
these capabilities and must be provided with conditions and choices that enable their 
flourishing.  
  Nussbaum’s approach is convincing because she does not represent her list of 
human capabilities as eternally ‘true’ or as ‘human nature.’ Rather, it has emerged out of 
human experience, in a context of cross cultural inquiry, as a response to the question, 
“What activities characteristically performed by human beings are so central that they 
seem definitive of a life that is truly human?” Thus Nussbaum’s account of the human “is 
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both open ended and humble; it can always be contested and remade.”
78 This means that 
Nussbaum’s humanism is not grounded in transhistorical claims about the human person, 
although the human person and, more specifically, her capacity for moral choice clearly 
authorize Nussbaum’s inquiry and provide its ethical rationale.  
Other thinkers such as Carol Quillen, however, perceive Nussbaum’s approach as 
flawed in its ignorance of contextual difference, in particular the “difference making 
mechanisms,” or tools, which structure people into unfair hierarchies, such as, for 
instance, the institution of the family, which often undermines emancipatory aspirations. 
In assuming a universal definition of the human, Nussbaum obscures these difference 
making mechanisms so that we are unlikely to ask the central question: “how do human 
persons come to imagine themselves as autonomous moral choosers at all?”
79 As Saba 
Mahmood concurs in Politics of Piety, using Judith Butler’s theorizations of agency, a 
person’s mode of exercising “choice” and agency is always heavily dependent on the 
“difference making mechanisms,” that have produced them as individuals in the first 
place, whether they are Western subjects or non-Western ones. Thus she redefines the 
concept of agency: 
I want to suggest we think of agency not as a synonym for 
resistance to relations of domination, but as a capacity for action 
that historically specific relations of subordination enable and 
create.
80 
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Since a person’s choice is never fully their choice, but also the choice of the discourses 
and material circumstances that have produced them, Mahmood questions the very idea 
of individual autonomy. The corollary is her argument for “uncoupling the notion of self 
realization from that of the autonomous will.”
81  
However, Mahmood’s claim that one must question the idea of individual 
autonomy overlooks that it is precisely the “illusion of choice” that leads to the “self 
realization” she talks about. Given that Mahmood’s subjects think they are exercising 
individual autonomy, that they are “choosing” to submit to God’s will, is it not the 
illusion of choice that leads to self-fulfillment in the first place? If yes, then can we still 
question, the way Mahmood does, the link between the notion of self-fulfillment and 
individual autonomy? Judged by the capabilities approach, after all, these women are 
making choices and “flourishing,” even if they are not following liberal ideals. Thus even 
though Mahmood argues that “the desire for freedom and liberation is a liberal and 
historically situated desire whose motivational force cannot be assumed a priori”
82 her 
analysis suggests otherwise. While we cannot define exactly what shape this freedom 
may take, the women in the mosque movement are clearly exercising freedom as 
autonomy in their daily lives, though outside the purview of liberal humanist 
manifestations of that autonomy.  
As Mahmood herself points out, her subjects read their failures to approximate an 
Islamic ideal of femininity as “a marker of an inadequately formed self” which causes 
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them to “undertake a specific series of steps to rectify the situation.” While the subjects’ 
corrective actions do depend on the prior repeated performances of normative virtues that 
Butler outlines in her theory of agency,
83 or the “difference making mechanisms” that 
constitute them, their actions in relation to these virtues are based on a perception of 
choice, the choice to act in accordance with God’s will and thereby glean self-fulfillment. 
A universal definition of freedom and agency tied to the notion of self-fulfillment, yet 
that differs in its contextual specificities from liberal humanist, secular manifestations of 
individual freedom, still implicitly survives in Mahmood’s study.  
A survival of such ideas in Mahmood’s analysis, then, makes the case for 
“contextual universalisms” that acknowledge the universality of individual freedom while 
still taking into account the difference making mechanisms that affect the choices 
individuals make.
84 The bildungsroman by Krupabai Satthianadhan that I read in Chapter 
Four poses just such a contextually universalist idea of agency; Satthianadhan defines 
individual freedom as the power to exercise choice and make decisions without 
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84 What I am suggesting throws up two controversial questions that remain central to a lot of 
feminist debates about women’s rights in non-Western cultures: Is a choice still a free choice if it 
is subconscious or unaware of the discourses that have produced it as a choice? And is a choice 
still a free choice if the choice ends up proving harmful to one’s overall interests? For instance, 
what can one say, according to this framework, to the (admittedly rare) woman who chooses to be 
circumcised? Would telling her that the choice is a harmful one, and that she cannot make it, be 
tantamount to an imperialist standpoint? The capabilities approach suggests the answer to this in 
its assertion that a truly free choice can only be made if the context in which a woman has made 
the choice is in line with Nussbaum’s list of human capabilities; Nussbaum would suggest that we 
cannot call a woman’s choice to be circumcised a free choice if she does not have alternatives 
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constraint. Yet, her universalizing assertions of individual freedom rely on a physical 
body that interprets conditions as oppressive or liberating according to affective 
sensations grounded in local structures of feeling. Such contextually universalist 
humanisms contest dismissals of universalisms by demonstrating the latter’s non-
imperialist libratory potential in other cultural contexts.  
 
In the following chapters, I explore such literary “contextual universalisms” in 
Oriyan devotional poetry, Zulu praise poetry, and the Indian bildungsroman in English, 
turning to these oft overlooked texts as valuable sources with which to rewrite colonial 
histories. As Mohanty points out, literary readings of such indigenous texts can carry out 
an interdisciplinary project of historical recovery, thereby reconceptualizing “what we 
often condescendingly call the ‘premodern.’”
85 In this vein, I retrieve and highlight the 
unique, and startlingly modern, manifestations of rationality, democratic ideals, and 
individual freedom that defined South African and Indian indigenous modernities.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
85 See Mohanty, “Alternative Modernities and Medieval Indian Literature: the Oriya Lakshmi 
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Chapter 2: Radical Religious Rationalities in Colonial Indian Poetry
86 
In March 1881, an incident took place in the Orissan city of Puri, located in 
Eastern India, that shook the Brahminical religious authorities, as well as the colonial 
establishment that buttressed them,
87 to the core.
88 A group of fifteen followers of 
Mahima Dharma, an ascetic religious movement founded in late nineteenth century 
Orissa by non-Brahmin priests, marched to Puri and stormed its famous Jagannath temple 
compound. The press and police reports make clear that the Mahima Dharmis, reportedly 
in Puri under the influence of their adivasi
89 Guru, Bhīma Bhoi,
90 tried to remove the 
idols of Jagannath, Subhadra and Balarama in order to burn them, reflecting an 
uncompromising stand on idolatry, sacred hierarchies and temple rituals. The reports 
brand the group as rioters, criminals, savages and fanatics for committing an act so 
                                                        
 
87 Colonial presuppositions about the role of sacred texts in ‘religion’ predisposed Orientalists 
towards focusing upon such texts as the essential foundation for understanding the Hindu people, 
resulting in the literate Brahmins, for whom religious texts like the Vedas and Shastras were 
central, becoming representative of the Hindu religion, and enjoying elevated social, economic 
and political status. Richard King, Orientalism and Religion, (London: Routledge, 1999), 101-
102. 
 
88 The colonial law keepers underscored the irrationality of the Mahima Dharmis by defining 
them as lunatics and fanatics. The Utkala Deepika, an Oriya newspaper patronized by the upper 
classes, stressed the lowly origin and filthy habits of the attackers. Ishita Bannerjee Dube, 
Religion, Law and Power, (London: Anthem Press, 2007), 51. 
89 The term ‘adivasi’ was coined in the 1930s by the British to refer to the original inhabitants of a 
given region and also carries the connotation of past autonomy disrupted by the British.  
90 In truth, Bhīma’s involvement in this incident is questionable. The Sambalpur District Gazettier 
only linked him to the events decades later in 1908 because the instigators marched to Puri from 
Sambalpur, which is where Bhīma emerged as the main leader of the faith after Mahima Swami’s 
death. See Ishita Bannerjee Dube, Religion, Law and Power, (London: Anthem Press, 2007), 53.  
See also Ishita Bannerjee-Dube “Issues of Faith, Enactment of Contest: The Founding of Mahima 
Dharma in Nineteenth Century Orissa,” in Jagannath Revisited ed. H. Kulke and B. Schepnel, 
(New Delhi: Manohar, 2001),149-177. 
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revolutionary that it has been eliminated from the collective memory of an increasingly 
Brahminized community.  This willed forgetting is not surprising given that Bhīma’s 
devotional verses, despite being written by a mere adivasi,
 challenge the authority of the 
Brahminical priestly and intellectual class. Asserting himself as a writer who deserves 
respect despite his social background, he defiantly declares that his poetry is not the 
result of any scriptural knowledge, but of his own experiences as a tribal: “It is a jest of 
my Guru that my eyes cannot see./ I mastered no Vedas or Sastras./ I compose my verse 
with my mind, through my experience, peering into the Void.”
91 
Bhīma Bhoi (18-- - 1895) was the saint poet of Mahima Dharma, literally the 
“glorious dharma,” which advocated devotion to an all-pervasive, formless Absolute, 
equally accessible to all, as the way to salvation. This seemingly simple message 
rendered the worship of idols (murtipuja) redundant, including that of Jagannath, the 
central deity of Hinduism in Orissa and the state deity for centuries, and questioned 
hierarchies of caste and kinship (jatigata bibheda), and the role of the Brahmins as 
mediators between gods and men. Therefore, Bhīma rejected the ritual use of the tulsi 
plant, a high symbol of the Sanskritic and Brahmanic Hindu identity, and in a radical 
reversal of social conventions, refused to accept food from Brahmins. Mahima Swami, 
the faith’s founding Guru, preached in the distant territories of the tributary states, 
inhabited predominantly by lower caste, untouchable and indigenous peoples. Mahima 
Dharma, then, was “doubly subaltern;” not only geographically and epistemologically 
                                                        
91 Johannes Beltz and Bettina Baumer, Bhīma Bhoi: Verses from the Void, (New Delhi: Manohar, 
2010), 175.   62 
separate from the colonizing powers, but also separate from powerful groups within 
Indian society itself.
92  
Bhīma Bhoi was voicing his challenge to Brahminical authority, from the 
peripheral tribal regions of Orissa, during the height of the colonial period. This was the 
same time that Swami Vivekananda, the famous nineteenth century reformer of 
Hinduism, was bolstering Brahminical, Vedic interpretations of Hinduism for the 
colonialists and educated nationalists in metropolitan regions of India and the Western 
world. Unlike Vivekananda, however, Bhīma derived his “criticism of the Hindu tradition 
directly from the tradition itself,”
93 drawing from the diverse intellectual traditions that 
tribal Orissan society was steeped in. His devotional verse collections, the Stuti 
Chintamoni and Bhajan Mala, identify him with a number of regional intellectual and 
narrative traditions such as the panchasakha, the group of sixteenth century poet saints 
who wrote for the masses in vernacular Oriya rather than in Sanskrit for the educated 
elite. In doing so, he was also drawing on the legacy of the low caste, fifteenth century 
farmer Sarala Das who produced vernacular Oriya versions of the Sanskrit ancient Hindu 
epics, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, and who was widely known and revered as 
“sudra muni,” or low caste sage. Rather than drawing from the Sanskrit Vedas and 
Shastras of high caste Hinduism,
94 Bhīma got his conception of Brahman as Alekha, or 
                                                        
92 Bannerjee Dube, Religion, Law and Power, 8. 
93 Anncharlott Eschmann, “Mahima Dharma: An Autochtonous Hindu Reform Movement” in 
The  Cult  of  Jagannath  and  the  Regional  Tradition  of  Orissa,  eds.  Anncharlott  Eschmann, 
Herman Kulke and Tripathi, (New Delhi: Manohar, 1978), 375. 
94 Mahima Dharma consists of two monastic orders from different sections of society. The 
unorthodox kaupinadharis in western Orissa are mostly from marginalized castes and the 
bakkaladharis at Joranda, with their highly organized, regulated monastery, from rich farming 
castes. For an account of the conflicts between the two see Johannes Beltz, “Contested   63 
the “unwritten,” as well as his concept of “sunya,” or “the void,” from the Nagarjuna 
Buddhist and Tantric influences that had saturated rural, tribal Orissa for centuries.
95 
Bhīma drew on symbolic tantric cosmology to portray the divine and the worshipper’s 
body as containing and creating the entire universe.
96 His yoga was influenced by the 
tantra of the Siddhas and Nath Yogis,
 97 emphasizing the importance of the subtle body, 
its chakras, and the rising of Kundalini Sakti,
98 elements purged by the mainstream 
Jagannath cults. Furthermore, Bhīma’s language of bhakti, that of devotion and total 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Authorities, Disputed Centres and Rejected Norms: Situating Mahima Dharma in its Regional 
Diversity,” in Periphery and Centre: Studies in Orissan History, Religion and Anthropology, ed. 
G. Pfeffer, (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), 86-93. 
95 ‘Alekh’ suggests that the Absolute that is Brahman cannot be represented, defined, seen or 
written about. Alekha comes from the Sansrit root ‘lekh’ or ‘likh’ which means to write. ‘A lekh,’ 
then, means that which is ‘unwritten,’ an implicit challenge to the educated Brahmin religious 
authorities and the colonial institutionalization of their written texts. 
 
96 Bhīma Bhoi was very much influenced by tantric cosmology that suggested that all the 
elements of the universe, including the ancient yogis and places of pilgrimage, exist in one’s own 
body. In tantric sadhana the body is a link between outer and inner; one can discover the divinity 
within oneself by using the body as a container of the divinity without. Bhīma therefore instructs 
the devotee to “locate within your body the holy pilgrimages of the outside world. None so 
foolish as a yogi who wanders from place to place on the earth.” The way to “journey into your 
body and create therein the vast universe” is to “perform the rites of yoga.” There the yogi will 
find that, “the slave of the Lord contains within all nine continents, and the infinite universe.” See 
also Bettina Baumer, “Tantric Elements in Bhīma Bhoi’s Ouvre” in Popular Religion and Ascetic 
Practices: New Studies on Mahima Dharma, eds. Ishita Bannerjee-Dube and Johannes Beltz, 
(New Delhi: Manohar, 2008). 
97 A Siddha in Sanskrit means one who has reached spiritual enlightenment. The Sanskrit word, 
nāthá, denotes the path towards enlightenment and the word itself is a synonym for Brahman. 
The Nath tradition, a subsect of the siddha tradition, was founded by Matsyendranath, a simple 
fisherman, in the 8
th century, and further developed by Gorakshanath. These two individuals are 
revered in Nagarjuna Buddhism for perfected spiritual attainment. The Natha Sampradaya does 
not recognize caste barriers, and was adopted by outcasts and kings alike. The language of the 
Natha yogis is the sandhya bhasa which influenced Panchasakha literature.  
98 Kundalini shakti, Sanskrit for “serpent power,” is energy thought to reside within the sleeping 
body like a coiled serpent in the root chakra (the centre of subtle energy) at the base of the spine, 
and is aroused through spiritual discipline to bring about enlightenment. In Tantra Yoga, 
kundalini is an aspect of Shakti, the divine female energy and consort of Shiva. 
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surrender to the Guru who embodies the Divine, was drawing on the influence of Orissa’s 
medieval bhakti poets. His references to the Krishna story also have a slight Vaishnav 
tinge, though one derived from regional folk theatre, and not written texts. Bhīma’s 
universalizing assertions of equal, rational social organization, which I explore in this 
chapter, then, were contextually grounded in local, pre-colonial intellectual cultures.  
This chapter focuses on Bhīma’s collections of popular devotional verses, the 
Stuti Chintamoni and Bhajan Mala,
99 sung even today during the ritual worship of 
Brahman. The context of its recitation is a ritual called “dhuni,” devoted to Alekha, 
where a ritual fire is burnt and his verses are recited accompanied by regional 
instruments. Diverse traditional, popular and local tunes are used as melodies. The songs 
are sung fervently by often illiterate devotees and babas, although their content is full of 
highly philosophical and mystical ideas that are far from simple. The verse structure of 
the text, which draws on the structure of bhakti poetry, facilitates its function as 
devotional text meant to be memorized and chanted by the devotee, while mirroring the 
logical, ‘rational’ sequence of the philosophizing the poetry tries to convey. While 
Bhīma’s poetry is composed systematically, “with due regard to metre, rhythm and 
musicality,” and conveys a rational philosophy of social equality, his language is the  
“twilight language,” or “intentional language,” the sandhya bhasa, full of paradoxes and 
contradictions or ‘upside down’ expressions (ulta – bamsi). It is the mystical, paradoxical 
                                                        
99 Bhīma Bhoi’s Oriya text is very popular but there are only three accurate translations in 
English. I use the latest complete and scholarly 2010 translation by Johannes Beltz and Bettina 
Baumer, long time scholars of Mahima Dharma, and supplement it with Sidharth Satpathy’s 2006 
translation of Stuti Chintamoni. For other bhajanas not in the above translations, I use Sitakant 
Mahapatra’s 1983 translations. See Johannes Beltz and Bettina Baumer, Bhīma Bhoi: Verses from 
the Void, (New Delhi: Manohar, 2010). Siddharth Satpathy, Bhīma Bhoi, Prayers and Reflections, 
Selections from Stuticintamani, (Bhubaneswar: Rupantar, 2006). And Sitakant Mahapatra, Bhīma 
Bhoi, (Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1983).   65 
language of the Buddhist siddhas and nath yogis.
100 It is characterized by spontaneous 
rhetoric, as described by A.K. Ramanujan and developed by Linda Hess who calls it 
“rough rhetoric,” containing a combination of “rudeness and potency” as well as 
“simplicity and bluntness of style.”
101 This is a phrase particularly apt for Bhīma Bhoi 
who belongs to the category of grassroots vernacular religious poets, and certainly shares 
the qualities of spontaneity and “rough rhetoric.”  
Bhīma’s Stuti Chintamoni and Bhajan Mala, then, are counterhegemonic texts in 
both form and content. As I show in the textual analysis below, Bhīma articulates his 
subaltern consciousness and calls for social change by highlighting the rationality that 
was the basis of his thought. His focus on rationality is particularly important because 
both during his own time, and today, his ideas were dismissed as irrational by elements at 
the top of the colonial and religious hierarchy who found them threatening. In the larger 
colonial context, his conceptions of rationality were very different from Swami 
Vivekananda’s, the nineteenth century reformer of Hinduism who highlighted the 
rationality of the Vedas for a Western audience by charting out a course of Hindu 
nationalism replete with Western scientific discourses of rationality. As I argue, the 
nationalist reform movements of which Vivekananda was a pioneer had little or no 
                                                        
100 The first known instance of the “sandhya bhasa” was found in the 8th-12th century Vajrayana 
Buddhist caryagiti, or “songs of realization,” from the tantric folk tradition in eastern India.  The 
language exemplifies some of the earliest instances of the Assamese, Oriya, Maithili and Bengali 
languages. The writers of the Charyapada were the Buddhist Mahasiddhas or Siddhacharyas of 
the various regions of Assam, Bengal, Orissa and Bihar. The sandhya bhasa literally means the 
'Twilight Language' in Sanskrit, or Alo-andhari (half expressed and half concealed). However, 
later evidence from a number of Buddhist texts suggests that it was called the “Intentional 
language,” or the Sandha-bhasha in Sanskrit. See Prabhat Mukherjee, “The Sidhacharyas in 
Orissa” in The History of Medieval Vaishnavism in Orissa, (New Delhi: Asian Educational 
Services, 1981), 55. 
 
101 Beltz and Baumer, Bhīma Bhoi: Verses from the Void, 61-62. 
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grassroots support for their ideas; the Brahmo Samaj and Ramakrishna Mission imposed 
their reformist ideals from above in alliance with the colonial state apparatus and the 
upper castes.
102 Furthermore, building on Sekhar Bandhopadhyay’s argument that Hindu 
society maintained its cultural hegemony and structure by frustrating reformist endeavors 
and marginalizing dissidence,
103 I suggest that nationalist reformist endeavors such as 
Vivekananda’s were themselves inextricable from this process of marginalization; rather 
than reforming Hindu society into a more egalitarian space, Vivekananda was 
strengthening its hierarchical structures by consolidating it into an increasingly upwardly 
mobile, upper caste, English speaking, literate Hindu identity. It is not surprising, then, 
that he set up secular distinctions between “rational” thought and “mythic” thought by 
simply suppressing any mythic, tantric or ritualistic elements (which were ‘popular’ 
rather than upper caste forms of religiosity) that he found.  
 
Bhīma’s conceptions of rationality were also very different from those within his 
own religious community. The dharma that Visvanath Baba, the leader of the Mahima 
Dharma sect at Joranda from 1920 to the 1990s, popularized was radically different from 
what Bhīma thought, since the former ignored Bhīma’s revolutionary, dissident or 
heterodox tenets regarding the equal treatment of women, the stand against casteism, and 
                                                        
102 Indian caste feudalism was strategically consolidated through an alliance of Brahmanism and 
colonial  state  power,  calculated  for  their  own  benefits.  See  Nicholas  Dirks,  Castes  of  Mind: 
Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton: Oxford, 2001) and Gail Omvedt, Dalits 
and  the  Democratic  Revolution:  Dr  Ambedkar  and  the  Dalit  Movement  in  Colonial  India 
(London: Thousand Oaks, 1994). 
 
103 Shekhar Bandhopadhyay, Caste, Culture, and Hegemony, Social Dominance in Colonial 
Bengal, (London: Sage, 2004).  
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his favoring of the popular language, the colloquial Oriya. Visvanath Baba himself wrote 
in highly Sanskritized Oriya, gave ethical and ritual guidelines, prohibitions and 
commands, discriminated against women, and recognised social stratification based on 
caste.
104 Most importantly for this argument, however, Visvanath Baba permanently 
established links between the Sanskritic tradition of Hinduism and Mahima Dharma, 
underlining that the ‘new’ message of Mahima Swami offered a path of pure, rational, 
non ritualistic monism that was Vedic in its valences.  
 
Given the rewriting of Bhīma’s radical legacy by some of his followers, it 
becomes all the more important to highlight the unique, and startlingly modern, 
rationalities that were central to his thinking and in effecting social change. In doing so, I 
illuminate Bhīma’s assertion of an alternative modernity, and, in the process, aim to 
‘provincialize’ European accounts of modernity without resorting to cultural or historical 
relativism.
105 Since the dichotomy of rationality vs. irrationality often buttresses the 
conceptual binaries of modern vs. premodern, one way to explore indigenous modernities 
is by investigating how forms of rationality arose in non-Western cultures. Indeed, one of 
the most important defining features of modernity, as I argue in my introduction, has 
been the suppression and devaluing of non-Western knowledges through the domination 
of Enlightenment Reason over ‘reason’ in general which Charles Taylor and Harry 
Frankfurt define as the legacy of human beings in general and which consists of, among 
other things, the ability to be logically consistent, to separate oneself from one’s 
                                                        
104 Beltz and Baumer, Bhīma Bhoi: Verses from the Void, 39-40 
 
105 Mohanty, “Alternative Modernities and Medieval Indian Literature: the Oriya Lakshmi Purana 
As Radical Pedagogy,” 3–21. 
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immediate context in order to evaluate one’s life and one’s desires in terms of larger 
ideas about the world, and the ability to trace one’s own cognitive thought patterns.
106 
Bhīma Bhoi expresses these rationalities in the aesthetic form of religious poetry, very 
different from the ways in which Occidental philosophers were doing so. Yet seeing his 
verses as nothing more than devotional poetry in the colonially constructed epistemic 
category “religion” would obscure the fascinating theorizations of rationality the aesthetic 
form enacts. As I suggest in the introduction, drawing on Satya Mohanty, literary 
readings of such indigenous texts can carry out an interdisciplinary project of historical 
recovery, thereby reconceptualizing “what we often condescendingly call the 
“premodern.’”
107  
To highlight just how radical Bhīma’s ideas of rationality were, and how 
independently they were articulated from colonialist discourses of modernity, I begin 
with an exploration of how Swami Vivekananda coupled the idea of minimal rationality 
with Enlightenment discourses of science to lend legitimacy to Hinduism for a Western 
audience and for the higher caste Hindu landed aristocracy that financed and supported 
his cause.
108 By way of contrast, I then turn to Bhīma Bhoi who enacts two important and 
                                                        
106 See Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” 5-20. and Taylor, 
“Rationality.” 
 
107 Mohanty, “Alternative Modernities and Medieval Indian Literature: the Oriya Lakshmi Purana 
As Radical Pedagogy,” 6. 
 
108  Vivekananda  often  notes  science’s  supposed  ability  to  understand  individual  experiences 
through larger ideas about the world: ‘The scientist does not tell you to believe in anything, but he 
has certain results which come from his own experiences, and, when he asks us to believe in his 
conclusions,  he  appeals  to  some  universal  experience  of  humanity.’  Swami  Vivekananda, 
Selections from Swami Vivekananda, (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1964). 
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radical philosophies of rationality in his poetry. First, he theorizes rationality from within 
the local aesthetic epistemes of devotional poetry to resist local Brahmanic power 
structures and to carve out a modern theory of identity that relies on an individual’s 
actions (karma), rather than their fate (bhagya.) In doing so, Bhīma’s poetry testifies to 
the “knowledge revolution,” to use Susan Stanford Friedman’s term, that was a crucial 
component of indigenous alternative modernities; his poetry reflects and produces the 
cultural structures of feeling and literary languages that emphasized the defining of 
individuals, in resistance to local and foreign power structures, through their actions 
rather than through their pre-ordained religious or caste status. In the process of enacting 
a rationality drawn from Orissan intellectual traditions, Bhima attempts to understand his 
own social position and desires in light of larger ideas about the world, and also self 
consciously traces the logical consistency of his cognitive thought patterns.  
 Second, Bhīma Bhoi couples his rational social critique with a radical positing of 
secular rationality in the ‘ulti bamsi’ or upside down language of Orissan tribal 
religiosity. Thus I examine how, unlike Vivekananda, Bhīma Bhoi enables us to uncover 
forms of ‘secular rationality’ in pre-colonial Indian religion relatively uninfluenced by 
Western theorizations of rationality. My positing of this universal capacity for “secular 
rationality,” however, does not indicate a separation of religious from secular institutions 
in government; epistemological secularism, according to Talal Asad, precedes political 
secularism and describes a sensibility or state of mind which distinguished living in myth, 
magic, ritual and the sacred from a state of mind based on rational understandings of the 
world.
109 Furthermore, my use of this definition implicitly challenges what Jakobsen and 
                                                        
109 See Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).   70 
Pellegrini describe as Enlightenment secularism, “in which reason progressively frees 
itself from the bonds of religion and in so doing liberates humanity. This narrative poses 
religion as a regressive force in the world, one that in its dogmatism is not amenable to 
change, dialogue or nonviolent conflict resolution, separates secularism from religion” 
and, in the process, “places secularism in a particular historical tradition, one that is 
located in Europe and grows out of Christianity.”
110 Meanwhile, my alternative 
investigation of Talal Asad’s “epistemological secularism,” which I suggest is a universal 
capacity, attempts to unsettle the universalization of this Enlightenment idea of 
secularism and its positing of religion as “irrational” and in opposition to the category of 
the “secular.” In doing so, my analysis aims to decolonize the ‘secular’ by highlighting 
the possibility of alternative secularisms that arose in the non-West, thus legitimizing the 
epistemic modes through which subalterns often leave behind their intellectual legacies, 
and recognizing them as modernities in their own right.  
Vivekananda’s rationality: a colonial discourse?  
  Vivekananda’s writings, I argue, can be read as the result of understanding 
rationality mainly through European Enlightenment categories of knowledge, both 
because these were the ones he held as superior, and, as Niranjan Dhar has shown, 
because they enabled him to effectively represent Hinduism to the West and to the 
colonially backed, upper caste, and English speaking Hindu aristocracy that supported 
                                                        
110 Janet Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini (eds.), Secularisms (A Social Textbook), (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2008), 2. 
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him.
111 I suggest, then, that while Bengali nationalist reform movements such as 
Vivekanada’s Ramakrishna Mission saw themselves as progressive, they took a top down 
colonialist approach that had little grassroots level support. Rather than reforming Hindu 
society to the benefit of lower castes and marginalized groups, they were in fact 
managing subaltern groups for the benefit of the colonizing British and for those upper 
caste Hindus who had managed to climb into the upper echelons of the colonial 
hierarchy.
112  It is not surprising, then, that like European thinkers at the time, 
Vivekananda believed that Enlightenment science was the ultimate rationality and 
therefore legitimized Hinduism through extensive comparisons to science. Last, this 
section considers how Vivekananda glossed over anything that would have been 
considered irrational by Western standards. The result is that the indigenous forms of 
rationality present in, for example, Radha Krishna worship or tantra, remained 
unexplored and consigned to the category “irrational.” 
Born Narendranath Dutta in Calcutta, a colonial metropolis, in 1863, 
Vivekananda was the chief disciple of the 19th century mystic Sri Ramakrishna 
Paramhamsa and the founder of Ramakrishna Mission. He is considered a key figure in 
the introduction of Vedanta and Yoga in Europe and America and is also credited with 
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raising interfaith awareness, bringing Hinduism to the status of a world religion during 
the end of the 19th century.
113 As Richard King and Ashis Nandy have pointed out, 
Vivekananda’s reform of Hinduism was heavily influenced by Occidental religious 
discourse and devoted to representing Indian spirituality to the West as rational. In doing 
so, Vivekananda was one of the key figures involved in what Richard King has called the 
modern construction of Hinduism, “a process which located the core of Indian religiosity 
in certain Sanskrit texts (the textualization of Indian religion), and second by an implicit 
(and sometimes explicit) tendency to define Indian religion in terms of a normative 
paradigm of religion based upon contemporary Western understandings of the Judaeo-
Christian traditions.
114” This new episteme created the rising perception that ‘Hinduism’ 
had become a corrupt shadow of its former Vedic self, and that the gap between the 
original Hinduism, and contemporary Hindu beliefs and practices, had to be filled by 
nationalist Hindu reform movements such as the Brahmo Samaj and Vivekananda’s 
Ramakrishna Mission. Vivekananda took on this task with gusto. His thought was 
developed during attempts to influence Western views of Hinduism over two very long 
trips to the United States in the 1890s when he founded a Vedanta Society in San 
Francisco and a Shanti Ashrama (peace retreat.) Returning home from his first trip only 
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in 1897, he conducted a whirlwind speaking tour throughout India, and launched a 
number of English language journals for foreign as well as domestic subscribers. For 
instance, the Prabuddha Bharata, or Awakened India stated its objective was “to present 
the truths of the Hindu religion and the Vedanta in a simple and homely style, illustrating 
them by means of Puranic stories, philosophical tales and novels, and by the lives of great 
saints and sages.
115” As Srinivas Aravamudan points out, this periodical was a 
sophisticated theolinguistic organ, featuring stories of Vivekananda’s missionary work, 
even as it retailed advertisements for photographs of spiritual leaders, “Hindu” 
timepieces, and books on Indian religion.
116 
 Vivekananda’s ideal of rationality, then, was clearly fashioned according to what 
a Western audience would find compelling and engaging. More specifically, it was 
fashioned according to the dictates of European Enlightenment philosophy that was part 
of a colonialist discourse of modernity, where science was the epitome of the rational, 
needed to lend legitimacy to Hinduism. Thus he used Enlightenment science to back his 
representation of rationality in the Hindu philosophy of non-duality, or Advaita, which 
argues that the self does not exist separately from the divine (Brahman). The concept of 
Dvaita, meanwhile, describes the opposite, a God outside the self who one must worship. 
According to Advaita, this concept of the God outside oneself is the unfortunate result of 
“Maya,” which describes the limited, purely physical and mental reality in which our 
everyday consciousness has become entangled. Maya survives by preventing the 
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individual from becoming one with, or attuned to Brahman. The aim of every human life, 
or Moksha (spiritual salvation), is the union of the soul with this truth, with Brahman, a 
condition that Vivekananda sums up as “unity.” He justifies non-duality, his ideal of the 
ultimate rationality, so: 
Science  is  nothing  but  the  finding  of  unity.  As  soon  as 
science  would  reach  perfect  unity,  it  would  stop  from 
further  progress,  because  it  would  reach  the 
goal…chemistry could not progress further when it would 
discover  one  element  out  of  which  all  others  could  be 
made.  Physics  would  stop  when  it  would  be  able 
to…discover  one  energy  of  which  all  the  others  are  but 
manifestations, and the science of religion become perfect 
when  it  would  discover  Him  who  is  the  one  life  in  a 
universe  of  Death.  All  science  is  bound  to  come  to  this 
conclusion  in  the  long  run…the  Hindu  is  only  glad  that 
what he has been cherishing in his bosom for ages is going 
to be taught in more forcible language, and with further 
light from the latest conclusions of science.
117  
Here Vivekananda uses the examples of Chemistry and Physics to suggest that they all 
point to the “unity” apparent in his non-dualist Hinduism. The most important discovery 
that Physics and Chemistry can make is discovering the “one energy,” or the “Him” from 
which all life comes, and all science at its core is engaged in gathering more and more 
evidence to bolster this point of view. Furthermore, while science can provide evidence 
for non-dualism as the ultimate truth of the universe, it must not be regarded as higher 
than Hindu philosophy because the Vedas preceded European science in founding key 
scientific principles: “there are theories in the Vedic philosophy about the origin of life 
on this earth very similar to those which have been advanced by some modern European 
scientists. You, of course, all know that there is a theory that life came from other planets. 
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It is a settled doctrine with some Vedic philosophers that life comes in this way, from the 
moon.
118” Vivekananda therefore refers to Raja Yoga as a science rather than a 
philosophy. “The science of Raja yoga proposes to put before humanity a practical and 
scientifically worked out method of reaching the divine truth.” Vivekananda further 
elaborates on the precision and empiricism suggested by the words “practically” and 
“scientifically worked out method:” in science “a certain method must be followed. You 
must go to the lab, take different substances, mix them up, compound them, experiment 
with them, and out of that will come a knowledge of chemistry. If you want to be an 
astronomer, you must go to an observatory, take a telescope, study the stars and planets, 
and then you will become an astronomer.”
119 In other words, Vivekananda stresses, 
Hinduism is as rational as Enlightenment science was projected as being, with just as 
much of a precise empirical method through which to arrive at results.  
The problem with this, of course, is that Vivekananda, and the reformist religion 
he led, ignored any aspects of indigenous rationality that would be considered “irrational” 
according to Enlightenment epistemes. His dismissal of the “irrational” from Hinduism 
meant that the indigenous forms of rationality present in, for example, tantric forms of 
worship, remained categorized as superstition, rather than being seen as ‘rational’ in their 
own right. Just how much these forces were at work in Vivekananda’s version of Hindu 
rationality is clear from his representation of his Guru, Sri Ramakrishna and the 
Ramakrishna Mission, as the embodiment of his idea of a universal religion free of idol 
worship or tantrism, and of symbolic, ritualistic aspects: “Ay, long before ideas of 
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universal religion and brotherly feeling between different sects were mooted and 
discussed in any country in the world, here, in sight of this city, had been living a man 
whose whole life was a Parliament of Religions, as it should be.”
120 This did not only 
involve diluting the specificities of Hindu religiosity into a whitewashed, general 
“universal religion,” but also actively hiding those aspects that would not be acceptable to 
a “Parliament of Religions.” In fact Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, who Vivekananda first 
met in November 1881 did believe in the worship of deities; he had been a priest of the 
Dakshineshwar Kali Temple, dedicated to the goddess Kali, which was influenced by the 
main strands of the devotional Bengali bhakti tradition. Ramakrishna was also a tantric, 
or someone who studied the use of the body as a vehicle towards Moksha, or salvation, in 
both sexual and non-sexual ways; his first spiritual teacher was an ascetic woman skilled 
in tantra and Vaishnava bhakti. Vivekananda actively overlooked these elements, taking 
up only those elements of Ramakrishna’s thought that supported his theories of non-
dualism. 
121 
 In his quest to refashion Ramakrishna’s religious sensibility into one agreeable to 
a Western audience, Vivekananda adamantly worked to rewrite Ramakrishna’s biography 
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so that few of these elements survived. As Narasingha P. Sill has shown, he cautioned 
biographers to avoid “all irregular indecent expressions about sex because other nations 
think it the height of indecency to mention such things, and his life in English is going to 
be read by the whole world.” He wrote to another biographer: “Take thought, get 
materials, write a sketch of Ramakrishna, studiously avoiding all miracles. The life 
should be written as an illustration of the doctrines he preached.” Vivekananda also 
preached against Radha-Krsna worship, something that would have sorely troubled his 
master. In April 1897 he wrote to the latest Bengali biographer of Ramakrishna: “There is 
not the least necessity for teaching the divine love of Radha and Krishna. Remember that 
the episodes of the divine relationship between Radha and Krishna are quite unsuitable 
for young minds.” Later he elaborated: “And wherever you hear the Radha-Krishna songs 
going on, use the whip right and left. The whole nation is going to rack and ruin! People 
with no self-control indulging in such songs!”
122 Furthermore, idol worship for 
Vivekananda was a stunted, infantile version of rationality that humans partook in when 
they were not capable of anything better: “External worship, material worship,” say the 
scriptures, “is the lowest stage; struggling to rise high, mental prayer is the next stage, but 
the highest stage is when the Lord has been realized…One thing I must tell you. Idolatry 
in India…is the attempt of undeveloped minds to grasp high spiritual truths….Idols or 
temples or churches or books are only the supports, the helps, of his spiritual childhood: 
but on and on he must progress.”
123 Vivekananda had no time for deities or their tantric 
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associations; his dismissal of the ‘irrational’ from Hinduism and his reframing of 
Hinduism into a “Parliament of Religions” relegated indigenous forms of rationality 
present in, for example, Radha Krishna worship to the category of “superstition,” and, 
unlike Bhīma Bhoi’s rationality, also fashioned Hindu religiosity into a mirror of Western 
religiosity by actively seeking out the West as its main influence and audience. In the 
process, Vivekananda also bolstered the cultural hegemony of the upper caste Hindus 
who financed him.  
rational Others: Bhīma Bhoi  
Like Vivekananda, Bhīma Bhoi practiced and theorized his own conceptions of 
religious rationality, but he did so through devotional poetry that tapped into forms of 
“popular” religiosity that were becoming increasingly marginalized by movements such 
as Vivekananda’s. I therefore turn to his work, as well as the various religious and 
intellectual traditions from which he drew inspiration, as examples of how rational states 
of mind arose in pre-colonial India in forms of knowledge now classified as “religious,” 
as well as how they harnessed popular movements of resistance against irrational social 
hierarchies. This section begins with an exploration of the form Bhīma’s devotional 
poetry took, before tracing the specific rationalities in his poetry; drawing on Charles 
Taylor and Harry Frankfurt I outline the three distinct ways in which Bhīma asserted his 
rationality. He consistently detached himself from his immediate context as a poor, low 
caste tribal to evaluate how his life fit into larger ideas about the world, he reflected on 
and evaluated his own desires in light of his position as an outcaste, and self consciously 
traced his own logical and cognitive thought patterns within his verse. Most importantly,   80 
2000 stanzas in 100 bolis, drawing attention to the magnitude of his work, and by 
corollary his devotion to Alekha and the importance of his radical social message. Bhīma 
also drew on the structure of bhakti poetry to formulate his text, facilitating its function as 
devotional text meant to be memorized and chanted by the devotee. Bhakti poetry starts 
with a ghosa or refrain repeated by the entire group of devotional singers and ends with a 
“signature line” expressing a prayer or an intense feeling. That the aesthetic form of the 
Stuti Chintamoni is suitable for memorizing is not surprising given that this text was and 
is still largely transmitted orally, though a number of palm leaf manuscripts still exist. 
Although these aspects are difficult to see in the written English translations I quote, I 
emphasize the way the logical sequence of the verse structure mirrors the rational 
progression of Bhīma Bhoi’s thought and his investment in the merits of rational social 
organization. 
Bhīma uses his devotional verse to reflect three major explorations of rationality, 
the first of which is the ability to separate oneself from one’s immediate context to 
evaluate one’s life in terms of larger ideas about the world. In line with this notion, 
Bhīma argues that the self can only unite with Brahman once one extricates oneself from 
Maya. Maya describes our immediate context, the limited physical and mental reality in 
which our everyday consciousness has become entangled such as, for instance, the 
trappings of wealth and status. Maya must be overcome in order to attain Moksha, or 
salvation, achieved not through any external rites or pilgrimages but through an intense 
meditative path, through a deep cleansing of the doors of perception till one is attuned to 
Brahman, and therefore to the universe. This journey of overcoming Maya to become 
attuned with one’s own spiritual wealth is suggested by the title of Bhīma’s verse   81 
collection itself. Stuti Chintamoni literally means “eulogy to the thought jewel,” a 
mythical wish-fulfilling stone described in Nagarjuna Buddhism, which was an influence 
on Bhīma’s thought. The Mani jewel was said to manifest whatever one desired, 
including treasures, clothing and food, while removing sickness and suffering. However, 
“Chintamoni” also describes the teachings and virtues of “the enlightened one,” the being 
who has reached Moksha and is able to reflect on all states of the subconscious mind, 
including the ones tied up with Maya, while not being defined or entrapped by either of 
them. Devotion to the enlightened Chintamoni, the being who possesses supreme 
knowledge of these states of mind, is the path to Moksha. Bhīma’s title, then, contains a 
play on metaphors of material as well as spiritual wealth, and as I demonstrate in my 
analysis, his message concerning both is one with radical implications for the society in 
which he lived. 
Bhīma demonstrates his rational ability to understand his own desires in light of 
larger ideas about the world by pointing out that being blind to one’s immediate material 
circumstances, which represent Maya, is acceptable as long as one has the ability to see 
within oneself and acquire spiritual wealth. He therefore describes Maya using the 
metaphor of darkness: “There is no lamp/You keep the house dark.”
124 This is a radical 
point, one that turns Bhīma’s lamentable circumstances as a poor and possibly blind tribal 
into a strength, because it emphasizes that the value of a person should come from within, 
rather than from socially constructed hierarchies. It is a rationality, then, in line with 
Bhīma’s protest against social inequalities such as casteism and sexism. Bhīma therefore 
denigrates the rich and powerful who disregard the spiritual values he tries to impart: 
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Their minds are steeped in ignorance 
And wicked are the high-born. 
When I speak of you as without desire, 
Oh Svami, they just twist their moustaches in pride.
125  
 
The “high born,” or those born into a higher caste, are ‘wicked’ because ‘their minds are 
steeped in ignorance’ and false pride. Bhīma conveys their investment in the trappings of 
Maya by describing their ignorant pride in their moustaches, even though, according to 
spiritual rules, Brahmins are generally supposed to be clean-shaven.
126 Bhīma asserts 
instead that true material wealth is that which comes from spiritual devotion: 
 
What you gave me is merely a glance. 
Of compassion, grace and mercy. 
I paid you back with my devotion and service. 
What remains of my debt or its interest?
127  
 
In this verse addressed to the divine, Bhīma measures material riches through spiritual 
metaphors such as “compassion, grace and mercy,” which he “pays back” not in 
monetary terms but through “devotion and service.” His use of fiscal metaphors conveys 
that the riches of spiritual enlightenment are much more valuable than financial rewards. 
He reinforces this point by ending with a question that challenges his listeners, asserting 
that there should be no question of “debt or interest” because “devotion and service” are 
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more valuable than external signifiers of wealth. Bhīma, then, rationally distances himself 
from his immediate external circumstances to understand himself in relation to the larger 
spiritual truths he values. 
 
The emphasis on valuing a person according to their inner being rather than the 
external trappings of Maya, such as material wealth and social status, is reinforced by the 
hagiographic legends that surround Bhīma’s existence and which he actively propagated 
in his lifetime. According to one of these, “when Mahima Swami, Bhīma Bhoi’s guru 
came to visit him, the blind Bhīma said, ‘If you have come to bless me let me be able to 
see you.’ And then he could see. He came out and saw the two seers standing outside like 
the ‘Sun and Moon.’ Mahima Swami blessed him with the intense power of poetic vision 
and said that he had a preordained role to play in the propagation of the tenets of the 
Mahima cult in this century. Bhīma prayed to him: ‘O Lord, with the power of vision you 
gave me I have seen your divine feet but I don’t want to see all the dirt in this world. 
Bless me that the outside world remains invisible to me.’ The Swami blessed him saying: 
‘Let your inner eyes open and the external eyes close as before.’ Bhīma again went 
blind.”
128 Here, sight functions as a metaphor of enlightenment, and Bhīma stresses that 
true ‘sight’ does not require the functions of the physical body. These legends reinforce 
the point that Moksha can only be reached through a concentration on the inner self 
through intense meditation, rather than through a focus on the external self and the 
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requirements of the physical body. Only those who go down this path of spiritual self-
awareness will be able to overcome Maya and become one with Brahman.  
Since one must detach oneself from one’s immediate context to achieve Moksha, 
in some of his other devotional songs (bhajans), Bhīma focuses on the inner world of the 
self, describing the physical landscape only to emphasize a shimmering landscape of the 
inner world.  
There is no tree nor its roots 
Yet its shadows lengthen 
There are fruits without buds or flowers 
The leaves expand without stalks 
And he is reached through the path of actionlessness.
129  
 
Here, Bhīma metaphorically displaces the immediate physical reality. ‘There is no tree 
nor its roots, …no buds or flowers, no stalks,’ there are just the effects of these things on 
the internal world of the self. For Bhīma, a rich, spiritual state of being can yield the 
productive, meaningful aspects of life without the pleasant, yet ultimately unnecessary 
objects that produce them, such as stalks, buds, flowers and trees; the devotee can benefit 
from the true riches of the world while foregoing those that do not really matter. He can 
enjoy the welcoming shade that trees provide, although not the tree itself; he can satisfy 
his hunger with fruit from the tree but not smell the fragrance of the flowers that usually 
accompanies the fruit. The final sentence “and he is reached through the path of 
actionlessness” suggests that these images are metaphors for a flourishing inner state of 
mind, one that needs only “actionlessness,” or the introspective journey of the mind, to 
achieve equivalents of sensual pleasures such as a flower’s scent. Bhīma’s “actionless” 
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journey, then, enacts a self-aware quest to displace the self from Maya and connect it 
with larger spiritual truths attained through meditation.  
Bhīma’s verses also enact another rational practice, that of being able to reflect on 
one’s own desires. As Harry Frankfurt argues, one form of rationality that makes one 
human is the ability to be self-aware and self-conscious about one’s own desires by 
tracing one’s own cognitive thought patterns. Bhīma’s complaints enact this cognitive 
rationality by separating those desires that are linked to Maya, from those that he feels 
deserve to be satisfied. He therefore rebukes himself for longing for wealth and status 
that is unreasonable or undeserved.  
My heart always longs for tapasya 
And to chant the One-lettered Name 
Yet I am unable, entangled as I am 
In many worldly desires.
130  
 
Here, Bhīma rues himself for desiring the worldly desires that “entangle” him and distract 
him from his tapasya, and wishes to distance himself from these “sins” of longing: “Just 
as darkness cracks up when the Sun’s rays fall on it, similarly o’Lord cut away my sins 
with the sword of knowledge. Just as when the moon rises at night, light shines 
everywhere; similarly abolish the burden of my sin O Lord.”
131 Once again, Bhīma uses 
the “sun” and “moon” metaphor of light displacing darkness. Yet, as before, the “sun” 
and the “moon” are not symbols of physical reality, but of Mahima Dharma’s gurus who 
will lead to inner light, inner knowledge and “abolish the burden of my sin.” Bhīma, then, 
                                                        
 
130 Bhīma in Beltz and Baumer, Bhīma Bhoi: Verses from the Void, 105. 
 
131 Bhīma in Mahapatra, Bhīma Bhoi, 71. 
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is self-consciously describing the objective, rational act of reflecting and evaluating his 
own desires for undeserved wealth or status, a process key to extricating oneself from 
Maya and achieving Moksha. 
Importantly, however, while Bhīma is able to recognize which of his desires are 
unreasonable, in his enactment of cognitive rationality, he also recognizes the desires that 
are reasonable; in a radical point Bhīma asserts that he deserves to have his basic needs 
met. Thus he tempers his emphasis on the value of one’s “inner self,” that responsible for 
producing one’s thoughts and actions, by stressing that being detached from the material 
world does not mean that he does not need any material comforts at all; while he refers to 
being caught up or entrapped in the illusion that is one’s material reality in negative 
imagery, he also stresses that to escape from Maya, a “shelter” of some sort is needed:  
 
Where shall I go? 
Where shall I find a shelter? 
I do not really know. 
Unruly Maya assaults 
Again and yet again. 
How long shall I bear it?
132  
 
“Shelter” works at both a literal and a metaphorical level here; at the metaphorical level it 
signifies the mental strength needed to conquer a Maya that is all encompassing and 
inescapable. Bhīma reinforces the overwhelming power of Maya through the verse form, 
which begins with a question and ends with one, and through the alliteration of the 
Maya’s “assault” and “again and again.” One of the central lines of the verse takes a 
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break from the questioning and states “I do not really know,” capturing his hopelessness. 
However, “shelter” also works at the literal level; elsewhere, Bhīma makes the point that 
if one’s material wealth should derive from one’s inner state of mind, he and his fellow 
devotees should not be treated like dogs and consigned to poverty just because they are 
tribals (adivasis), or members of a lower caste.  
I get easily neither food to eat 
Nor clothes to wear. 
My life is lowly, I am an outcaste. 
I know not when I shall receive your grace. 
 
You are the great Lord and Creator, yet all is in vain. 
You have given me this body, 
Yet my most basic needs you have not met. 
What justice is this, Oh Lord?
133  
 
In the Oriya original, “basic needs” refers to “manda,” the word for gruel. Bhīma, then, is 
not talking about his desire for the Lord to grace him with material wealth, a desire he 
dismisses as “sinful,” but simply asking for basic clothing and for enough food to eat, and 
that too of the minimal quality needed for him to survive. Asserting his basic rights, 
Bhīma demands “justice,” making the modern point that there are some things that 
deserve to be satisfied just by virtue of his humanity.
134  
While asserting the innate dignity of himself as a human, or in the religious sense 
a soul that contains Brahman, as the reason he deserves his basic needs met, Bhīma 
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134 Mahima Dharmi ascetics, then, did not wish to live in total detachment from the material 
world, wanting to be fed and clothed by local patrons who valued their spiritual message. Lidia 
Julianna Guzy, “Mahima Dharma Ascetics: A Case Study on Popular Ascetism and its Patronage 
Structure in Rural Orissa” in Hinduism in Public and Private, ed. Anthony Copley, (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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simultaneously contends that he also deserves that which he works for.
135 In doing so, he 
makes a radical point, tying the value of an individual, and what they deserve, not to 
traditional notions of gender and caste bound identities that were static and inescapable, 
but to modern notions of identity that were tied to the value of the work they did. Bhīma 
outlines and links this rational and thoroughly modern idea to the Hindu notion of karma, 
the law that proclaims that one’s past actions determine one’s social status as well as the 
good or bad events in one’s life. Bhīma writes: 
What you have written I enjoy, 
Following the unseen karma. 
I fill my belly with a morsel of food 
That I earn from daily toil.
136  
 
Bhīma begins by referencing the widespread belief that karma is linked to fate; Brahman 
has “written” “unseen karma,” therefore determining a soul’s fate without the soul being 
able to see its destiny, let alone change it. Bhīma, however, turns this on its head, 
transferring a theological point which generally refers to how actions in one’s past life 
decide one’s static and rigid caste identity in the next, to a modern notion of identity in 
which one can change one’s current circumstances according to one’s own actions in the 
present. Thus the karma Bhīma is referring to is not “unseen” after all; it is the result of 
                                                        
135 Satya Mohanty makes a similar point in his analysis of the Oriya Lakshmi Purana. He argues 
that the goddess Lakshmi has an egalitarian vision in which the worth of an individual is 
determined by the individual’s actions, duty and work rather than static caste hierarchies. 
Mohanty, “Alternative Modernities and Medieval Indian Literature: the Oriya Lakshmi Purana 
As Radical Pedagogy,” 5. 
This idea is also expounded in the Mahabharata, translated by Sarala Das into the vernacular 
Oriya centuries before Bhīma was writing. The Mahabharata revolves around the question of who 
deserves the throne of Hastinapur, asking whether one earns one’s lot based on one’s actions or 
because of their place in the kinship, social or religious hierarchy.  
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carefully calculated rational action. Bhīma highlights the fact that he fills his belly with 
food that “I earn from daily toil.” The word “earn” reinforces the notion that the food he 
eats is directly the result of his actions. 
 Bhīma also enacts his rationality by self consciously recognizing the logical 
consistencies in his cognitive thought processes. His devotional verse expands his 
argument that the value of an individual not only comes from his inherent worth as a 
“soul” issued from Brahman, or in secular terms, just by virtue of being human, but also 
from his actions. He therefore traces the relationships between cause and effect to 
reinforce his point that identities are made according to one’s actions rather than being 
fixed and unconditional:   
If the pandit or a poet does not study, 
Knows not the auspicious and inauspicious times, 
If he is without his almanac or chalk or betel-nut, 
How can he understand virtue and vice? 
 
If a yogi is mad for sense-objects 
And cares not for yoga-sadhana, 
If he has no faith in the practice of mind-and-breath, 
How can he perform his tapasya? 
 
If a Brahmin does not fulfill his ritual duties, 
And follows not the Vedas, if he repeats no mantra, 
If he does not practice the three times of prayer, 
And offers oblations to the dead, then he is of no use.
137  
 
Here, Bhīma explores the logical links between a person’s actions and the outcomes of 
those actions; if a yogi is mad for sensual objects, how can he perform his tapasya, or 
spiritual practice, since the very definition of tapasya is to detach oneself from the 
                                                        
137 Bhīma in Beltz and Baumer, Bhīma Bhoi: Verses from the Void, 107. 
   90 
pleasures of the senses? And if a Brahmin does not fulfill his ritual duties, he ‘is of no 
use’ as a Brahmin, since the very definition of Brahmin is to fulfill these rites. Apart from 
the logical consistency in these statements, they also make a radical social point. A 
Brahmin is not a Brahmin unless he does his duty, just as a pandit or a poet cannot 
understand virtue and vice if they do not study these things. There is no such thing as an 
identity that one is born with; identities are constructed through one’s actions. The radical 
corollary of this, then, is that Brahmins do not deserve their place at the top of the social 
hierarchy anymore than anyone else does. As the verse progresses, Bhīma uses his 
highlighting of the logical schemas of cause and effect to make increasingly controversial 
claims. Having prepared the rational grounds for fewer objections from fellow devotees 
and listeners by starting with the less subversive examples of the “poet,” “pandit,” and 
“yogi,” by the end, he is questioning the fixed nature of Brahmanic identity by the same 
logical sleight of hand. Indeed, he is so bold that by the last two verses, he is even 
challenging the unconditional right of Brahma to be called the creator, or Lord Visnu’s 
unconditional right to be lord of the universe:  
 
If Brahma did not create 
The body of three qualities, 
And if he cares not for birth or destiny, 
Then how can he be called the creator? 
 
If Lord Visnu does not nourish the fifty-six crore creatures, 
If he does not recognize the Self 
And protect the Dharma, 
Then his lordship is not justified.
138  
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Even the divine, then, are not spared Bhīma’s radical rational practice. Thus Bhīma 
makes the point that identities are constructed, not random, and rely on one’s actions. 
Furthermore they are not static but based on changing socio-political contexts that need 
to be questioned when they do not meet the needs of those who deserve better. 
Secular Rationality? Tantra, Ritual & Deity worship in Stuti Chintamoni & the Bhajan-
Mala 
This section examines how Bhīma’s radical rationality, while positing a modern 
politics of social equality, also demonstrates that some pre-colonial Indian thinkers made 
marked secular distinctions between rational thought and mythic thought, (notably 
different from Enlightenment definitions of the secular), and that categories of the 
modern, such as the epistemological “secular rational” I defined earlier through Talal 
Asad, arose from indigenous epistemologies, before and during colonialism, relatively 
outside the influence of colonial epistemologies. In tracing these forms of rationality, this 
section argues that, often, epistemologically secular understandings, with their distinction 
between myth, magic and ritual ideas of the world from rational ideas of the world, were 
rooted in what European thought classified as ‘religious’ belief so that the secular arose 
from within “religion” itself.
139  
                                                        
139 In making this argument I implicitly rely on the idea that religion, secularism as well as the 
binary created between them are discursive constructs. As Richard King and Talal Asad among 
others have shown, colonial epistemology categorized religion, deciding what was to fit into it, 
resulting in a considerably altered ‘Hinduism’ and Buddhism. When I argue that particular forms 
of religious and secular subjectivity are universals both in the West and the non-West, then, I am 
not referring to specific colonial and postcolonial religions, but validating the human 
characteristics of thinking and living in myth, magic and the sacred, as well as in secular modes.  
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Why is tracing secular understandings in Bhīma’s poetry so important? Doing so 
implicitly questions the sharp Orientalist distinction between 
modern/philosophy/rational/the West, and pre-modern/mysticism/irrational/the non-West. 
It was this binary which Hindu nationalists such as Vivekananda set out to change when 
they asserted the inherent rational monism that was supposedly central to Hinduism. In 
doing so, however, they used the very Judeo-Christian frameworks they thought they 
were resisting, focusing on the glorification of the textual Vedas and Shastras, while 
denigrating the use of rituals, idol worship and mythology. Thus this section also asks 
whether it is possible to find rational states of mind in “religion” without obscuring those 
aspects, such as symbolic ritual and idol worship, that Western models of rationality 
would classify as irrational. I argue that Bhīma destabilizes colonial binaries but without 
whitewashing the bread and butter of Hindu religiosity, those supposedly ‘irrational’ 
aspects of religious life that the subaltern tribal groups of society thrived on, and which 
were central to their intellectual thought. 
In the literary analysis which follows, I explore Bhīma’s supposedly ‘irrational’ 
modes of worship through his “ulti bamsi,” examining how his sadhana, which included 
the yogic practice of meditation, tantric symbolism, and the contemplation and worship 
of deities such as Krishna, was inseparable from his rational thought processes. In doing 
so, Bhīma differentiated states of living in myth, magic, and ritual that involved rational 
understandings of the world, from those that did not, therefore positing a secular 
rationality that distinguished between different forms of mystic religiosity and 
consciously validated marginalized forms of subaltern religiosity.    79 
his practice of these forms of rationality, were inextricably linked to his radical politics of 
equality.  
   One reason why Bhīma’s devotional verse may not have been recognized as 
being an assertion of rationality, is that it has been judged by foreign epistemic and 
aesthetic categories. For instance, unlike Occidental thinkers, Hindu aestheticians have 
not always accepted poetry as one of the fine arts. The Acharyas, or learned ones, did not 
even classify poetry as one among the 64 artistic skills (chaunsath kalayen.)  Rather, 
poetry was seen as a “vidya,” or form of knowledge and a way of philosophizing, while 
other forms of art were upavidyas. The form of Bhīma Bhoi’s poetry, then, becomes 
doubly significant if seen as a vehicle through which he explored philosophical truths 
rather than simply an art form devoted to sensory pleasures. Indeed, Bhīma Bhoi’s verses 
and Bhajanas (singing the glory of God through dialogue between mind (mana) and 
consciousness (chaitanya) are suffused with wistful prayer and yearning for the spiritual 
uplift of human beings. 
The poetic form of Bhīma Bhoi’s devotional lyrics, then, rendered it a form of 
philosophy according to Orissan epistemic categories. In line with the importance of the 
message he wanted to convey within his poetry, Bhīma structured his verse with strict 
attention to form, with the number of his poems, stanzas and lines, written line by line in 
prose style, forming a repeated pattern; the manuscript of Stuti Chintamoni contains 100 
bolis (poems) with 40 lines in each. Every two lines make a stanza, with each boli 
containing exactly 20 stanzas, and each line containing exactly 20 letters. Bhīma’s 
stringent attention to these numbers is evidenced by his noting of the exact number of 
stanzas so far composed after every 5 bolis. The whole book, he notes at the end, contains   93 
Bhīma’s Upside Down Language and the continuity between rational thought and 
‘irrational’ practice 
In my analysis of Bhīma Bhoi’s rationality so far, I have emphasized his cognitive 
processes, drawing attention to his abandonment of ritual, idol worship, pilgrimages and 
the mode of the symbolic for intense cognitive introspection and meditation that 
articulated a radical politics of rational social equality. Bhīma defiantly declared his 
rejection of idol worship: “I do not bow to gods and goddesses, To idols of clay and 
stone. O Lord, In search of liberation, I meditate on You.”
140 His poetry highlights the 
revolutionary nature of such ideas by drawing attention to the opposition he faced from 
those who fumed that “devotees of Mahima do not care for Vedic diktat…they have 
dumped in the nether world all the rites and rituals honored in the Vedas.
141” However, 
Bhīma Bhoi’s religion was just as much about tantric ritual, symbolism, mythology and 
icons, as it was about cognitive introspection. While Alekha was a metaphor for “truth” 
and the way to Alekha was to discover the all powerful, all pervading, formless and 
indescribable truth within oneself through rational thought processes, Bhīma also 
engaged with tantric ritual and with the saguna tradition, which contemplates a personal 
god with a form and attributes, intimate and accessible, full of compassion and mercy, 
come down to earth to save suffering beings.
142 Bhīma’s Ultimate Reality, then, was at 
once dual (made up of a God outside the self) and non dual, (or made up of a God within 
                                                        
140 Bhīma in Satpathy, Bhīma Bhoi, Prayers and Reflections, 38. 
 
141 Bhīma in Satpathy, Bhīma Bhoi, Prayers and Reflections, 140. 
 
142 Tantra celebrates sexual experience by recognizing the deities Shiva and Shakti, or Purusha 
and Prakriti, soul and body, as the lingam and yoni, the masculine and feminine energies which 
create the universe in their sexual union, providing a dharmic path to Moksha.    94 
oneself reached through thought and introspection.) Furthermore, he was reachable 
through true devotion that produced spiritual knowledge (bhakti yoga) as well as 
intellectual knowledge arising out of difficult reflection and introspection (gyan yoga.)  
  In light of all this, Bhīma Bhoi’s religious thought seems far from being an 
articulation of the secular rational, a mode of knowledge that distinguishes between 
rational states of mythic, magical, and ritual being, and irrational ones. The seeming lack 
of this distinction also renders Bhīma’s thought as full of logical inconsistencies and 
contradictions. However, a literary analysis of his poetry reveals that he was well aware 
of these contradictions. Indeed, he highlights them through his mystical sandhya bhasa, 
the ulti bamsi, literally the “upside down” language.  
He is neither water nor wind. 
He is not formless, yet has no form. 
He is neither knowledge nor ignorance, 
Nor even the conception of the Veda.
143  
 
This is an intentionally paradoxical verse. In Nagarjuna Buddhist thought, which Bhīma 
drew on, water signifies cohesion, and wind, expansion. The two are, then, opposites. 
Similarly, in the verse, Brahman “has no form” that one can perceive, yet he is not 
formless. The verse structures itself around pairs of opposites: water/wind, 
formless/form, and knowledge/ignorance in its descriptions of Brahman, providing a 
logical conundrum. The only line that does not have an opposition at its centre is the last. 
Bhīma does not say that Brahman is the Veda, and simultaneously not, making the line a 
strong rejection of the Vedas as vehicles towards Brahman, especially given the 
                                                        
143 Bhīma in Beltz and Baumer, Bhīma Bhoi: Verses from the Void, 181. 
   95 
oppositions that structure the rest of the verse. The ulti bamsi reappears in another 
deliberately contradictory verse: 
With waves control the water 
In the pond without banks. 
At the feet of the Formless of Infinite joy 
You shall live forever bearing the brilliance of Brahman. 
The river running upstream is full to the brim.
144  
 
The lines in this verse are full of intentionally logically nonfunctional images. Far from 
controlling water as Bhīma writes, waves disrupt water. A “pond without banks” cannot 
be called a pond. Similarly the “formless” cannot have discernible feet because if it does, 
it must have form. With these paradoxes, Bhīma gestures towards a space beyond 
representation, that of the void that is Brahman. Alekha Brahman, after all, stands for the 
Absolute that cannot be defined, seen or described. If one grasps this, one can reach the 
void and “live forever bearing the brilliance of Brahman.” This is an internal process of 
meditation, evidenced by the last line. “The river running upstream is full to the brim” is 
an image frequently used by the Natha yogis and the panchasakha, which serves as a 
metaphor for “ulata sadhana,” or “upside down practice,” the regressive process of 
spiritual practice which flows against the currents of worldly existence.
145 
 
However, I argue that Bhīma’s ulti bamsi posits these logically nonfunctional, 
paradoxical images in order to resolve them, in the process describing a tapasya that is a 
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145 Acyutananda Das, one of the Panchasakha poets, uses a similar image in his Brahma-Sankhali. 
“Who is an embodied siddha, who has not gone against the current? Moving in the upstream 
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secular practice, one which does make distinctions between rational understandings of the 
world and the irrational ones he denigrates. As I mention in my introduction, then, the 
indigenous literary device of ulti bamsi is continuous with Bhīma’s humanist assertion of 
subaltern logic. To this end, Bhīma’s ulti bamsi depicts a practice of overcoming 
opposites that posits a secular mode of ritual being in which rational thought and certain 
ritual practices are one, serving the same ends, and elaborating the same epistemes of 
rationality. In doing so, Bhīma elevates those symbolic and ritualistic practices that are 
one with his rational thought, above those that are not.  
When you measure the measureless and eat the inedible, 
The company of saints destroys past sins. 
If you meditate on the unimaginable Brahman day and night, 
The body is transformed anew. 
 
If you can see the essence of the unseen, 
You can recite the unuttered prayer. 
Know the unknowable 
And worship the formless. 
 
If you want to cross over 
Dive into the practice of nirveda. 
True knowledge and the path of liberation 
Are found at the doorstep of the Guru.
146  
 
In these verses, Bhīma speaks of a knowledge beyond duality that contains an invitation 
to a practice of overcoming opposites so that their contradictions are dissolved. 
Furthermore, the verses demonstrate that the process of overcoming opposites relies on 
the idea that, in some modes of religiosity, rational thought and ritual practice are one. 
The first verse posits the idea that the practice of “measuring the measureless” and 
“eating the inedible” will produce the thought, or enact the spiritual process, in which the 
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“measureless,” or Alekha will become reachable or “measurable,” a process that will 
destroy past sins.” Similarly, meditations on the “unimaginable Brahmin,” will result in a 
practice that “transforms the body anew.” The final verse consolidates these ideas by 
suggesting that “the practice of nirveda,” a practice which denotes a bodily detachment 
from worldly objects, will produce thought, or the “true knowledge” that leads to the 
“path of liberation.” The ulti bamsi and the contradictions it contains, then, contains the 
seeds of its own resolution by suggesting the redefining of some modes of religious 
practice, such as the symbolic rituals of tantra, as being continuous with and inseparable 
from thought. While Western anthropology would categorize these practices as modes of 
symbolic “ritual,” Catherine Bell proposes that so-called ritual activities be removed from 
their isolated position as special, paradigmatic acts and be seen as culturally strategic 
ways of acting. She argues that seeing ritual activities as actions separate from thought, as 
people doing ritual and necessarily thinking something else, is logically nonfunctional. 
Instead, ritual is a mode of practice, and thus continuous with other modes of behavior 
within everyday life, including thought. Pierre Bourdieu suggests something similar when 
he writes that social agents operate according to an implicit practical logic and bodily 
dispositions, or “habitus,” which create meaning in the doing. One learns to think a 
certain way through bodily practice; the bodily practice produces the thought.
147 Bhīma’s 
creative transformation of language through the mystical ulti bamsi, then, ends up 
transcending all opposites in the same way that the devotee’s mind has to overcome the 
duality of Maya in order to achieve salvation, making the point that rational thought and 
ritual practice can be one. Ultimately, then, Bhīma’s cognitive introspection can be seen 
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as a product of his practical sadhana rather than his sadhana being an out of place 
footnote to his rational pursuit of moksha in the way it was for Vivekananda.
148  
If, then, we understand Bhīma’s symbolic and mythological path to the divine 
through the body as producing his rational cognitive introspection, we can also explain 
some of Bhīma’s supposed logical inconsistencies. For instance, he registers his hatred 
for the womb born gross body, or “sthula sharira” but simultaneously also reveals a 
seemingly unselfconscious affectionate concern for the well being of the material body; 
the idea that the body will not be afflicted by a process of decay if one takes refuge in 
Mahima dharma is reiterated throughout the text.
149 However, if one sees Bhīma’s 
descriptions of the body as relating to different stages towards achieving moksha, they no 
longer seem contradictory. Instead the paradoxes describe how the physical process of 
the body becoming beautiful enacts and produces the spiritual process of drawing the self 
closer to God, and vice versa. 
                                                        
148 This is also clear, for instance, in Bhīma’s worship of Krishna through seeing himself as 
Radha reborn. Johannes Beltz, and Kedar Mishra, “Ascetic, Layman, or Rebellious Guru? Bhīma 
Bhoi and his Female Consorts,” in Popular religion and Ascetic Practices: New Studies on 
Mahima Dharma, eds .Banerjee-Dube and J. Beltz, (New Delhi: Manohar, 2008). In this bhakti 
tradition, romantic love between human beings in the material world is seen as merely a 
diminished, illusionary reflection of the soul’s original, ecstatic spiritual love for Krishna, an 
incarnation of Brahman. Thus the practice of romantic love enacts and therefore produces the 
spiritual union with Brahman that yields Moksha.  
 
149 The unenlightened body is often spoken of in the Sankhya terminology of sthula (gross) but 
Bhīma also refers to the suksma sharira (subtle body). Only the gross body “dies;” the subtle 
body survives as the product of the union of the Guru or Brahman with the shisya, or disciple, in 
Moksha. Bhīma writes: “Just as Flesh covers bones, so do, Guru and shisya envelope each other 
in the ocean of wisdom. Just as blood flows through flesh all over the body, so is the relation/ 
between Guru and shisya/ How can one separate the two?”  The subtle body here functions as a 
tantric vehicle towards Moksha, becoming the metaphor for the union of the Guru and disciple.   99 
May this body of mine shine like a mirror. May it dazzle like the lightning. 
May the formless Brahman remain kind to me. May this form of mine 
glow like burnished copper. 
 
May this form of mine sparkle like gold; may it shine like the luminous 
sun; may I remain firm, in my devotion to the revered Guru through the 
ages.
150  
 
Bhīma emphasizes the direct link between the physical process of bodily transformation 
and the spiritual progress towards Moksha, through a play on the word “firm.” Since the 
preceding line has been about the beautification of the body, “firm” is clearly a reference 
to a “firm” youthful body. Johannes Beltz, therefore, points out that the chanting of these 
verses was part of a ritual performance meant to heal the chanter; the thoughts evoked by 
the verse enacted the bodily practice of healing to the extent that Bhīma was credited 
with healing powers.
151 However the line that follows: “in my devotion to the revered 
Guru” makes it apparent that Bhīma also means “firm” in devotion, or firm in his beliefs. 
The subtle body, then, brings about the enlightened state of Moksha and vice versa; 
Bhīma’s engagement with the symbolism of the body gives birth to an enlightened state 
of cognition that leads to Moksha. The co-existence of the sthula sharira and the subtle 
body, then, are not logically inconsistent and therefore not irrational; they are simply 
different steps on the way to Moksha. 
Another seeming logical inconsistency in Bhīma’s thought is the coexistence of 
nirguna and saguna traditions of bhakti. The divine is simultaneously formless, reachable 
only through cognitive introspection, and a personal god incarnated in the form of 
                                                        
150 Bhīma in Satpathy, Bhīma Bhoi, Prayers and Reflections, 52. 
 
151 Johannes Beltz, Heiko Frese, Angelika Malinar (eds.) Text and Context in the History, 
Literature and Religion of Orissa, (New Delhi: Manohar, 2004), 169. 
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mythological deities. Thus his reality is at once dual, made up of a God outside the self, 
and non dual, or made up of a God within oneself reached through thought and 
introspection. Indeed, Bhīma often frames the tantric union of Prakriti with Purusha 
through the mythological union of two deities, in one verse, Radha (here Prakriti) and 
Krishna (here Brahman or Purusha.) “Your union with Prakriti/ Created the world./ From 
being nameless/You acquired a name;/ From being formless,/You took up a form/ 
Fondly, people call you Krishna – /The one who dances beneath the kadamba tree.”
152 
However, these logical inconsistencies are similarly resolved through Bhīma’s 
understanding that once he has achieved the spiritual goal of reaching Moksha, he will 
achieve the physical goal of becoming an embodiment of the deity; he will give form to 
the formless. One contemplates the formless Brahman till one sees oneself merging with 
the divine, embodying the form of the formless. Bhīma writes, “Gurudev, my Lord is the 
Nirguna Purusa. I am the one who is saguna. May the Lord show me the path as I enter 
the woods.” The “woods” represent the deep, dark, thorny path involved in achieving the 
merging of the saguna with the nirguna. When achieved, however, the resulting union of 
the disciple with the divine is so natural and complete that the formless divine merges 
with the form of the disciple.  
You will only understand the mystery of the body, 
As described in the scriptures, when you and your Guru are one. 
As milk and water are perfectly mixed, 
Moreso must you unite your minds. 
                                                        
152 Krishna is supposed to have conducted his ‘dance’ or love play in the Kadamba tree’s 
hospitable shade. The ‘rasa lila’ or ‘the dance of divine love,’ is considered one of the highest of 
Krishna's pastimes because it results in the creation of the universe. Thus, while Bhīma Bhoi’s 
cognitive thought processes reject rituals and idols in favor of finding Brahman within oneself, he 
also acknowledges the existence of deities and idols through his tantric celebration of Krishna as 
an incarnation of Brahman.    101 
 
Between who is Guru and who is disciple, 
There is no difference at all. 
The Lord and his devotee have but one body, 
They eat their meals together.
153  
 
The verses highlight the absolute inseparability of the Guru, who is the embodiment of 
the divine, and the Shisya, or devotee, after enlightenment has been achieved. There is 
“no difference,” they are of “one body,” and the form contains both disciple and guru so 
completely that when one carries out a bodily function of eating or drinking, the other 
does too. It is no longer the gross body sitting down to eat but the divine; once again, a 
spiritual practice results in a physical one. The seeming logical contradictions of the ulti 
bamsi, then, signal their own resolution by pointing towards the continuity of modes of 
symbolic practice, such as tantric rituals and bhakti yoga, with the spiritual, introspective 
process of drawing the self closer to God. In the process, this “holistic rationality” also 
emphasizes those rituals that produce the thought processes and tapasya that leads to 
Moksha, demonstrating that Bhīma does distinguish between the “infinite pilgrimages 
and rituals/ that lead up to the Lord” and those that will enable the devotee to reach 
spiritual enlightenment. Bhīma’s intentional twilight language, then, enacts a secularism 
that comes from within his religious practice itself, by describing a secular state of mind 
that distinguished between myth and ritual that was rational, and that which was not.  
Bhīma Bhoi’s poetry, in asserting a contextually grounded theory of rational 
social equality, and a theory of secular rationalism in colonial India, produces a 
movement of popular resistance against exploitative social structures and lays the 
foundations for an indigenous alternative modernity. His verse aesthetic encourages one 
                                                        
153 Bhīma in Beltz and Baumer, Bhīma Bhoi: Verses from the Void, 179.   102 
to see that universalism does not have to mean that the exact same idea, rationality, for 
instance, gets instantiated in the same ways in all contexts; universalizing forms of 
rationality were appearing in pre-medieval literary languages like the ulti bamsi, very 
different from contemporaneous colonialist scientific epistemes, at the height of the 
colonial period. These were part of a modern knowledge revolution that valued a person’s 
actions over their religious or social status. A general idea of rationality, this kind of 
universalism would argue, gets challenged and instantiated universally, albeit in different 
manifestations. It thus implicitly affirms that other epistemic frameworks, including those 
that emerge from marginalized cultural and religious spheres, were arising in response to 
colonialist knowledge systems that were imposed from above, such as Vivekananda’s 
emulation of Enlightenment scientific rationality was. In some South Asian contexts, 
secular rationality arose from within religion itself and in the process challenged many of 
the binaries set up by the categories ‘modern’ and ‘premodern.’ Reading how Bhīma 
Bhoi articulates an indigenous rationality through the aesthetic form of his poetry enables 
us to decolonize indigenous thinkers, and give them back their ability to articulate their 
own identities.  Furthermore their enacting of such reason is emancipatory because it 
encompasses a diverse set of theoretical practices emerging from and responding to 
colonial legacies while exposing the abuses of power inherent in them. The material they 
provide, if read as not being completely subsumed by the logic of colonizing 
Enlightenment Rationality as Vivekananda’s was, enables us to change the terms of the 
conversation about modernity. It enables us to see a vast array of humanist local 
narratives from all corners of the world conflicting, intersecting and arising in response to 
one another, all contributing to modernities. More importantly though, because different   103 
kinds of thinking are able to coexist with European thought rather than be dominated and 
humiliated by it, we are left with a way of thinking which renders all it uses, including 
that from Europe, universally marginal, fragmentary and unachieved.  Universalizing 
humanist modernities are turned into a truly local and global legacy.  
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Chapter 3: “A Chief is a Chief Through Other People:” Modern Democratic 
Ideals in Zulu Poetry 
 
 
In early nineteenth century Zululand, in colonial South Africa, the terrorized 
subjects of Shaka, the dictatorial warrior chief, protested in unison that when Shaka went 
on rampages to neighboring territories: 
women who were with child gave birth easily; 
The newly planted crops they left still short, 
The seed they left amongst the maize-stalks. 
 
This “praise poem” was a searing critique of Shaka’s authoritarian power;
 so inhumane 
were his military rampages that the “seeds” of future generations were ripped from 
wombs, and the “seeds” of the crops that would sustain them lay abandoned, 
unplanted.
154 In this chapter I argue that these praise poems, in describing Shaka’s 
destruction of food, fertility, and communal systems of food sharing, were also mourning 
the loss of a “traditional” political order that prized consensus based decision making 
between a chief and his subjects, enshrined in the popular proverb “a chief is a chief 
through other people.”  
While my reading of Bhīma Bhoi’s devotional poetry demonstrated how 
universalizing assertions of rationality were “contextual” through being expressed in 
local intellectual languages and cultures that were part of a modern knowledge 
revolution, these Zulu proverbs and praise poems demonstrate that “modern” humanisms 
                                                        
154  In 1820 – 1828, Shaka imposed the institution of kingship and army in Zululand, effectively 
becoming a dictator. All powers and functions now lay with the king and the army. I argue that 
19
th century praise poems reflect this change in their criticism of Shaka’s authoritarian power.   105 
such as democratic ideals were contextually grounded in, and produced through, very 
specific material conditions. Thus, this chapter looks at how “unmodern” ontologies were 
undone by, and modern literary epistemologies produced and supported by, “modern” 
institutional structures. Zulu agricultural organization stressed the communal sharing of 
crops and cattle between a chief and his people, a system of food distribution that literally 
and symbolically buttressed a political system of democratic power sharing between a 
chief and his subjects. Zulu folk literatures therefore repeatedly approve of chiefs’ rule 
through metaphors to do with the sharing of crops and cattle, and critique authoritarian 
rulers by speaking of their destruction of communal food economies. Cattle and food 
functioned as metaphors of power,
 155 and in praising those chiefs who shared their food, 
Zulu texts were also referring to how well chiefs extended their power to their subjects.  
As I elaborate later, by “democratic” rule, I refer to the core idea of democracy as 
a form of political organization that aims at universal and equal control over matters that 
affect one’s interests. However, I focus on democracy not just as an institutionalized 
political system where people had a right to decide who ruled over them and the laws that 
governed them, but also as a culture of democracy, a pre-colonial “discursive institution” 
                                                        
155 Cattle and food obtained from crops represented wealth, including the bride wealth or lobola 
that legalizes marriage. Cattle were also the food of libation, and the requirement of ritual 
sacrifice, with all family ceremonies being performed in the cattle fold. References to cattle 
pervade the praise poems, with the language containing literally hundreds of terms for cattle, 
distinguishing them minutely as to horns, colorings and markings. Cattle were considered so 
central to the cultural life of the Zulu nation that they even had praise names, and the owner of a 
favorite or beautiful beast would compose and recite praises in its honour. The centrality of cattle 
in the ritual economy meant that there were a lot of taboos relating to the cattle fold, cattle, and 
milk. Cattle were valuable as providers of meat and milk, which in the form of curdled milk 
(amasi) was the mainstay of the diet, together with maize (ummbila) and millet (amabele) and the 
nutritious tshwala beer (utshwala). 
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that involved being able to freely speak criticism of those chiefs who did not share power 
with their subjects or rule ethically.  
Verses of poignant, mournful, and angry poems create and sustain such a “culture 
of democracy” throughout the period of Shaka’s rule. This is not surprising; Shaka was 
the ruler who, from the late eighteenth century to the early nineteenth, radically changed 
the political structure of Zululand from one of largely informal systems of consensual 
rule between a chief and his subjects, to a dictatorial kingship with its own army.
156 The 
kingship concentrated “all powers and functions in the king, and the army (now based on 
age sets rather than on territorial or tribal units) subordinated all affiliations to the 
national affiliation centered in the king. Shaka’s rule, then, replaced the values of 
reciprocity and diplomacy with the ideal of dominance, in which the values of 
forcefulness and fearlessness, martial power and national glory, played the most 
important part, together with the values of good order, respect for authority, and 
obedience to discipline.”
157 This radical shift in culture, however, did not go 
unchallenged. Praise poems, a traditional Zulu social institution based on communal 
chanting, sustained “a culture of democracy” that was uniquely placed to propound the 
popular Zulu proverb “a chief is a chief through other people.” I argue that praise poems 
did so by explicitly critiquing chiefly transgressions. As Liz Gunner and Mafika Pascal 
                                                        
156 James Stuart, Anthony Trevor Cope, Izibongo – Zulu Praise Poems, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1968), 22. 
 
157 Stuart, Cope, Izibongo – Zulu Praise Poems, 22. 
   107 
Gwala point out, praise poetry was “a broadly based poetic tradition widely practiced and 
widely circulating, not a tradition tied to the aristocratic and powerful.”
158 
Praise poetry, and to a lesser extent izagu (proverbs) and riddles, safeguarded 
democratic cultures and exemplified “a chief is a chief through other people” in their 
cultural status, performance, content, and form. These oral texts had immense cultural 
status because they were considered sacred activities sanctioned by the ancestral spirits of 
Zulu tribe. The public sphere in which these texts belonged, then, was a sacred one that 
was outside the purview of even the most powerful chief. By extension, the communal 
recitation of praise poems, proverbs, and riddles was almost a form of prayer, a way of 
connecting to the ancestors.
 159 Since, as I argue, these sacred literatures were a form of 
“democratic” behavior that supported shared government and communal institutions, 
these texts challenge scholarly binaries between “tradition” and “ modernity” and the 
“religious” and secular;” just as Bhīma’s verse does, these praise poems testify to the 
existence of recognizably “secular” and “modern” behaviors and institutions in spheres 
usually regarded as “traditional” and “religious.”   
                                                        
158 Elizabeth Gunner, Mafika Pascal Gwala, Musho! Zulu Popular Praises, (East Lansing: 
Michigan State UP, 1991). 
 
159 As Michael Chapman notes, the praise poet also took part in religious service, acting as a 
medium of communication between the ancestors and the living. Michael Chapman, Southern 
African Literatures, (Scottsville: University of Natal Press, 1996), 53 – 63. Cope adds that “the 
praise poem plays its part in the religious sphere as it does in the political sphere, for just as it is 
in a sense a channel of communication between the people and the chief when he is alive, so it is 
certainly when he has passed on to the world of ancestral spirits. The only way to contact an 
ancestor is to recite his praises, usually at the same time that a beast is sacrificed. He hears, and 
directs attention to the needs of his descendants. The chief and his ancestors protect the interests 
of the tribe in the same way that the family ancestors watch over the welfare of the family.” 
Stuart, Cope, Izibongo – Zulu Praise Poems, 33. 
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These “religious” literatures safeguarded and produced democratic cultures in 
their performance. In being shouted out at communal gatherings in response to the 
audience’s calls to “Musho!” or “Speak Him!,” praises, for instance, had the ethical 
responsibility of being expressions of public opinion, providing an effective means of 
social control and literally speaking the chief into being as embodying the character traits 
he was attributed with. Although Trevor Cope contends that “the purpose of the praise is 
to present the chief as an object of admiration, and there is consequently a tendency to 
maximize praise and minimize criticism” I argue that the praise poems themselves do not 
bear this out; praise poetry functioned as a vehicle of criticism, defining the chief, in both 
positive and negative terms through the opinions of other people.
160  
Finally, the formal elements of the praise poetry enacted this communal culture of 
democratic critique through repetition in various guises: metre (repeated rythms), rhyme 
(repeated final syllables), alliteration (repeated consonant sounds), assonance (repeated 
vowel sounds), and parallelism (repeated statements of identical construction, with 
different words expressing the same idea). For instance, in parallelism, lines used 
different forms of repetition that while essentially saying the same thing gave the 
impression of a democratic multivocality; while stirring the emotions and imagination 
through rich description, such repetition produced a mingling of different vocal registers 
to present one unified consensus based meaning. 
                                                        
160 For example, Trevor Cope notes that the Zulu chief Senzangakhona is praised for his beauty 
and criticized for his obstinacy. Similarly, Cetshwayo’s praiser expresses the anxiety and 
disapproval of his people when he warns him strongly not to provoke the white man of Natal. 
Stuart, Cope, Izibongo – Zulu Praise Poems, 31. 
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As I mention in my introduction, this literary analysis hopes to suggest ways of 
articulating convincing accounts of alternative modernities by turning to oft overlooked 
texts as valuable sources with which to rewrite colonial histories. My analysis of 
“alternative” indigenous modernities takes on board the “implicit view of theorists of 
alternative modernity that the crucial features of the concept of modernity can be 
disaggregated; they can even be recombined in a number of different ways, shaped by 
differences in sociocultural context.” As Mohanty elaborates, the existence of these 
modern values and ideas in socioeconomic systems very different from eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century European capitalism challenges scholars not only to trace the 
provenance of such values and ideas in non-European contexts but to examine the 
alternative institutions and cultural forms that supported them.
161 In this vein, I identify 
the occurrence of “democratic” ideas and values in Zulu literatures.  Zulu oral texts 
express shared understandings of “modern” democratic cultural values in the aesthetic 
form of praise poetry, very differently from the ways in which Occidental political 
theorists, from Aristotle to John Stuart Mill, were doing so. Significantly, I also identify 
the alternative institutional structures, including a communal agricultural system of food 
distribution linked to a political system of consensus based representational democracy, 
that buttressed these “democratic” values through discursive institutions such as praise 
poetry.  
My analysis of democratic cultures in nineteenth century Zulu literatures first 
explores the communal institutions of food sharing that enacted the popular Zulu proverb  
                                                        
161 See the introduction of the forthcoming volume Satya P. Mohanty (ed.), Colonialism, 
Modernity, and Literature: A View from India, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 3. 
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“a person is a person through other people.” I then demonstrate how these ideas of 
interdependence extended to the political sphere in the form of the proverb “a chief is a 
chief through other people” so that the communal system of food sharing also functioned 
as a metaphor for systems of sharing political power. Finally, I demonstrate how the 
“parallelist” verse aesthetic in praise poetry expounds and enacts a democratic 
multivocality that prizes universal political participation but, unlike Western systems of 
democracy, emphasizes consensus based rather than majoritarian decision making. 
The Democratic Institution of Sharing of Food and Cattle in pre-colonial Zululand 
  In this section, I first explore the communal behavior of food sharing that enacted 
the popular Zulu proverb  “a person is a person through other people” because, as I 
elaborate later, Zulu democratic values were linked to these behaviors. This confirms 
political theorist Barnard Crick’s point that talking about “democracy” involves talking 
not just about a “principle or doctrine of government,” but of a set of institutional 
arrangements” and even of  “a type of behavior (say the antithesis of both deference and 
of unsociability.)”
162 My analysis of Zulu oral texts suggests “democracy” as a form of 
government (communal participation in meetings with chiefs regarding important 
political decisions) was indeed inextricably linked to a set of institutional arrangements, 
including a communal system of food sharing centered in the chief. Democracy as a form 
of government was also linked with “a type of behavior,” represented in oral texts, that 
emphasized interdependence and generosity when it came to food and crops, and was 
irreverent and critical towards chiefs that did not behave in this manner.  
                                                        
162 Bernard Crick, Democracy – A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 5. 
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As multivocal “discursive institutions” such as praise poetry, riddles, and 
proverbs testify, the democratic behaviors of interdependence, reciprocity, and generosity 
surrounding food and agriculture were central to the ethical and political framework of 
the Zulus; the Bantu speaking people were traditionally agriculturists and, as South 
African literary scholar Michael Chapman points out, in binding the living to the 
ancestral dead, land, and the cattle and crops it produced, provided both physical and 
sacred roots of existence.
 The sharing of the fruits of the land therefore served as the basis 
of the economy but was also an ethical imperative, without which the ancestors could not 
be happy. As a result, there are countless customs surrounding the concept of “a person is 
a person through other people” that deal with the giving and taking of food. For instance, 
the word ukuthekela referred to the sharing of one’s crops, ukunana referred to the 
sharing of one’s household items, and ukusisa referred to the lending of one’s female 
livestock to a neighbour till it gave birth to calves, which the neighbour would keep, only 
returning the cow. These systematic institutions of sharing were expressed through Zulu 
proverbs, izagu, such as “they eat through other men,” which refers to the practice of 
helping a man to slaughter and skin his beast, and then sharing the meat with him. The 
idea of sharing food was also captured by proverbs that deal with giving food, 
particularly to strangers. For instance, phrases such as “the stomach of a stranger is 
small;” “the stomach of a traveler does not finish anything;” “the mouth does not 
despise” and “a beast that is passing finishes no grass” were usually recited by strangers 
at one’s door asking for a bite to eat, with the tradition being to ply such strangers with 
food. One reason for this generosity was the custom of reciprocity expressed by proverbs 
such as “Let the meat gifts cross one another” and “To give is to dish out for oneself   112 
(ukuph’ ukuziphakela).” Giving to another, then, metaphorically translated into giving to 
the self, realizing the idea central to the popular South African notion of ubuntu that “a 
person is a person through other people.”
163 Giving to another was also considered canny 
because the expectation was that the same person or their tribe would be able to look after 
you in return if you traveled their way. The characteristic of not sharing food, meanwhile, 
was heartily criticized, with izagu speaking of such people as displaying ubuqili or 
cunning, as in the proverb “he is the crafty one whose locusts are roasted last.” This 
proverb, referring to the practice of boys roasting and sharing their locusts over a 
communal fire, highlights the last roaster as being keen to benefit from the efforts of 
others while being reluctant to share his own food.
164  
The ideas of interdependence and reciprocity through sharing food also extended 
to concepts of social organization and property ownership. One nineteenth century riddle 
describes the layout of a Zulu village through the metaphor of a pumpkin plant, which 
was a staple crop in Zulu farming:  
Guess ye a pumpkin-plant; it is single, and has many 
branches; it may be hundreds; it bears many thousand 
pumpkins on its branches; if you follow the branches, you 
will find a pumpkin everywhere; you will find pumpkins 
every where. You cannot count the pumpkins of one 
branch; you can never die of famine; you can go plucking 
and eating; and you will not carry food for your journey 
                                                        
163  For the connection between ubuntu’s “a person is a person through other people” and “ a chief 
is a chief through other people” see my published article: Mukti Lakhi Mangharam, “Ubuntu 
Sports Inc.: The Commodification of Culture in South African and American Sports,” Safundi 
12.1, (January 2011). 
 
164 C.L. Sibusiso Nyembezi’s 1963 book, Zulu Proverbs, has a whole section on proverbs about 
ubuntu. See C.L. Sibusiso Nyembezi, Zulu Proverbs, (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University 
Press, 1963). 
   113 
through being afraid that you will find no food where you 
are going. No; you can eat and leave, knowing that by 
following the branches you will continually find another 
pumpkin in front; and so it comes to pass. Its branches 
spread out over the whole country, but the plant is one, 
from which springs many branches. And each man pursues 
his own branch, and all pluck pumpkins from the 
branches.
165  
The riddle depicts the pumpkin plant as a village and the pumpkins as its individual 
homesteads to echo “a person is a person through other people.” The parallelism of the 
phrase, “you will find a pumpkin everywhere; you will find pumpkins everywhere,” with 
the repetition only distinguished by the pluralization of “pumpkin” to “pumpkins,” asserts 
that a single pumpkin found “everywhere” is the same as, or connected to, the many 
pumpkins found everywhere. One pumpkin is linked to many; therefore one is many, just 
as a person is a person only because she belongs to a community of many; the singular is 
only possible through the existence of the plural, and vice versa. Furthermore, in 
representing the village as a unified whole made up of many homesteads, just as a 
pumpkin plant is “one from which springs many branches,” the riddle also makes an 
important point about the nature of private property. While each man pursues “his own 
branch,” or his own village street, this individual ownership is immediately negated by 
the pluralization of the individual to “all” men, of “branch” to “branches” and of 
“pumpkin” to “pumpkins.” The individual, then, is inextricable from the community, and 
                                                        
165 Reverend Henry Callaway, Nursery Tales, Traditions, and Histories of the Zulus, (London: 
Greenwood Press, 1970), 364. 
 
Henry Callaway (1817-1890) was a missionary for the Church of England and a bishop of St. 
John's, Kaffraria, in the Church of the Province of Southern Africa (now the Anglican Church of 
Southern Africa) In collecting these Zulu language sources he clarifies that he transcribed the 
exact spoken word as it was told to him. He writes that “my object has been to give idiom for 
idiom rather than word for word, and at the same time, to preserve, as far as possible, the 
characteristic peculiarities of the original.” See Callaway, Nursery Tales, Traditions, and 
Histories of the Zulus. Thanks to Khwezi Mkhize for help with verifying translations.  
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so his branch and pumpkin are inextricable from the branches and pumpkins of the rest of 
the village. The syntax indicates that there is no such thing as individual possession. The 
point is consolidated by the assertion that, since the pumpkins belong to everybody, the 
traveler does not have to carry his own food, a significant point for it refers to the practice 
of sharing food so central to the social organization of the Zulu homestead. 
The Democratic Sharing of Chiefly Power Through the Institutional Distribution of Food 
and Cattle 
Not only was “a person is a person through other people” about a behavioral 
generosity characterized by the sharing of food and cattle between subjects but also about 
an organized sharing of food between a chief and his subjects, the “set of democratic 
institutional arrangements” that Crick refers to; the chief of the village was also the 
guardian of the communal economy, regulating the way food and cattle circulated to his 
subjects. As the link to the ancestors, the chief partook in rituals such as the First-fruit 
Ceremony that infused the harvest with ancestral blessings. Only after he had done so, 
was the harvest filtered down through the various levels of authority, to tribal chiefs, sub-
chiefs and head-men, and eventually the common farmer and his family. As the guardian 
of the ancestor’s wishes, a chief who did not fulfill his ethical imperative of ensuring the 
material prosperity and well being of his subjects through the sharing of cattle, milk and 
harvest was not worthy of rule. The communal economy, then, worked through the chief 
who collected these items from his subjects and then distributed them. This was done 
without the chief formally “owning” any of the items he collected, thereby negating any 
conception of “private property.” In depending on the goods he received from his people,   115 
the organization of the communal food economy effectively literalized the maxim “a 
chief is a chief through other people.”  
I argue that Zulu “principles or doctrines” of government
166 grew out of just such 
a communal system of food and cattle sharing. This responsibility of sharing food and 
cattle was also political because it metonymically represented the sharing of power with 
the chief’s subjects. As Michael Chapman has shown, this sharing of power was an 
extension of the practical system of sharing government;
167 the system of traditional 
democratic monarchy was conducted by discussion in public meetings open to all adult 
males, where any man could express criticism of the chief’s behavior, and this system 
was buttressed through the ritual distribution of cattle, food and milk. Paul J. Bjerk, a 
historian of the Zulu kingdom, argues that because the king’s cattle were collected from 
every homestead in the realm, the king “bound the strength of the entire kingdom unto 
himself, centralizing and controlling its power.”
 168 He then distributed this concentration 
of power by sharing land and cattle among his subjects, literally letting his warriors drink 
from the udders of his cows in a controlled manner. Food, then, and milk, in particular, 
was also a metaphor for power and the king’s fitness to rule was judged according to how 
readily he shared his milk and cattle, and therefore his power, with his subjects. Bjerk 
quotes one of James Stuart’s informants, Magojela ka Mfanawendhlela, who discussed 
the eating habits of the chiefly rivals Zungu and Makoba to determine which one should 
                                                        
166 Crick, Democracy – A Very Short Introduction, 5. 
 
167 Chapman, Southern African Literatures. 
 
168 Paul J Bjerk, “They Poured Themselves into the Milk: Zulu Political Philosophy Under 
Shaka,” Journal of African History, 47 (2006): 1–19. 
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accede to the throne.
 169 He notes that since Makoba ate up everything he was given, 
whereas Zungu would only take one mouthful and let the rest fall through his hands, 
Makoba was a glutton and would be mean, whereas Zungu would be content with a little 
and leave some for others; hence it was right he should become the chief despite 
Makoba’s seniority.  
Similarly, izagu and riddles also connect the ideas of interdependence that 
produced a communal food economy to ideas of a chief’s function as the sustainer of his 
tribe. One riddle, for instance, puts forth this message through a metaphoric description 
of the chief as the eye of his tribe:  
Guess ye a man who makes himself a chief; who does not work but 
just sits still; his people work alone, but he does nothing; he shows 
them what they wish, but he does nothing; his people do not see, 
he sees for them, they are blind, the whole of his nation; he alone 
can see. They know that though they cannot see; they see by him; 
for they do not go without anything they want; he takes them by 
the hand, and leads them to where there is food, and they return 
with it to their homes; but he touches nothing, for he makes 
himself a chief; he remains a chief for ever, for his people are 
supported by him… At first there was a dispute, and his people 
said, “You cannot be our king and do nothing; we cannot see the 
power of your majesty.” He answered them, saying, “Since you 
say I am not a chief, I will just sit still, and look on the ground. 
Then you will see that I am truly a chief, for if I look on the ground 
the land will be desolate; you will fall over precipices and into pits; 
you will be eaten by wild beasts through not seeing them; and die 
                                                        
169 James Stuart was born of British parentage in Pietermaritzburg and learned Zulu from Zulu 
children. As a civil servant and magistrate in various districts of Zululand between 1888 and 
1912, he made an intensive study of Zulu customs, history and oral tradition, obtaining verbatim 
reports from a great number of old Zulu men some of whom had served under Dingana. The latter 
reigned from 1828, when he wrested the Zulu kingship from his half brother Shaka, to 1840 when 
he was displaced by his own half brother Mpande. Among the numerous praise poems recited to 
Stuart by practicing praise poets in the early years of this century were the memorial praises of 
Shaka and Dingana. 
   117 
through famine, being unable to find food; because you dispute 
with me, you are blind.”
170 
The riddle begins by building up the uselessness of the chief, reflecting what may have 
been a popular criticism of a chief’s power, that he “does nothing.” Indeed, the riddle 
uses repetition to reinforce this notion, noting that the chief “does not work,” “he does 
nothing.” However, the riddle then goes on to note, without altering the structure of the 
sentence or the syntax and therefore effectively replacing the previous negative 
statements, that the chief “sees” for his subjects. This “seeing,” furthermore, is directly 
linked to the chief making sure that “they do not go without anything they want; he takes 
them by the hand, and leads them to where there is food, and they return with it to their 
homes.” Significantly, the riddle highlights that the chief “touches nothing” himself. 
Nothing belongs to him. Perhaps most importantly, the riddle stresses that the chief 
‘makes himself the chief’ through these actions. He “remains a chief for ever, for his 
people are supported by him.” The direct causality in this sentence makes a radical 
statement. The “chief is only a chief through other people;” he does not inherently own 
his power, but earns it through the effective performance of his duty, and it is only these 
actions which make him ‘truly’ a chief.   
The Democratic Critique of Chiefs through Praise Poems 
Praise poems took these critiques even further. These oral texts were forms of 
history that recalled important historical characters and described contemporaries in 
specific turns of phrases and “praises” that had been passed down over generations. 
Praise poetry therefore exemplified “a chief is a chief through other people” in its 
                                                        
170 Callaway, Nursery Tales, Traditions, and Histories of the Zulus, 366. 
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function as a link to the common origins of the clan; the izibongo, or personal name with 
which one was identified, was also the name of one’s clan. In being praised with their 
clan name by the people in one’s tribe, the Zulu subject metaphorically became that 
person, carrying all the historical resonances associated with the name and giving explicit 
meaning to the idea that “a person is a person through other people.” As the literary 
scholar of praise poetry, Liz Gunner, has shown, the same clan name was used to praise 
chiefs, stressing continuity and origin rather than personal status.
171  
Praise poems were also particularly effective in their expression of cultural 
democracy because in their aesthetic forms they created a space of communal orality that 
depended on interactions between speakers and listeners, and that harnessed movements 
of popular resistance to authoritarian rule.
172 The praise poet, for instance, functioned as 
the intermediary between the chief and his subjects, for, when he presented the chief to 
the people in his recitation, he also represented the opinion of the people to the chief. As 
South African literary scholar Trevor Cope points out, the special position of the praiser 
enabled him to criticize with impunity certain aspects of the chief’s personality or 
actions, either by overt criticism or covertly by the omission of praise. The effectiveness 
of these poems in sanctioning democratic cultures was primarily due to their communal 
                                                        
171 In her translations of praise poetry, Liz Gunner notes that the izithakazelo, clan praises, which 
are closely related to praise poetry both linguistically and in their gestural significance stress the 
common origins of those from a particular clan rather than any other kind of hierarchy. Thus 
everyone who has the clan name Zulu has the right to be greeted by one of the clan names, 
Ndabezitha! Anyone with the clan name Mhongo has a claim to the salutation: Njomane son of 
Mghabe who was a prodigal for years but was seen again in the fourth year! See Gunner, Gwala, 
Musho! Zulu Popular Praises. 
 
172 It was not till the middle of the 19
th century that Zulu was reduced to writing by missionaries, 
bringing with it a different mode of knowledge and literacy that relied on individual transfers of 
information. Praise poetry remained a popular oral form even then. 
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recitation; they acted not just as an incentive and reward for socially approved actions but 
a reminder to all present what qualities and conduct are praiseworthy. Characteristics of 
the recital therefore aimed to make it an important occasion in which the entire 
community took part. The praiser, or imbongi, wore a fantastic costume of furs, feathers 
and animal tails, reciting the praises at the top of his voice and as fast as possible. The 
high pitch, loudness, and fastness, aimed to create an emotional excitement in the 
audience as well as in the praiser himself, whose movement became increasingly 
exaggerated. Liz Gunner notes that it was a dramatic performance of suiting actions to 
words, producing an effect of seriousness and occasion. Furthermore, in its elimination of 
any downdrift intonation, praise poetry gave the impression of never ending and of 
always being open to further additions, so that the subject of the poem was always aware 
that criticisms could be added to his praises, and that he would continually be held to 
account for his actions. Indeed, while the imbongi crafted the praises, anyone could recite 
them so that voices of criticism and praise were not limited to a select few. 
Praise poetry devoted to particular chiefs, collected by the Zulu linguist and 
colonial official, James Stuart, in the nineteenth century make radical and evaluative 
public judgments about a chief’s “democratic” tendencies by commenting on their 
egalitarian management of the communal food economy. For instance, the izibongo 
describes the chief Senzangakhona as someone: 
who chewed with his mouth without eating 
He who removed me from below and I went up above 
I returned with yellow corn and threshed and cooked.
173 
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The imbongi characterizes Senzangakhona as chewing but not eating, suggesting that he 
controlled his own intake so as to enable others to eat. He is therefore described as  
“removing” the subject “from below,” a phrase that suggests the lower echelons of the 
tribal hierarchy, so that the subject could find yellow corn to thresh, cook and eat. 
Another chief, Khondlo of the Qwabe Clan, meanwhile, was so concerned about the well 
being of his subjects that he is praised as food himself: 
 
Black millet that is eaten raw, 
They ate it as it showed on the dry maize stalks.
174  
 
Black millet is nutritious and does not have to be processed before it can be eaten. In 
describing Khondlo in these terms, the izibongo notes that Khondlo nourished and 
sustained the tribe while also highlighting Khondlo’s willingness to sacrifice himself for 
the wellbeing of his subjects. The last line praises Khondlo for making the consumption 
of food so easy that his subjects could eat the crop as soon as it appeared on the plants.   
 
However, metaphors of eating and drinking did not only serve as literal praises 
but as negative criticism as well. A chief Dingane was described in his praise poem as 
“the milk bucket which overﬂows (gaba) without having given birth.”
175 This was a vivid 
praise, as well as a criticism, of the king’s authoritarian power because it suggested that 
milk, which served as a staple source of nourishment as well as a metaphor for power, 
had not been distributed to subjects, impeding their livelihood and ability to rule 
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themselves.
176 Similarly, the chief Jama was also criticized for his greed through the 
metaphor of chewing: “He who chewed with his mouth when he had nothing to chew, As 
if he were the son of Chewer of the Scrapers Clean.”
177 Another chief was criticized as 
the “miserly one who ate up the lobola cattle,”
178 a significant praise because lobola cattle 
were not meant to be eaten; they carried symbolic significance as the animals given by 
the bridegroom to the bride’s family at the time of marriage, and were to be returned if 
the marriage was to fail for any reason. By eating up the lobola cattle, then, this chief was 
tearing apart the very social fabric of his tribe. Chiefs were also criticized for living at the 
expense of his subjects without providing anything in return. For instance, the chief 
Zihlandlo was described as “the lazy one who has eaten the corn of the diligent ones.”
179 
The poet adds Chief Zihlando’s words that “I can never be rich in crops and in cattle, 
And also be rich in people,” thus highlighting the chief’s wish to acquire as many crops 
and cattle as he could regardless of how much popular support he lost.
180  
 
The most consistently negative praises, however, were reserved for Shaka who 
was not seen as fulfilling his chiefly duty of providing for his subjects. The imbongi 
echoes these sentiments in other parts of the izibongo when he describes Shaka as a beast 
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Themselves into the Milk: Zulu Political Philosophy Under Shaka.” 
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who does not let himself be milked, not only denying sustenance and nourishment to his 
subjects, but also denying them the ritual sharing of milk that symbolized the sharing of 
power and, by extension, not letting them have any part in ruling the kingdom. A verse 
therefore exclaims: 
Powerful limbs, calf of a beast, 
The kicking of this beast puzzled me, 
It kicked the milker and left the one holding it.
181 
 
As Paul J Bjerk notes, the king’s own unique royal status was maintained by reserving 
the best young warriors and the best milk, for royal consumption – and they, as the 
distilled essence of the Zulu state, then nursed him. The state, in a ritual sense, was the 
king’s mother – evoking an intimate relationship of mutual obligation between the king 
and the homestead heads, i.e. the citizens of the Zulu state. In turn, once the king had 
collected heifers, he “became mother to countless warriors who suckled at his teats.”
182 
Since the sharing of cattle and milk symbolized the sharing of power, giving the king 
cattle symbolized the people giving the chief his power, giving literal truth to the proverb 
“the chief is a chief through other people.” However, in “kicking the milker,” Shaka was 
described as collecting subjects’ cattle and enjoying the benefits of rule, without sharing 
any of the power that they gave him. The imbongi stresses this idea in other verses too: 
 
Help me Maphtitha and Ngqengelele, 
And give him a cow that he may learn to milk into the mouth, 
And give him a sharpened stick so that he may dig for himself.
183 
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Milking into the mouth describes the ritual whereby the king’s subjects drank directly 
from the king’s udders (those of his prize heifers,) thereby symbolizing their right to the 
king’s cattle, and subsequently a share in his power. In noting that Shaka needs to “learn 
to milk into the mouth” the imbongi, therefore, criticizes Shaka’s authoritarian rule.  
 
As in the criticisms of other chiefs, however, the imbongi also disparagingly notes 
that Shaka lives off his subjects, both literally in eating the food and goods they provide, 
and metaphorically in not sharing the power they give him. The imbongi therefore sums 
up the nature of Shaka’s totalitarian power through praises such as “leopard that prevents 
the other leopards at the fords.”
184 This is significant because fords, along with other 
features of the land, were not seen as belonging to any one person, but to the community 
as a whole. In “preventing other leopards at the fords” Shaka had usurped what was not 
rightfully his. Thus, many poems criticize Shaka for living at other people’s expense. The 
imbongi describes Shaka as the: 
 
Lazy one that eats the corn of the diligent ones. 
He who clears the ground with spears where chiefs use hoes; 
He summoned an army from Menwiza saying it should gather the corn 
before it is ripe.
185 
 
This verse notes Shaka’s destruction of the crop in combination with a description of him 
living off other people and not doing any work himself. His capacity for annihilation, 
then, is two fold and unique in its damage; the imbongi stresses that Shaka does not do 
                                                        
184 The praise poems are embedded in Zulu social life, reflecting the landscape. There are 
frequent references to rivers (imifulu), mountains (izintaba), forests (amahlati) and ridges 
(izinkalo). The rivers are sometimes wide and deep, with the result that the fords assume strategic 
importance. 
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his duty like other chiefs. Instead, Shaka is “he who clears the ground with spears where 
chiefs use hoes.” Since Shaka does not “hoe” the ground to provide his people with 
sustenance, he is like “gruel made of inedible millet.” Furthermore, Shake “clears the 
ground with spears,” a reference to his many military rampages.  Much praise poetry 
devoted to Shaka, then, in focusing on the havoc he wreaked in neighboring territories, 
highlighted his destruction of local food economies and sustainable consumption. 
 
The imbongi criticizes Shaka for his unwillingness to produce systems of 
sustainable consumption for the Zulu nation, stressing that instead Shaka was interested 
only in holding on to power, even at the expense of other people. The imbongi therefore 
notes his destructive characteristics metaphorized by voraciousness. Indeed, a lot of 
Shaka’s praises concentrate on his penchant for murder and destruction through 
metaphors of consumption.  
    
He who while devouring some devoured others,  
And as he devoured others he devoured some more 
He who while devouring some devoured others,  
And as he devoured others he devoured some more 
He who while devouring some devoured others,  
And as he devoured others he devoured some more 
He who while devouring some devoured others,  
And as he devoured others he devoured some more
186 
 
 
The verse stresses Shaka’s insatiable appetite for power through endless repetition that 
would have been recited breathlessly without pause and without any downdrift 
intonation. In doing so the imbongi gives the impression that Shaka eats, or kills, without 
stopping. 
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Praise poems also describe these violent expeditions through eating metaphors 
depicting his ravenous greed, and his killing for the sheer enjoyment of it:   
 
He ate up Mantondo son of Tayi, 
He felt him tasteless and spat him out, 
He devoured Sihayo.
187 
 
Not only does Shaka “devour,” a word that suggests wild voraciousness, he also wants 
his prey to taste good; he wants to enjoy his “eating.” His actions are so horrific that the 
imbongi highlights them through a narrative intervention in his own point of view, 
chanting, 
 
I criticized them, the evil-doers, 
The cattle of Sihayo returned 
And then there followed those of Mangosi 
That were milked by a hysterical person at Mavela’s place.
188 
 
 
The verse describes Shaka’s and Mepho’s (a Mkhize chief who flourished as a favorite of 
Shaka) “evil” effect on the communal food economy through their murder of neighboring 
chiefs, Sihayo and Mangosi. The imbongi presents a dramatic visual scene of the cattle, 
the most prized possessions of the Zulu homestead, returning to the kraal without anyone 
guiding them. He emphasizes the pathos of this even further by noting that they were 
milked by a person made “hysterical” by Shaka’s crimes. The word “hysterical” 
supplants any specific description of Shaka’s doings, leaving these up to the listener’s 
imagination and memories, and therefore giving them even more terrible force. The verse 
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simply suggests that Shaka’s effects on people were so horrific that they were rendered 
incapable of providing for themselves. 
 
 So devastating were these expeditions to the lives of subjects, that the imbongi 
includes a veiled threat in his verse. In doing so, he highlights the kinds of actions that his 
listeners, Shaka’s own subjects, could take against him. Warning against the dangers of 
cattle raiding, the imbongi exclaims: 
 
The people’s cattle, Shaka, leave them alone, they are a cause of disaster, 
they tie sharp knives on to their tails.
189 
 
The description “they tie sharp knives on to their tails” demonstrates how significant the 
cattle are to the local food economy. Stealing them is risking death. Remarkably, then, 
this poem contains the seeds of a democratic revolution against Shaka if he continues his 
destruction of the communal food economy and the democratic political process it was 
meant to buttress. 
 
Enacting and Buttressing Consensus Based Democratic Government through Parallelist 
Praise Poems 
Praise poems, then, described and sustained reciprocal generosity of “behavior” 
that enabled the “institution” of a communal food economy. This democratic institution, 
in turn, buttressed a democratic political system. When I talk about the Zulu political 
system of government as a democratic one, I refer to the core idea of democracy as a 
form of political organization that aims at universal and equal control over matters that 
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affect one’s interests. As I lay out in Chapter One, this core universalist idea is 
manifested in context specific permutations. For instance, in a representative democracy, 
the political system in much of the Western world, every vote must have equal weight, no 
restrictions can apply to anyone wanting to become a representative, and the freedom of 
its citizens is secured by legitimized rights and liberties which are generally protected. I 
argue that, while Zulu democracies traditionally also aimed at universal and equal control 
over matters that affected one’s interests, decisions were reached not according to 
majoritarian voting but through consensus. As Thaddeus Metz points out, African 
cultures often consider it immoral to make policy decisions in the face of dissent, as 
opposed to seeking consensus. In the political realm, unanimity is prized, and 
majoritarianism is typically seen as a morally inadequate way to resolve conﬂicts of 
interest or to determine law. Thus, in many small-scale African communities, discussion 
continues until a compromise is found and all in the discussion agree with the 
outcome.
190 The Zulu political sphere traditionally contained similar spaces of consensus 
based dissent and decision making; the system of traditional democratic monarchy was 
conducted by discussion in public meetings open to all adult males, where any man could 
express his opinions about an issue until a decision was reached.
191 These are clearly 
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191 Kwasi Wiredu describes a modern version of such a “non-party polity” among the Akan 
people in Ghana. This is a type of democratic system in which a candidate who wins a majority of 
votes would not aim to promote his constituency’s interests, but would rather share power with 
other representatives by seeking consensus with them in the adoption of every government policy. 
This is, then, a fascinating and under-explored model of representative democracy quite different 
from the winner-take-all system in the United States and the parliamentary systems in Europe. 
See Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective, (Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 1997).  
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political principles found in a representative democracy, but are nevertheless different in 
their contextual specificities from how we would describe “democracy” in the Euro-
American political tradition, reflecting local intellectual cultures and sensibilities. It is, 
then, a “contextual universalism.”  
Through my reading of praise poetry, I argue that the Zulu political system before 
Shaka prized as broad a range of opinions as possible, and in my reading of Shaka’s 
praise poems I argue that discursive institutions struggled to keep the spirit of this 
multivocality alive despite his authoritarian rule. Furthermore, as I assert in my 
introduction and demonstrate through an analysis of Bhīma’s logical, upside down 
language, these subaltern literary devices were continuous with their socially progressive 
messages. Much praise poetry represents and enacts this system of consensus based 
representative democracy through a particular form of repetition. Parallelism consisted of 
lines of repeated statements of identical construction but with slightly different words and 
synonyms expressing the same idea. This gave the impression of a democratic 
multivocality; while stirring the emotions and imagination through rich description, such 
repetition produced a mingling of different vocal registers to present one unified 
meaning, just as a consensus based democratic system allowed all voices to be heard 
before reaching a common decision. Parallelism, then, added a contrapuntal quality to 
praise chants, containing two or more voices independent in their specific nuances 
because of the different words used to express the same idea, but harmonically 
interdependent because they carried a unified meaning expressed in identical sentence 
construction, a regularity of rhythm with the same number of stresses in each line, as well 
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as alliteration and assonance. The formal elements of praise poetry, then, echoed the 
democratic nature of the activity by vocalizing different voices that expressed the same 
praises while also lending force to the statements of critique the izibongo was making. 
Parallelist praise poetry supported and reflected a consensus based political 
system in its manufacturing of evaluative judgments surrounding a chief’s rule. This 
consensus based critique was achieved through an agreed upon summary of the chief’s 
character, as well as of the historical events that he was part of. Praise poems, for 
instance, enact a multivocal consensus on Shaka’s character through repeated statements 
that vary in their emphasis while presenting one main idea. For instance, one verse 
describes Shaka’s angry, violent disposition through repeated metaphors to do with fire:  
He who goes along making fires and leaving behind conflagrations, 
Who when he was rubbed flared up like a fire
192 
 
Both lines strive to convey Shaka’s fierce nature through the metaphor of fire. However, 
each does so to evoke different aspects of his fiery nature. The first conveys the results of 
his temperament through an evocation of the burned down villages he left in his wake. 
The second, meanwhile, comments on what causes this ferocity – the ease with which 
Shaka was provoked. The line notes that he was dry firewood, quick to burst into flame 
when rubbed or irritated. The two lines, then, reach a consensus on his aggresive nature 
while suggesting a multivocality in their reference to different aspects of that fieriness.  
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Shaka is similarly described through repeated similes referring to his impressive 
physical size, each with the aim of conveying one main agreed upon point about Shaka’s 
enormous strength and power but with a slightly different emphasis:  
 
He who is as big as his country, enormous one, 
He who is as big as mountains. 
He who is as big as Sondude mountain, 
He who is as big as the tree on the ridge of Maqhwakazi, 
On which lived the Ndwandwes and the Nxumalos.
193 
 
The verse enacts a democratic multivocality through synonyms that reinforce the central 
point; Shaka is not just “big” but “enormous.” This point is conveyed through different 
similes; Shaka is as big as his country, as mountains, as a tree. The descriptive, repetitive 
addition of “ Sondude mountain” after “mountains” not only emphasizes Shaka’s power 
but evokes a different elaborative voice that responds to the first speaker’s initial 
statement that Shaka “is as big as mountains.” The verse, then, enacts a consensus based 
multivocality by creating the impression of different speakers responding to each other, 
adding details to, and confirming each others’ points.  
 
These kinds of verses also gave power to consensus based critiques of chiefs by 
emphasizing that the creation of history was a communal project. Shaka’s praise poem 
evokes the necessity of multiple voices recounting a historical incident involving the 
chief until one unified version is finally agreed upon.  For instance, one verse describes 
Shaka on a rampage as: 
 
Fire of the long dry grass, son of Mjokwane; 
Fire of the long grass of scorching force, 
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That burned the owls on the Dlebe hill, 
And eventually those on Mabedlana also burned.
194 
 
Each line adds a different detail to the recounting of the historical incident, emphasizing 
what the previous speaker has left out. In this regard, the lines are responses to previous 
voices; the second line repeats “long grass” but leaves out the “dry” and adds scorching. 
The last line is crafted as a final response and addition to the previous line because it 
starts with “and” and remarks that the owls on “Mabedlana eventually also burned.” In 
another similar recounting of a historical confrontation between Shaka and another chief, 
the praise poetry enacts a parallelist historiography by noting that: 
 
And then there came out two morning stars up in the sky, 
The two morning stars came out and confronted one another.
195 
 
 
The second line repeats the first line’s point that the “two morning stars came out” 
suggesting a different voice in its additional detail that they “confronted one another.” 
This kind of parallelist repetition makes the point that while historical truth needs to be 
unified, the process of its production is a universalizing one in which everyone’s different 
nuances and additions need to not only be considered but recorded to enable posterity’s 
own judgment of the specific process through which this consensus was reached. 
 
Parallelist repetition achieves a consensus on a chief’s dominant personality traits, 
and the historical events he was part of, to lend force to the final critique of his actions. 
Shaka’s praises alternate between consensus building on his character and his role in 
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historical events before building up a powerful denunciation of them. In one such critical 
verse, the imbongi uses parallelist repetition to describe an unending cycle of violent 
greed characterized by the word “devour.” In doing so, he suggests that Shaka destroys 
people so quickly that he is not done destroying one before he moves on to the next. His 
praises portray a relentless barrage of devastation through a build up of negative verbs 
that, while all emphasizing his enormous capacity for destruction, do so through 
synonyms that give the impression of different voices – thus emphasizing and building a 
consensus based critique of Shaka’s destructive propensities: 
 
He devoured 
He ate up 
He killed 
He destroyed
196 
 
 
A parallelist multivocality is also used to link these actions directly to Shaka’s 
unwillingness to share power. The imbongi sings: 
For he ate up the cattle that were murmuring,  
For he ate up the cattle at the Dlodlweni kraal. 
Overflowing one that disregards warning;
197 
 
The parallel repetition of the first two lines, “for he ate up the cattle,” gives the 
impression that two different voices are speaking of Shaka’s actions. While one specifies 
that the “cattle were murmuring,” the other notes that they belonged to Dlodlweni’s kraal. 
The parallelism, through similar accounts of the event placed in conjunction with each 
other lends force to the imbongi’s view of Shaka, making it a democratic, yet unified, 
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consensus based voice of critique about Shaka’s overindulgence in eating other people’s 
cattle. The imbongi characterizes him as “overflowing” with the cattle he has eaten.  
Moreover, the word “overflowing” functions at another level, referring to one who is 
overflowing with milk, which symbolized power. He points out, in other words, that 
Shaka is so miserly that he allows his power to overflow and be “wasted” rather than 
sharing it. 
A similar example of a parallelist consensus based critique appears in the 
imbongi’s description of Shaka’s massacre of the Langeni clan of which his mother was a 
member: 
 
King, you are wrong because you do not discriminate, 
Because even those of your maternal uncle’s family you kill, 
Because you killed Bhebhe son of Ncumela of your maternal uncle’s 
family.
198 
 
The verse builds the impression of multiple voices achieving a consensus on the 
horrendousness of Shaka’s behavior by giving each line, or voice, a different role. The 
first gives a unified opinion of his actions, the second gives a reason for that opinion, 
while the third repeats and adds to the second line, providing details of the person Shaka 
killed.
199 The verse, then, achieves a unified consensus based critique that achieves its 
rhetorical force by giving the impression of different people filling in different aspects of 
critical indicting information that confirms Shaka’s “wrongness.” 
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  In 1828, three assassins from Shaka’s own tribe crept up to the royal kraal and 
murdered him, dumping his corpse into an empty grain pit and filling it with mud and 
stones. This was a fitting symbolic rejoinder to Shaka’s lack of grain provision to his 
subjects. By that time, Shaka had made enough enemies among his own people to hasten 
his demise, which came relatively quickly following the devastation Shaka wreaked after 
the death of his mother. As historians have noted, in this mourning period, Shaka ordered 
that no crops should be planted during the following year, no milk was to be used, and 
any woman who became pregnant was to be killed along with her husband. At least 7,000 
people who were deemed to be insufficiently grief-stricken were executed, along with 
thousands of cows so that their calves would know what losing a mother felt like.
200 In 
his final years, then, Shaka carried out a terrifying, single minded assault on the 
communal system of food production and sharing that produced and buttressed Zulu 
democratic cultures and behaviors. It is not surprising, then, that his half brothers, along 
with tribal co-conspirators, were to take political power into their own hands, bringing 
the izibongo’s poetic warnings to Shaka to fruition.   
  As I have argued, the aesthetic forms and content of Zulu praise poetry and izagu 
enact “a chief is a chief through other people” in their radical critique and regulation of 
despotic chiefly power. In doing so, they offer a contextually grounded, yet 
universalizing conceptualization of democratic cultures and institutions, expressed 
through literary devices that are continuous with their humanist messages. Democratic 
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behavior, then, emerges as a contextual universalism, a “universalizing,” “humanity 
defining” idea that is not a colonial import, and that responds to local and colonial 
legacies of domination. Importantly, these praise poems also illuminate what alternative 
institutional forms, such as communal agricultural systems, buttressed and produced 
these indigenous “modern” discourses. They ask us to reconsider approaches to 
alternative modernities that selectively demonstrate how majoritarian systems of 
democracy were appropriated, and then repeatedly failed, in parts of Africa. This 
rethinking also challenges views of African indigenous cultures as always developing 
towards “modernity,” instead showing how modernity itself is a concept that needs to be 
interrogated. These praise poems, then, reveal a rich historical complexity in non-western 
cultures that has much political relevance even today.  
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Chapter 4: Affective Agencies: Contextualizing Individual Freedom in the colonial 
Indian bildungsroman 
In 1888, Krupabai Satthianadhan (1862-1894), touted by her contemporaries as “the 
first Indian woman writing in English,”
201  wrote: 
What a world of untried work lay before me, and what large and 
noble possibilities seemed to open out for me! I would throw aside 
the fetters that bound me and be independent. I had chafed under 
restraints and the ties which formed the common lot of women, 
and I longed for an opportunity to show that a woman is in no way 
inferior to a man. How hard it seemed to my mind that marriage 
should be the goal of woman’s ambition, and that she should look 
pretty, and never know the joy of independence and intellectual 
work! The thought had been galling. It made me avoid men, and I 
felt more than once that I could not look into their faces unless I 
was able to hold my own with them. So like a slave whose freedom 
had just been purchased, I was happy, deliriously happy.
202 
 
Satthianadhan was a convert to Christianity who spent most of her short life in the 
Maharashtrian city of Bombay, and at the Madras Medical College in Southern India. 
The above passionate speech is not surprising given that Satthianadhan was not only 
hailed as the first Indian woman writing in English, she was also one of the first female 
Indian medical students; she dreamed of becoming a doctor, of doing the “untried work” 
of helping other women that she spoke so fervently about. She was also one of the first 
female recipients of a scholarship to study medicine in England, and after she was forced 
to refuse it on account of her failing health, she was one of the first Indian Christian 
women to women to start a school for Muslim girls with help from the Church 
Missionary Society. Satthianadhan’s long list of firsts demonstrate not just the depth of 
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her “intellectual work” and drive at a time when women were still fighting to enter the 
public sphere, they also testify to her belief in universalizing ideas of freedom, which led 
to her desire to improve the “common lot of women” all over India; even as a Christian 
convert, she spent her short life fighting for the social well being of Christian, Hindu, and 
Muslim women alike.  
 
In this chapter, I focus on Krupabai’s universalizing ideas of individual freedom 
in her bildungsroman, Kamala. Kamala conveys its message that individual freedom is a 
universal right through the story of the eponymous protagonist, a motherless Hindu girl, 
who is brought up by a scholarly, Brahmin father, and married into a traditional, upper-
caste Brahmin family shortly after puberty. Her husband, Ganesh, makes a short lived 
attempt to have a “modern,” companionate marriage but soon brings a prospective 
mistress into the house. Kamala leaves him and Ganesh dies of cholera shortly 
afterwards. Kamala then learns that her father has left her an immense fortune from 
Ramchander, a man who secretly adores Kamala and to whom she was once betrothed. 
He asks her to marry him but she declines and spends the rest of her life as a widow 
doing charity work for widows and orphans. I argue that Satthianadhan clearly thinks of 
individual freedom in a way that is similar to modern – specifically Kantian -- ideas of 
free will, namely, as the ability to make choices without constraint.  But she 
contextualizes her universalizing ideas of agency in the physical body’s experiences of its 
surroundings rather than in a conscious will that grapples with imposed ideologies.  
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As I outline in the first chapter, my reading of a universalizing idea of individual 
freedom in Satthianadhan’s bildungsromane also hopes to challenge feminist dismissals 
of universalizing ideas of rights on the grounds that these are always flawed in their 
ignorance of contextual difference and serve as imperialist tools when transported to 
other cultural contexts.
203 Instead, I demonstrate how the occurrence of a universalizing 
idea of individual freedom in a context very different from Enlightenment Europe 
suggests the possibility of recuperating universalizing humanist frameworks for feminist 
politics, stressing that such universalizing frameworks can be sensitive to contextual 
difference. Satthianadhan thus suggests ways out of the cultural relativism vs. 
universalism debates haunting quests for a universalizing, yet non-colonialist 
feminism.
204 However, Satthianadhan’s ideas of individual freedom are not just an 
instantiation of what I call “contextual universalisms.”  Satthianadhan also theorizes just 
how a universalizing idea of agency can be contextually grounded through her focus on 
the way that the body’s universal corporeality combines with context specific cultural 
discourses to produce an embodied agency. This focus on the materiality of the body also 
adds nuance to some post-structuralist accounts of a discursive body that shapes 
individual freedom, pointing out how the body’s dynamism, while shaped by, and 
perceived through, cultural discourses, cannot be reduced to these discourses, to 
language. As Judith Butler self-reflexively writes: 
I confess, however, that I am not a very good materialist. Every 
time I try to write about the body, the writing ends up being about 
language. This is not because I think that the body is reducible to 
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language; it is not. Language emerges from the body, constituting 
an emission of sorts. The body is that upon which language falters, 
and the body carries its own signs, its own signifiers, in ways that 
remain largely unconscious.”
205 
 
Indeed, Satthianadhan’s ideas of embodied agency testify to the irreducibility of the 
body’s materiality to language; she locates her ideas of individual freedom in a universal 
physical body that resists relations of domination by drawing on culturally specific 
structures of feeling that “move” the subject away from oppressive surroundings; as I 
demonstrate in my analysis Satthianadhan’s bildungsromane, while written in English at 
the height of the colonial period, in the center of a colonial metropolis, and using a 
European literary form, explicitly draw on indigenous literary genres such as the ancient 
poetics of the kavya genre. Unlike the other South African and Indian literatures I read, 
then, Satthianadhan’s writing represents an internalization of colonial literary cultures 
and ideologies but, nevertheless, consciously tries to lay out humanist ideas 
independently of colonialist frameworks. In doing so, Satthianadhan demonstrates, as I 
mention in my introduction, that regional literary genres that articulated non-colonialist 
discourses of modernity, were very much a part of the intertextual universe of 
Anglophone texts. These indigenous literatures, then, should not simply be read as 
internalizations of colonialist value systems. 
Furthermore, while Bhīma Bhoi’s devotional poetry explored alternative 
indigenous modernities through the “knowledge revolutions” that defined human worth 
through actions rather than a preordained religious or social status, and while my analysis 
of Zulu praise poetry focused on the material institutions that buttressed radical modern 
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epistemes, Satthianadhan’s bildungsromane testify to the effects of “expanding 
intercultural contacts”
206 in impeding, aiding, and altering indigenous modernities. They 
are an example of how different visions of alternative modernities interact with each 
other and with colonial modernity, while holding their own in relation to it and even 
challenging it. In the sections that follow, I argue that Satthianadhan makes the case for a 
contextually grounded yet universalizing account of individual freedom by first 
problematizing factional nationalist and colonialist discourses pertaining to the 
emancipation of Indian women as well as narrative attempts, such as Charlotte Bronte’s 
Jane Eyre (a text that Satthianadhan had most likely read),
207 to render the exercise of 
free will a Christian prerogative. Having done so, Satthianadhan crafts an alternative 
universalizing narrative of individual freedom that is not limited by religious or political 
factionalism. 
Problematizing Nationalist and Colonialist Discourses of Modernity 
 
Satthianadhan’s two novels Saguna (1887-88) and Kamala (1894) were serialized 
in Madras Christian College Magazine, and her numerous short stories and prose 
sketches were written during the 1880s and 1890s when the nationalist reform 
movement
208 for Indian women was in full swing.
 209 As Partha Chatterjee has shown, 
                                                        
206 Friedman, “Definitional Excursions: The Meanings of Modern/Modernity/Modernism,” 507. 
 
207 Krupabai Satthianadhan, Miscellaneous Writings of Krupabai Satthianadhan (Madras: 
Srinivasa, Varadachari and Co. 1896). Satthianadhan was well versed in the British canon, 
making references to George Eliot, Milton, Wordsworth, Elliot, and, as I demonstrate, very 
closely echoing passages and plot lines from Jane Eyre. 
 
208 The movement arose in reaction to British imperialist assertions that colonialism was 
necessary to alleviate the supposedly wretched condition of India’s women. In response, Indian 
activists such as Mahadev Ranade placed women at the centre of their own ideological struggle   141 
nationalist discourse set up binaries that defined the home as spiritual and feminine and 
the outer world as material and masculine. Indian women were represented as the soul of 
the inner, spiritual, and Hindu world of the home through the figure of the perfect wife.
210 
Such a wife was to be educated in Western style conjugality while simultaneously being a 
pativrata, a woman who embraced devotion to her husband as the ultimate dharma. As 
Satthianadhan’s bildungsromane testify, these contradictory ideologies were to have a 
heavy toll on women, who were often expected by different members of their families to 
enact and represent different ideologies. 
Satthianadhan can be placed in a flourishing tradition of writing during the late 
nineteenth century that engages these nationalist and colonialist reform movements 
through a narrative focus on women’s lives. Indeed, between the 1880s and the 1920s, 
Bengali novelists Bankimchandra, Rabindranath Tagore, and Saratchandra 
Chattopadhyay, traced and consolidated social reform themes such as the fight against 
child marriage, the fight for widow remarriage and the struggle for female education, 
through female protagonists. While these male Bengali writers received much critical 
attention, however, their female counterparts’ novels and autobiographical accounts of 
the reform movements, were often overlooked. This was a pity; Satthianadhan and other 
                                                                                                                                                                     
for independence. As Partha Chatterjee has argued, nationalists were divided between those who 
regarded the Indian woman as belonging to a sacrosanct sphere untouched by empire, insisting 
that women remain isolated in the domestic sphere as they were expected to by ‘tradition,’ and 
those who insisted that the anti-colonial struggle required addressing the woman’s question 
through social reform to modernize Indian society. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its 
Fragments, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
 
209 Kamala was first published serially in 1894 in the Madras Christian College Magazine and 
posthumously as a book in the same year. 
 
210 Priya Joshi, In Another Country, (New York: Columbia UP, 2002), 173. 
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notable female writers, writing in regional languages as well as in English,
211 gave 
reformist issues such as child marriage, the hardships of widowhood, the evils of purdah 
and the need for education, complex new dimensions. Satthianadhan’s bildungsroman, 
Kamala, for instance, traces many contentious reformist themes while complicating their 
simplistic calls for reform. Her description of husbands’ attempts to educate their wives 
in line with the Victorian ideal of a companionate marriage invokes the difficulties that 
young wives faced in being caught between their husbands’ wishes to educate them, and 
their in-laws’ resistance to such education. Similarly, her focus on the regretful condition 
of child widows through the sufferings of her eponymous protagonist invokes the 
controversial Widow Remarriage Act of 1856 which repealed the ban on widow 
remarriage for Hindus,
212 but she still has her protagonist choose not to get remarried, 
even when the man she loves proposes to her. Satthianadhan, then, was clearly going 
beyond these ideologies when thinking about what exercising freedom may mean for 
women.  
While fitting into Indian reformist literature, Satthianadhan can also be read as 
building on and reacting to 18
th century British Sentimentalist Literature. As Lynn Hunt 
argues, sentimental ﬁction taught its audience new ways of imagining equality. Novels 
                                                        
211 These included Swarnakumari Debi, who edited the journal Bharati (Bengali) and wrote The 
Uprooted Vine in Bengali (1892), Tarabai Shinde (Marathi), and Shevantibai Nikambe, who 
wrote Ratanbai in English (1895). 
 
212 The Widow Remarriage Act repealed the ban on widow remarriage on the grounds that there 
were many Hindus who practiced widow remarriage but who were now unable to do so as the 
courts run by the East India Company and the British government had declared this illegal. The 
British codification of Hindu law tended to impose Brahmanic ritual on all Hindus. The law was 
controversial because it was regarded as a challenge to the authority of the Brahmins. Thus, more 
than forty petitions against the Bill were submitted by around sixty thousand high caste Hindus. 
See Radha Kumar’s The History of Doing (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1993).   143 
such as Samuel Richardson’s Pamela received frenzied acclaim because they encouraged 
readers to identify with weak female characters who struggled to preserve their autonomy 
and integrity against various forms of domestic oppression. By creating such bonds of 
identification, Hunt argues, the novels helped readers understand the Kantian notion that 
all humans resembled them on a fundamental level, and that everyone possessed inherent 
natural rights.
213 And, because of the sentimentalist emphasis on emotion, these novels 
argued for universal rights without Kant’s emphasis on rationality being the primary 
determiner of moral choice.
214 However, these novels also tied their evocation of 
empathy in the reader to the idea of a Christian morality; before the 18
th century, 
Christians readily accepted the equality of souls in heaven without connecting them to 
ideas of equality on earth.
215 Sentimentalist literature allied the two so that the right to the 
exercise of agency became seen as a universalizing Christian right. The result can be seen 
in Jane Eyre, which cannot imagine an effective exercise of agency outside a Christian 
framework or outside of a Christian marriage to Rochester. 
 Indeed, Satthianadhan was reacting to precisely the transnational genre of 
women’s bildungsromane, such as Jane Eyre, on the question of individual freedom for 
                                                        
213 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, A History, (New York: Norton 2008).  
 
214 Kant sees the practical concept of freedom as the independence of our will from the "coercion 
through sensuous impulses. Our arbitrary will is sensuous, so far as it is affected pathologically 
(by sensuous impulses); it is called animal (arbitrium brutum), if necessitated pathologically. The 
human will is certainly sensuous…but there is in man a faculty of determination, independent of 
the necessitation through sensuous impulses.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, (London: 
Macmillan, 1881,) 461. 
215 "In all creation every thing one chooses and over which one has any power, may be used 
merely as means; man alone, and with him every rational creature, is an end in himself." 
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, (London: Penguin Classics, 2008), 75.   144 
women amidst societal constraints, a genre that emerged as part of the New Woman 
movement in Britain as well as its colonies.
216 While the genre of the bildungsroman is 
overwhelmingly concerned with the central conflict between the main character’s free 
will and the society in which they live, as Joseph Slaughter has argued, the 
bildungsroman naturalizes not only human rights values such as individual freedom but 
also some of the unfair power structures that are a part of rights discourse.
217 I argue that 
Satthianadhan’s bildungsromane are concerned with revealing precisely these 
contradictions and hyprocrisies in Victorian novels such as Jane Eyre– a text in which 
universalizing sentiments about rights do not extend to Britain’s non- Christian colonized 
subjects. In Saguna, Satthianadhan thus exposes how, despite Britain’s purported 
imperial “civilizing mission,” marks of ‘civilization,’ such as the right to exercise one’s 
free will, were denied to raced Christian subjects like herself. 
And just as Bhīma does through the ulti bamsi, and Zulu imbongi do with their 
parallelist repetition, Satthianadhan conveys this subversive content through equally 
radical form. She disrupts the linear, progressive narrative of European bildungsroman 
that, in Jane Eyre, represents a Christianizing process of individual development. Instead, 
                                                        
216 The New Woman was the term used to describe the Indian woman who emerged during the 
later nineteenth century as a consequence of British colonialist influences, including educational 
and socio-religious reforms. The New Woman sought greater equality between men and women 
and wished women to be valued as educated and self reliant individuals. There is also a Japanese 
new woman and Korean one: see the edited collection by the Modern Girl Collective, based at the 
Univ. of Washington. The Modern Girl Collective, The Modern Girl Around the World: 
Consumption, Modernity, and Globalization, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
 
For a comparison between Satthianadhan’s female protagonists as a colonial double to Jane Eyre, 
see Narin Hassan’s essay, “Jane Eyre’s Doubles?” in Gilbert & Gubar's The Madwoman in the 
Attic after Thirty Years, ed. Annette Federico, (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2009). 
 
 
217 Slaughter, Human Rights Inc. 
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in Saguna, Satthianadhan’s narrative 'spirals and loops' like the ancient Indian epics, 
shifting in time to bolster the development of the individual through long flashbacks.  
Kamala, meanwhile, has an intrusive narrative voice that intervenes to contextualize the 
events it is describing, simultaneously disrupting the bildungsroman’s traditional 
teleological movement from past to present; instead the narrative voice constantly brings 
the reader back to a perpetual present from which the distant past is being viewed. These 
changes to the linear “development” of the protagonist structurally undermines colonialist 
and nationalist assumptions that the “modern” ideologies of companionate marriage and 
widow remarriage necessarily constituted “progress” for the women they concerned.  
Ironically, Satthianadhan’s subversion of colonialist missionary narratives as well 
as nationalist Hinduism in both form and content resulted in her work being appropriated 
by both groups, each of whom thought that in rejecting the other, she was promoting their 
ideologies. For instance, the Madras Journal of Education, the principal contributors of 
which were senior government officials and missionaries, stated that “Everyone in 
England should carefully peruse this book… it will shew them how the machinery for 
working Christian Missions may be improved.” Yet another British publication added 
that “A native Christian lady herself writes of Indian life, so that we get an accurate idea 
of such life, and truly to our Western experience, there is a great deal of the quaint and 
curious about what we read. The descriptions of Indian towns are so just and artistic, the 
ways of the poor Hindu females are so well described, Indian scenery is penciled with 
such a deft touch…where, the European reader will ask himself, did an Indian lady get 
hold of such a sweet, tender style? As we read, we fancy it is some English lady who has 
written the book, so charming it is to us.” However, the novels were simultaneously   146 
appropriated and praised by newspapers known for espousing Hindu nationalist reform 
ideologies. The Hindu praised Saguna and Kamala for the “high moral tone that is 
maintained throughout” adding that “we hope that the lady writer will be an object lesson 
to her sisters in Southern India…in her noble and self imposed task of delineating the 
mind of her Hindu sisters.” 
218 
As I have elaborated in my introduction, literary works of this period have too 
often been read by post-colonial scholars through the colonialist binaries imposed by 
these hegemonic groups within colonized societies. This has been largely due to the post-
colonial focus on colonial discourse analysis, a view that often assumes all discourse as 
uniformly shaped by power, to the detriment of those such as Satthianadhan, who were 
drawing on other discourses or, as evident in Bhīma’s devotional poetry and Zulu praise 
poetry, of those who lived in interstices of the nation state where colonial power had not 
percolated as deeply. Drawing on the colonial discourse analysis model, contemporary 
critics such as Chandani Lokuje have concluded that Satthianadhan’s simultaneous 
engagement with nationalist tradition and colonial modernity signifies a split subjectivity 
that extends to her protagonist. In Lokuje’s interpretation, one side of Kamala’s 
personality, or her “alter-ego,”
219 is simply an archetype of the traditional daughter, wife 
and mother, whose life’s purpose is dutiful self- sacrifice in the domestic sphere.
220 On 
the other hand, Lokuje argues, Kamala can also be read as a text promoting “colonial 
modernity” for a Western audience because in criticizing the “orthodox Hindu home,” 
                                                        
218 Reviews reprinted in Satthianadhan, Miscellaneous Writings of Krupabai Satthianadhan. 
 
219 Krupabai Satthianadhan, Kamala, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 9. 
 
220 Chandani Lokuje in Satthianadhan, Kamala, 4. 
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Satthianadhan takes on a colonialist persona. I argue, however, that such interpretations 
read Satthianadhan’s novels through precisely the binaries of nationalist tradition and 
colonial modernity that Satthianadhan was resisting and critiquing. Unlike social reform 
movements for women that were imposed from above, Satthianadhan, I insist, crafts a 
universalizing idea of individual agency for women that is not limited by race, religion, 
or ideology, instead grounding itself in the subject’s embodied experience of her 
surroundings. My general point, then – to return to what I said in my introduction -- is 
that the concept of modernity is more capacious that what is suggested by the term 
“colonial modernity,” which refers “to the particular combination of modern social 
institutions and colonialist ideology that European colonial rule brought with it; this 
ideology was based on a wholesale devaluation of traditional social institutions in the 
societies that were colonized. This ideology was used to justify colonial rule, but it is 
possible to separate the ideology from the institutions (and laws, values, etc.) associated 
with modernity.”
221 Instead, I suggest along with other scholars that we explore non-
colonialist forms of modernity that exist in cultural texts. I start by demonstrating 
Satthianadhan’s rejection of colonialist modernity, in her readings and rewritings of 
bildungsromane such as Jane Eyre and Saguna respectively. I then analyze her own 
construction of an alternative modernity based in universalizing assertions of individual 
freedom that were grounded in indigenous cultural and literary currents. 
 
Problematizing Jane Eyre’s Free/Christian Soul 
 
                                                        
221 See the introduction of the forthcoming volume Mohanty (ed.), Colonialism, Modernity, and 
Literature: A View from India, 18. 
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Satthianadhan was dissatisfied with the contradictions and hyprocrisies of 
colonialist modernity that she perceived in Victorian novels such as Jane Eyre– a text in 
which universalizing sentiments about rights do not extend to Britain’s non- Christian 
colonized subjects and which both Kamala and Saguna draw on and revise. As Joyce 
Zonana has argued in her well-known article on Jane Eyre, Jane’s story depends on 
discourses of Christian ‘feminism’ that represent agency as being a Christian prerogative, 
and Oriental heathens as denying freedom to their women. Jane finds it possible to resist 
Rochester at first because he acts in ways that clearly echo the Western conception of 
"Mahomet," not Christ. Zonana notes that Jane objects to a "pagan" tendency in 
Rochester
222 when he sings a song to her in which a woman swears "to live-to die" with 
her beloved.
223 Jane asserts that she "had no intention of dying" with Rochester: "I had as 
good a right to die when my time came as he had: but I should bide that time, and not be 
hurried away in a suttee.
224" Jane’s own idea of an agency with Christian valences, then, 
depends on a contrast with a “pagan” or “Mahometan” oppression.   
 
This characterization of oppressed Oriental womanhood in need of rescue was 
                                                        
222 Joyce Zonana, “The Sultan and the Slave: Feminist Orientalism and the Structure of ‘Jane 
Eyre,’” Signs 18. 3 (Spring, 1993): 614. 
 
223 Charlotte Bronte, Jane Eyre, (New York: Bantam, 2003), 301. 
 
224 Bronte, Jane Eyre, 301. 
 
Sati is the religious ritual whereby a Hindu widow immolated herself on the funeral pyre of her 
husband. The widow was led by the religious precept that sati released her from the female body 
in the cycle of births and also ensured her dead husband’s spiritual salvation. Colonial and 
evangelist discourse considered sati as symbolic of the oppression of all Indian women as a 
whole, and used it as a moral justification to impose their presence on India. See Lata Mani, 
“Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India” in Recasting Women, eds. 
Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid, (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1990), 88-126. 
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nothing new; Victorian discourses of freedom for women often took the shape of a 
feminist individualism that relied on the colonial project of “soul making,” or turning the 
heathen into a human with a soul. As I argue, in Bronte’s narrative as well as in much 
Victorian literature, the possession of a “soul” was the necessary precondition to enacting 
one’s free will, without which one could not be considered fully human. This meant that 
Bronte had to balance Jane’s exercise of free will in choosing to marry Rochester, instead 
of becoming a missionary, with the narrative background of St John’s mission to civilize 
the Indians into possessing a soul: "My vocation? My great work? ... My hopes of being 
numbered in the band who have merged all ambitions in the glorious one of bettering 
their race-of carrying knowledge into the realms of ignorance-of substituting peace for 
war-freedom for bondage-religion for hope of heaven, for the fear of hell.
225" Here, the 
“human” characteristics of “peace” and “freedom” are semantically linked to the promise 
of a Christian heaven. Despite the many critiques of Christian ideology and practice that 
abound in Jane Eyre, here Bronte obscures the patriarchal oppression that can also a part 
of Christianity. Bronte ends her text by elevating St. John’s words, who "labors for his 
race" with the same imperial impulses as Jane: "Firm, faithful, and devoted, full of 
energy and zeal, and truth ... he clears their painful way to improvement; he hews down 
like a giant the prejudices of creed and caste that encumber it."
226 Bronte ends her story 
with St. John's words because they “externalize and make global what has been her own 
internal and local project all along: the purging of oriental elements from her society and 
                                                        
225 Bronte, Jane Eyre, 376. 
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the replacement of "Mahometan" law by Christian doctrine.” 
227 
 
In line with the idea that free will is a Christian prerogative, Jane’s choice to 
marry Rochester, despite their class differences, is figured as the privilege afforded to a 
Christian soul. According to R. B. Martin, the union is significant because it is the 
outcome of a Christian test: “the test is to become worthy of love, not to take it on any 
terms but to deserve it: not to violate one's own nature and morality but so to expand that 
nature that it deserves reward. Jane and Rochester, learning to respect the inviolability of 
the soul as much as earthly delights, become a microcosm of man's striving for Christian 
reward."
228  In line with this, Jane’s exercise of her freedom of choice can only happen 
once she concentrates on her own “soul making,” expanding her own “nature and 
morality” to result in the “inviolable soul” that then deserves the “Christian reward” of 
marital happiness with Rochester.  
 
Bronte therefore demonstrates that before becoming capable of exercising her free 
choice to marry Rochester, Jane must prove that she has a Christian soul worthy of 
making that free choice. Indeed, as I argue, Jane’s eventual marriage to Rochester, and 
the ‘soul making’ that enables that free choice, happens by the grace of a Christian God 
who manifests himself in humane “Christian” relationships which Bronte enacts and 
naturalizes through descriptions of the natural world. Her process of soul making takes 
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place over the three days after she leaves Rochester, having discovered he is already 
married. Bronte makes it clear that the only thing that gives Jane strength to flee is a 
Christian God and the nature through which this God manifests Himself: “I had injured-
wounded-left my master. I was hateful in my own eyes. Still I could not turn, nor retrace 
one step. God must have led me on. As to my own will or conscience, impassioned grief 
had trampled one and stifled the other.”
229 It is God’s will and conscience, enacted 
through the symbolic space of the natural world, then, that sustains her: “Night was 
come, and her planets were risen: a safe, still night: too serene for the companionship of 
fear. We know that God is everywhere: but certainly we feel His presence most when His 
works are on the grandest scale spread before us; and it is in the unclouded night sky, 
where His worlds wheel their silent course, that we read clearest His infinitude, His 
omnipotence, His omnipresence.”
230 Here, Jane’s exercise of choice in running away, is 
semantically linked to God’s design; her “free” will is sanctioned by God. After certain 
fortuitous “acts of God” that conveniently kill off Rochester’s heathen wife, give Jane an 
inheritance that renders her financially independent, and introduce her to close relations 
of the kind she has always longed for, Jane asks Him to “show me the path.”
231 Finally, 
deeming her tried and tested soul worthy of reward, God leads her back to Rochester by 
enabling her to miraculously hear his cry for her from miles away.  
 
Rochester also undergoes the same process of Christian legitimization and soul 
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making that enables him to exercise his free will to marry Jane. When Jane encounters 
him at Ferndean, he is barely human; he is animal like in his appearance, deformed and 
alone. Jane therefore declares that "it is time someone undertook to rehumanize you,"
232 
and Bronte figures his subsequent change of behavior as an emotional act of Christian 
conversion: "Jane! you think me, I dare say, an irreligious dog: but my heart swells with 
gratitude to the beneficent God of this earth just now... I did wrong.... Of late, Jane-only-
only of late-I began to see and acknowledge the hand of God in my doom. I began to 
experience remorse, repentance, the wish for reconcilement with my Maker. I began 
sometimes to pray."
233 Rochester is born again; he is no longer a ‘dog’ but a human 
because he is a Christian man. He therefore frequently references his merciful God, and 
thanks Him for Jane and all other subsequent blessings. It is only fitting, then, that after 
Rochester’s conversion, more “Christian” miracles rain down on them. They are married, 
their child is born and the gift of sight is also bestowed upon him, which he considers an 
endowment from God: "On that occasion he again, with a full heart, acknowledged that 
God had tempered judgment with mercy."
234 Rochester’s literal blindness, then, serves as 
a metaphor for his spiritual blindness, and fittingly his sight can only be restored when he 
first ‘sees’ God through Jane. With his sight restored, the world is "no longer a void," to 
Rochester. Similarly, his previously "void" spiritual life is also filled with the blessings of 
a Christian soul, as are their lives together.  
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Since the exercise of free will depends on the development of a Christian soul, 
Jane and Rochester must complete their journey of soul making before they are 
completely free to marry. It is only after this that a Christian God manifests himself 
through a romanticized natural world to bless their union and to symbolize the emotive 
renewal Jane and Rochester undergo as individuals and as a couple.  Jane takes Rochester 
into "cheerful fields,"
235describing the "brilliantly green" grass, the "sparklingly blue sky" 
236under the "open air" of the world. The language is alive and joyful as it describes the 
wonder spread before Jane and Rochester. Such descriptions emerge as metaphors for 
their shining new relationship in which love provides a new, promising future. It is the 
achievement of a Christian soul that makes them “human,” then, that renders Jane and 
Rochester worthy of exercising their free will, as opposed to the inhuman Oriental 
heathen “others” that pepper the subtext of Bronte’s narrative. 
 
Resisting the Christianization of Freedom: Satthianadhan’s Saguna 
 
While in Jane Eyre, conversion is a privilege that the West must bestow on the 
uncivilized natives of its colonies, in her study of conversion in colonial India, Gauri 
Viswanathan argues that the act of conversion in the colonial context was very much a 
mode of resistance; it was a means of questioning the limitations of secular ideologies, 
particularly the discourse of rights central to both the British Empire and the British 
nation-state. Implicit in such questioning was an attempt to construct an alternative 
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epistemological and ethical foundation of national community.
237 Satthianadhan’s 
bildungsromane complicate both Viswanathan’s claims and Bronte’s imperial project of 
‘civilizing the natives,’ because while Satthianadhan contests the limitations of secular 
ideologies and the British Enlightenment discourse of rights as Viswanathan suggests, her 
bildungsromane do not dismiss the notion of rights altogether. Instead, Satthianadhan 
claims rights as a universal legacy that are not limited by British, Christian, or Hindu 
prejudices, while simultaneously being locally grounded in culturally specific structures 
of feeling. First, Satthianadhan chronicles how the experience of being an Indian 
Christian in colonial India was marked by contradictions; to be considered Christian was 
not only to construct an alternative national community by rejecting nationalist 
inventions of tradition as Viswanathan describes, but also, ironically, having to align 
oneself with the colonial state by subscribing to British culture and supporting the British 
imperial project. The corollary of this was that marks of ‘civilization,’ such as the right to 
exercise one’s free will or agency, was not only portrayed as Christian but also 
necessarily British. Since an Indian Christian was not British, however, she was often 
denied the privilege of possessing the rights accorded to a Christian soul, always being 
seen as less human than a white British Christian. Saguna testifies to this conflict, and in 
her next bildungsroman, Kamala, Satthianadhan ends up resisting the idea of agency 
being a Hindu, Christian or British prerogative, instead choosing to craft a universalizing 
humanist idea of individual freedom that is not limited by race or religion . 
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With deliberate irony, Satthianadhan names the Christian protagonist of the novel, 
Saguna, after a Hindu tradition of idol worship that offers devotion to a God with many 
forms. It is not surprising, then, that she crafts this main character as impulsively 
equating the right to agency with Christianity only to realize the fallacy of doing so. 
Saguna first figures the natural world as the space in which a Christian God’s will is 
orchestrated as Bronte does in Jane Eyre.  The landscape of freedom is a Christian one 
recreated in Edenic glory; just as Jane refuses to be “grilled alive in Calcutta,” 
Satthianadhan’s protagonist ironically points out that free will can never be realized 
within a “shadowy, dark and mystic, primitive land of bigotry and paganism.”
238 
Saguna’s revered older brother describes the Indian landscape in precisely these terms: 
“It was just like this, shadowy, dark, mystic, weird, with superstition and bigotry lurking 
in every corner, before the light of Christianity comes into a land. When the sun rises, he 
said, all the glory of the trees and rocks comes into view, each thing assumes its proper 
proportions and is drawn out in greater beauty and perfection. So it is when the sunbeams 
of Christianity dispel the darkness of superstitions in a land.”
239 Symbolically, then, the 
sun of Christianity claims the land by creeping along the landscape and driving back the 
shadows of Hinduism to achieve a Romantic union with the natural landscape. However, 
Satthianadhan deliberately reminds the reader that Christianity cannot be separated from 
colonialist oppression, and that missionaries can never deliver on their promises of 
Christian freedom to their native converts by reminding the reader that literally too, 
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British Christianity, always in conjunction with the British Empire, captures increasing 
amounts of Indian territory.  
 
Satthianadhan thus reveals the dangers of equating Christianity with civilization, 
pointing to how such a conflation can be stretched to a justification of the British Empire; 
In doing so, she demonstrates how one could not be an Indian Christian without also 
subscribing to colonizing “civilizing” ideologies. Echoing an Orientalist standpoint about 
the primitive and exotic orient in a scene on the banks of an “Indian river,” she sketches a 
suggestively sensual sight, titillating the reader with exotic images of “scantily clad 
widows,” “gaily attired damsels with the beauty of the lotus and grace of the deer,” 
“artless little creatures just verging on maidenhood…chiming steps and saucy 
movements”
240 but, as Lokuje points out, simultaneously depicts it all with a superior 
Western distaste for the uncivilized and Unchristian. Thus, an implicitly Christian nature 
looks down disapprovingly on a Hindu landscape. “All the time the swollen angry river 
rushed on unmindful of the concourse, and the gigantic trees of the tapawanum 
(meditation grove) from their lofty height looked solemnly down on the scene.” 
241 She 
reminds the reader that from a British perspective this is a scene of typical Hindu 
corruption needing the salvaging effects of the British Empire by describing the distant 
“noise in the temple, the ringing of many bells, and the blowing of horns.” This was so 
much like what British reviewers were used to from their own writers that one comments 
“The description of Indian towns are so just and artistic, the ways of the poor Hindu 
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females are so well described, Indian scenery is penciled with such a deft touch…”
242 Far 
from endorsing these viewpoints, Satthianadhan was demonstrating that to convert to 
Christianity was to inescapably align yourself with colonialist Orientalist ideologies 
about the uncivilized, inhuman heathen “Other” in need of rescuing by the empire. 
 
Satthianadhan depicts these connections between “humanity” and “Christianity” 
only to unsettle them, pointing out how the identification of her protagonists with 
Christianity and British civilization meant that they would have to reject their Indian 
identity altogether, something that they were unable to do. When Saguna’s father studies 
Hinduism, Satthianadhan comments that he does so with a “patriotic ardour;” with a 
passion not for the religion but for his country. His community and family’s objections to 
his conversion are founded, similarly, on grounds of national and racial disobedience 
rather than religious disobedience. “Their objection to the religion of Christ was that it 
was a foreign religion, the religion of the conquerors, and that it was, therefore, very 
unpatriotic for an orthodox Hindu to exchange his own faith for that of the 
foreigners.”
243Although at that point Satthianadhan refutes such a conviction by writing 
that “Harichandra was of course proof against this argument. Patriotism which sacrificed 
truth to blind sentiment was, he said, no true patriotism,”
244 other moments in the novel 
betray her lack of conviction that true patriotism could be Christian; on one occasion, for 
example, Saguna proudly asserts what a committed Indian her older brother is by quoting 
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his defining of himself in Hindu terms as a Brahmin: “He was a Brahmin, he said, a 
Brahmin to the backbone, and he would show his countrymen what it was to be a real 
patriot, to live and die for one’s land.”
245 
 
After demonstrating the difficulties of negating one’s Indian identity for the sake 
of conversion, Satthianadhan depicts how even after her protagonists converted, they 
were not regarded by the British colonizers and missionaries as entitled to the agency 
accorded to Christian souls on account of their Indian culture. Satthianadhan describes 
Saguna’s visit to missionaries’ homes with her mother. At the time, the narrative voice 
tells us, her “mother was dressed in the orthodox fashion, as if she had been a typical 
Brahmin lady. Nothing would induce her to alter her dress.”
246Despite being Christian 
converts, Saguna and her mother are not offered a chair to sit on, implying instead that 
the floor is good enough for them. The missionary’s wife, meanwhile, “herself sat on a 
chair.
247” Saguna feels this humiliation so keenly that she herself “drew a chair for 
mother, and myself stood by her side. I was myself also asked to sit but remained 
standing.”
248 When the visit ends, Saguna requests her mother never to take her to a 
missionary’s house again. Despite their conversion, then, Satthianadhan demonstrates 
that their “Indian” identity prevents them from ever being seen as truly “Christian,” or 
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entitled to the humanity, dignity, and free will that is assumed to be a Christian 
prerogative. 
 
Satthianadhan, therefore, insists on the “humanness” of her protagonist’s Hindu 
heritage despite her conversion to Christianity.  When a missionary calls Saguna’s friend 
who appears selling bibles at the door “a mere servant, fit only to be received in the 
kitchen,” Saguna responds that their Brahmanism makes them the “real aristocrats of our 
country, and that the English ladies who came to India only belonged to the middle 
class…She (the bible woman) is a Brahmin, and only takes money from the mission 
because she is poor. She is no servant. In your country you are no Brahmins. You are 
Sudras.
249” Interestingly, Saguna does not defend herself or her Indian Christian friend 
through an assertion of their common Christianity. Instead she reverts to bringing up her 
proud Hindu heritage and judging the missionaries’ social standing in Hindu terms of 
caste despite her conversion. This is significant because missionaries often propagated 
Christian conversion as a way for lower castes to escape discriminatory caste categories. 
Saguna, however, was a convert from a high caste Brahmin heritage, and therefore a 
convert solely due to a true belief in Christianity. Her decision to highlight her higher 
caste as proof of her superiority undermines hypocritical missionary epistemes by 
demonstrating how their similar prejudices drive converts back to the very caste 
structures, the supposed antithesis of individual freedom, that they promoted Christianity 
as resisting. Satthianadhan’s Saguna, then, responds to Jane Eyre’s mission to civilize the 
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natives through conversion by demonstrating the impossibilities of an Indian Christian 
being accepted as equals by their British colonizers, despite their shared religion. 
 
Crafting an Alternative Universalizing Agency: Free Affect in Kamala 
Satthianadhan’s second bildungsroman, Kamala, carries this critique further by 
contending that free will is a universal right through the story of the eponymous 
protagonist, Kamala. Throughout the travails of her protagonist, including child marriage, 
being educated for a companionate marriage, suffering her in laws’ ill treatment of her 
and her husband’s unfaithfulness, and then finally widowhood, Satthianadhan points to 
Kamala’s belief in the innate dignity of human beings as well as cultural perceptions of 
the natural world as a space where these universalizing ideas can be experienced and 
realized.
250 Raymond Williams calls such attitudes “structures of feeling,” by which he 
means the general organization of emotion and experience in a given period and the ways 
in which common values or shared generational experiences shape subjective experience. 
Crucially, Raymond Williams differentiates such structures of feeling from ideology, 
arguing that structures of feeling belong to the level of “formative processes” that shape 
experience—not, in his view, to the more developed structures and social positions that 
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characterize ideology.
251 A similar distinction is also maintained by Satthianadhan, who 
differentiates latent universalizing cultural attitudes from the nationalist and colonialist 
ideologies that she perceives as being imposed on her. Satthianadhan bases Kamala’s 
ability to make such a distinction on affect, which I define through Brian Massumi, as the 
way that emotions register in the body as physical sensation.
252 I am arguing, then, that 
Kamala’s affects, for instance “flushes of shame,” “shivers of elation,” or “choking 
anger” enable her to recognize oppressive situations and act against them in line with 
universalizing humanist structures of feeling.   
How exactly might the subject enact agency through affect?
253 According to Brian 
Massumi, affective experience involves the impingement of hundreds of stimuli upon the 
human body. In adults, according to Neurologist Oliver Sacks, this registering of affect is 
pure potential, or, a measure of the body’s readiness to act in a given circumstance. Sacks 
gives the example of an elderly patient whose hip fracture had immobilized her leg to 
such an extent that she felt it was missing. However, when she heard music she would 
involuntarily tap her foot to the beat. The recollection of the latent “structure of feeling” 
involving the cultural experience of listening to music, which included the reaction of 
neurons to external stimuli, could move her leg when her conscious will alone could 
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not.
254Affect, then, preceded the woman’s conscious will to move her leg. I suggest that 
Satthianadhan’s similar descriptions of Kamala’s affective potentials for action poses an 
alternative to Kantian theorizations of the conscious will being the prime determiner of 
free will and individual choice. Instead, Satthianadhan demonstrates that rational action 
can be based on unconscious, sensual modes of embodiment.  
Satthianadhan portrays her protagonist’s affective agency as being prompted by 
universalizing humanist structures of feeling orchestrated in a romanticized natural 
world. For instance, Kamala treats religion as an affective natural space where her mind 
can “follow pictures of her own making” to do with a “scene, rude, bold – a mountainous 
place where in the midst of dim, dark surroundings, she experienced an exaltation of 
spirit which made her feel that God was there and that she was in the presence of an 
almighty power.”
255 Nature as an affective space is not only able to provide Kamala with 
an alternate theology from missionary Christianity and nationalist Hinduism but also 
functions here as music does for the hip fracture patient, meaning more to Kamala than 
meaning itself, and producing stimuli which are registered in her being affectively as an 
“exaltation of spirit.” 
It would be a misreading to attribute this alternative pantheistic theology wholly 
to an internalization of the European romantic literary tradition. The classical 
mythological kavya literature of India also portrays nature, instead of institutionalized 
religion, as a feminine space that functions as the spiritual witness and moral arbitrator of 
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women’s lives. For instance, the female protagonist of the ancient epic, the Ramayana, is 
born from a furrow of earth and disappears back into it to escape from her husband’s 
mistreatment of her. Kamala’s inner self is also aligned with the natural world so that 
nature functions as the antithesis of inherited and institutionalized ideologies that 
represent self-alienation. Satthianadhan therefore portrays the natural world as the 
symbolic space where Kamala can flourish without external constraints.
256 
Instead, Satthianadhan’s characterization of the natural world can be read as 
deliberately drawing on Indian literary traditions to critique nationalist inventions of 
Hindu tradition that relegated women to the inner, spiritual world of the home. In 
contrast, Satthianadhan portrays the home, the arena where both colonial and nationalist 
reform efforts were being played out, as a place of entrapment and the outdoor landscape 
as one of freedom for women that is apart from patriarchal injunctions. This dialectic 
continues to operate throughout the text. For instance, Satthianadhan characterizes the 
inner quarters of the city through the disjuncture between ideological expectations of 
women in the city, and Kamala’s own desires grounded in universalizing structures of 
feeling. Satthianadhan describes how in the countryside Kamala “felt free like the air 
around her, and untrammeled by caste superstition and fear, she entered joyously into the 
spirit of the rural diversions, taking an interest in the simple rustic souls around her, 
hugging their little black babies when they ran to her and joyously clung to her feet. She 
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would forget to bathe after touching the low caste children.”
257  The phrase “free like the 
air” suggests a freedom that precedes the conscious will, that is as inescapably part of the 
being as air is in the natural world, and can therefore resist such oppressive conventions 
as artificial caste structures. In contrast, Satthianadhan writes that city bred women 
“knew nothing of the freedom of hills and valleys and wide fields, the innocence and joy 
of country homes. Their precocious and artificial childhood ended in a premature and 
forced womanhood, and there were no gradations of feelings or thoughts for them. Just as 
the door of a city house leads abruptly into the street where everything is open and 
glaring, so the threshold of their childhood opened suddenly into womanhood.” The 
affect of “joy” and “innocence” that the individual can experience in the “freedom of hills 
and valleys and wide fields” is, then, suddenly forced into conformity with the social 
world and its power structures. 
The affective freedom of the natural landscape as opposed to the constraints of the 
city is also used to critique child marriage. On the morning of Kamala’s wedding, 
Satthianadhan gives an elaborate description of her connection with nature: “she stepped 
over the cool dew-washed stones, picking here and there a wild flower which she pressed 
against her cheek, and with each gust of wind she felt the happy buoyancy of life which 
made her forget that she was a bride. The song of the birds rang out sweet and clear…it 
rose to the heavens, and filled the whole valley; and Kamala felt the melody dance in her 
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veins, and in her wild delight she too danced round the trees….She ran and jumped over 
the stones like a mountain goat, and sang out in her joy whatever came to her lips.”
258 
Satthianadhan describes how affect is experienced through external stimuli as intensities 
of feeling; Kamala’s being registers each “gust of wind” as a feeling, here “happy 
buoyancy.” These natural stimuli combine with the music of the birds so that “melody 
dances in her veins” producing a “wild delight.” The descriptions carry strong affective 
connotations of freedom; “wild,” “dancing” and “buoyancy” are representative of a 
freedom so agreeable to her repressed will that it can only be described through 
metaphoric associations with the natural world, so that Kamala is likened to the wind that 
dances around trees, the birds and their song, and the jumping of a mountain goat. These 
affective impulses are, in turn, contrasted to her role as “child bride” that the narrative 
indicates will curb all the joyful impulses that are so integral to Kamala’s personality. 
Indeed, Kamala feels “a throb of shame and fear” when she realizes that her father-in-law 
has been watching her and that her displays of positive affect are so out of touch with the 
behavior expected of her as a new bride. Her affect of throbbing shame and fear signals 
the oppressive conditions of her child marriage because it indicates the disjuncture 
between her internalized structures of feeling and the demureness expected of her by 
nationalist ideologies surrounding the figure of the Hindu wife. Satthianadhan uses affect 
to advocate a mythological, romantic, and organic foundation to subjectivity that 
critiques “civilized,” official agendas for a subject that exceeds both and posits an 
alternative modernity based on her own conceptions of free will.  
Satthianadhan links these descriptions of affect to the exercise of agency by using 
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them to frame the awakening of a consciousness in her protagonist, tracing how Kamala 
comes to recognize the disjuncture between her own repressed will and the internalized 
ideologies imposed on her. Satthianadhan begins by noting the “heights and depths in 
Kamala’s nature of which she herself was unconscious,” pointing out that it is only a 
matter of time before these “heights and depths” reveal themselves. She conveys the 
repression of Kamala’s will through the metaphor of a dam, a man made construction, 
holding back the natural force of a flood: “The ‘open sesame’ had not been uttered. The 
strength of the floods no one had tested, and their vehemence had not begun to shew 
itself.” Satthianadhan elaborates that these “torrents” were “confined by artificial 
barriers” of social conventions, and “lay still and dark.” Finally, Satthianadhan links this 
image of Kamala’s natural feelings being crushed under the weight of artificial ideologies 
to her agentive potential. She notes that Kamala “was herself astonished at the way she 
was drifting along, doing the things that she was bidden to do, like the dumb mule, 
questioning no one, nor inquiring into the why or the wherefore of anything.” The 
implications are clear; it is only when Kamala recognizes herself as the “toy and prey of 
circumstance” that her repressed will can surface: “Once, but only once, a wish intruded 
itself in the deepest and most sacred chamber of her heart – a wish which made her blush 
at her boldness and cover her bosom with her hands as if to hide it from herself. Would, 
she said to herself, that Ganesh had been more like Ramchander. Such a wish, though 
natural it may seem, was shocking in the extreme to a Hindu girl, who must never allow 
herself to compare her husband with anybody else.”
259 The narrator’s strategic 
intervention here identifies Kamala’s situation as oppressive by highlighting the 
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discrepancy between the nationalist ideology of husband worship that Kamala is expected 
to feel, and Kamala’s own repressed desires, a disjunction that registers in her body as the 
affect of blushing shame, prompting her to shield herself with her hands in a symbolic 
gesture of embodied action. The narrator reveals that this shame is what initiates 
Kamala’s affective agency. 
260 
Satthianadhan’s characterization of Kamala’s awakening clearly perceives agency 
as dependent on an autonomous will that resists relations of domination. Such an 
understanding of agency has been dismissed by theorists such as Saba Mahmood who 
insist that since all the choices the subject makes are necessarily produced and mediated 
by pre-existing structures of power, the idea of an autonomous will that can resist 
domination must be disposed of.  Mahmood, therefore, defines agency “not as a synonym 
for resistance to relations of domination, but as a capacity for action that historically 
specific relations of subordination enable and create.” She offers an alternative 
theorization of agentive action as “the specific ways in which one performs a certain 
number of operations of one’s thoughts, body, conduct, and ways of being, even if they 
consolidate structures of subordination, in accord with a particular discursive 
tradition.”
261  
I argue, however, that the Foucauldian approach to seeing all resistance as being 
                                                        
260 As Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank describe through the work of Silvan Tomkins, “many 
developmental psychologists consider shame the affect that most defines the space wherein a 
sense of self will develop.” “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins,” Critical 
Inquiry 21.2 (Winter 1995).  
 
261 Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the 
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shaped by power that Mahmood relies on, while insightful, does not capture important 
differences in how the imposition of power is registered by subaltern subjects themselves 
at varying historical moments. Satthianadhan’s universalizing depiction of Kamala’s 
affective awakening, in explicitly emphasizing the subject’s own perceptions of 
oppression, challenges such post-structuralist theorizations of embodied action because, 
crucially, they emphasize the subject’s own differentiation of what she feels is imposed 
on her and what she recognizes as having been internalized according to her own will. In 
making such a differentiation, Satthianadhan’s protagonist suggests that some forms of 
power are felt more directly as impositions than others, and, by corollary, some forms of 
resistive action are perceived by subaltern subjects as being more autonomous than 
others. These nuances stress the value of subjective perceptions of an autonomous will, 
focusing on how subalterns themselves register ideologies as “autonomous” or forced, 
and are  “moved” to act in accordance to or in resistance against them.  
          Indeed, Kamala finally acts when her own affect moves her to recognize her 
marriage as oppressive. She forces Ganesh’s mistress out of her home, and leaves, taking 
only her child with her. Satthianadhan writes: “the tiger element in her nature was 
roused,” a reference that hints at something in Kamala’s reaction beyond what social 
conventions would allow. When Ganesh hits her “she got up, suppressed the pain and 
facing him said – ‘You! You! To strike me for this. Take care that God does not strike 
you in return.”
262  Once again it is negative affect that alerts her to her oppressive 
surroundings by indicating a disjuncture between structures of feeling that tell her she is 
being violated and nationalist ideologies that taught women forbearance in response to 
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even their husbands’ violent actions. The narrator notes that Kamala felt “an icy chill 
passed through her at his strange sneering manner. She felt something bound round her 
heart and choking her. Something made her shudder and tremble as she walked.” The 
narrative voice does not specify what the “something” is; unlike other reformist texts of 
the time, Satthianadhan does not name it as her craving for a feminist independence, nor 
her disappointed hopes for a companionate marriage, but leaves it deliberately vague, 
only suggesting that the ‘something’ is beyond social conventions or ideologies.  
           This climactic “running away” scene also consciously subverts the Christian 
moralizing of Jane Eyre’s flight from Rochester. In Jane Eyre, Bronte characterized 
Jane’s strength to flee as coming from a Christian God and the nature through which this 
God manifests Himself: “I had injured-wounded-left my master. I was hateful in my own 
eyes. Still I could not turn, nor retrace one step. God must have led me on. As to my own 
will or conscience, impassioned grief had trampled one and stifled the other.”
263 Here, 
Jane’s exercise of choice in running away is semantically linked to God’s design; her 
“free” will is not her own but that of a Christian God. In contrast, Satthianadhan explains 
Kamala’s agency through a mythological, romanticized structure of feeling that moves 
Kamala away from her oppressive surroundings, making her “shudder and tremble as she 
walked.” Instead of a Christianized natural landscape, Satthianadhan draws on the 
classical kavya genre of Indian epic mythology that characterizes nature as empathizing 
with the characters’ sufferings. In the mythological epic, the Ramayana, the forces of 
nature, seasons, flower shrubs, all grieve with the central protagonist when she is 
abandoned by her husband: “as she began to weep, peacocks stopped their dances, trees 
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dropped their blossoms, does no longer grazed.”
264 Satthianadhan draws on these 
mythological cultural currents, influences of regional literary currents, to describe how 
Kamala’s turbulent state of mind is mirrored by “winds howling on all sides and the 
darkened tree tops rustled ominously. A long desolate plain lay before her.”
265 
Satthianadhan notes that the “something” that moves her to act was “the passion in her 
soul” which “was driving her on.” The natural world mirrors this passion, registering in 
her body as affect, and causing her to be able to act.   
Satthianadhan depicts Kamala as tuning into this affect to make all her important 
decisions, including, contrary to Jane’s climactic reunion with Rochester, Kamala’s 
refusal to marry the man she loves. At first, marrying Ramchander seems to be just what 
Kamala wants; Ramchander offers her a freedom which he describes through the kind of 
affect Kamala has always wanted, one that is orchestrated through the natural world: 
“You will be free with me – free as the mountain air, free as the light and sunshine that 
play around you.”
266 Although he hints at this pure freedom, however, his words 
simultaneously undermine it: “Come Kamala, make up your mind. You were mine before 
you were born. You were promised to me by your mother.” The phrase “you were mine 
before you were born” denies Kamala’s own affect by framing Ramchander as the 
agential giver of love and freedom, and Kamala as the agencyless receiver: “I have means 
at my command of which you know nothing; and love will welcome you in the new 
world, love such as you have never dreamt of – my love, my undying love and worship. 
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Accept me and your freedom, and come away with me, and no one will know anything of 
it.”
267The emphasis on her knowing nothing about the means on which they will live, 
despite her having means of her own, reinforces the idea that Kamala’s life will once 
more be structured by another’s discourses rather than through her own desires; the word 
“worship,” casts Kamala in the mould of nationalist conceptions of the ideal wife as the 
Grhalakshmi, or the household goddess, thereby limiting her to precisely the nationalist 
archetype she was resisting.  
Kamala therefore accepts the positive affect of Ramchander’s love, comparing it 
to the physical sensation of light and sunlight on her path that “brightened her life and 
played around her: Ah! It was happiness to know that someone loved her.”
268 However, 
she foregoes his offer of remarriage, and “frees herself once and for ever from the great 
overpowering influence of the man before her.” She chooses to enjoy the affective 
sensation of being loved for the first time in her life while living apart from Ramchander: 
she spends “all her money in unselfish works of charity; and her name lives even to this 
day almost worshipped by the simple folks of the place… Far in front was a shrine 
bearing the name of Kamala, who had now become a saint. Her unseen hands still relieve 
the poor and protect the unfortunate; for she left her fortune for the sole benefit of 
widows and orphans.”
269 This conclusion also undermines the traditional structure of the 
bildungsroman in which the linear progress of the narrative ends with the protagonist’s 
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268 Satthianadhan, Kamala, 156. 
 
269Satthianadhan, Kamala, 156. She therefore fits into the late 19
th century trend of contemporary 
figures such as Pandita Ramabai whose Mukti Mission, a shelter for widows, had been visited 
and admired by Satthianadhan in her own lifetime. 
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reconciliation with social structures. While Jane’s journey of self discovery and financial 
independence ends in a socially sanctioned Christian marital union, Kamala’s rejection of 
Ramchander’s proposal undermines such a neat ending; she remains at the periphery of 
society, helping those also at the periphery. Satthianadhan thus ends her narrative by 
reverting back to her intrusive narrator’s perpetual present symbolized by the monument 
dedicated to Kamala and her charity work. Unlike Jane Eyre, which ends in Jane’s 
reproductive future that buttresses the forward movement of the bildungsroman, Kamala 
remains symbolically frozen in time, a carving in stone, as a reminder that the new 
woman’s agency does not necessarily have to be defined by the protagonist’s coming to 
terms with the hegemonic ideologies of the society in which she lives. Satthianadhan, 
then, alters the traditional structure of the bildungsroman to undermine its colonialist 
logic of social modernization. She articulates her alternative modern idea of individual 
freedom through alternative form that does not lead to acceptance of the traditional social 
norms and mores. In doing so, she demonstrates, as I mentioned in my introduction, how 
the development of universalizing humanisms was often linked to the form through 
which they were expressed. 
Satthianadhan’s bildungsroman, then, offers a universalizing theorization of 
individual freedom that is ideologically apart from colonial conceptions of individual 
freedom as well as the nationalist ideas of free will that were reactions to them. In doing 
so, Satthianadhan demonstrates that universalizing assertions of humanity such as those 
that accompanied Enlightenment modernity were arising in other cultures, drawing on 
European as well as indigenous literary traditions to resist oppressive ideologies. 
Furthermore, Satthianadhan’s alternative modern idea of individual freedom prompts a   173 
reworking of Kant’s theorizations of the conscious will as the primary determiner of 
individual freedom while also offering a different way of thinking about resistance. Her 
bildungsroman foregrounds not only how subaltern subjects resist hegemonic power 
structures but how they perceive of, and subsequently embody, their resistance. 
 
Let me conclude this final chapter, then, by restating my main theses.  I hope my 
analysis has shown exactly how subaltern discourse is layered and complex rather than 
simple and homogeneous.  The subaltern, I have argued, may speak more clearly through 
some discourses than others. My central point is that that there were multiple discourses 
of modernity being harnessed by subaltern subjects through Anglophone as well as 
regional language literatures, and that to be able to understand the nuances of the 
"subaltern's speech," we must be attentive to these multiple mediations, indigenous as 
well as colonialist, through which they attempted to express themselves. Seen from this 
perspective, Kamala is a powerful critique of the social costs of the nineteenth century's 
reform efforts, of patriarchal structures such as child marriage that oppress women, and 
the new colonizing order symbolized by English education that disrupts their domestic 
sphere.  But this critique is made possible by an alternative, non-colonialist version of 
indigenous humanism.  For Satthianadhan indicates the vast territory of female 
subjectivity that remains untouched by domestic and colonial reform efforts on women's 
behalf. In the process, she suggests that modernity's humanist universalizing roots were 
multiple and dispersed, and in doing so, she directs us to alternative epistemologies, 
including affective agencies, that yet remain to be theorized.  
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Conclusion 
Redefining Alternative Modernities through Indigenous Literatures 
My analyses of Bhīma Bhoi’s devotional poetry, Zulu praise poetry, and 
Satthianadhan’s Indian bildungsroman in English challenge scholarly accounts of 
modernity as a colonial import into “traditional” societies. These subaltern authors, I 
suggest, redefine modernity as a descriptive word for any period of radical rupture and 
resistance against past orthodoxies, a way of questioning the present that insists on a 
universalizing radical humanism. They ascertain that universalizing ideas of the human, 
in context-specific forms, were also arising in colonized locations relatively 
independently from European humanisms. Instead of asking “How were Enlightenment 
ideas appropriated in India to produce an alternative modernity that was just as Indian as 
it was European?” (as Chakrabarty does), these texts therefore ally themselves to, and 
answer, the questions with which I began: “Where else might accelerated societal change 
brought about by a combination of new technologies, knowledge revolutions, state 
formations, and expanding intercultural contacts contribute to radical questioning and 
dismantling of traditional ontologies, epistemologies, and institutional structures?”
270 
What were the indigenous humanist ideas that lay behind these alternative modernities? 
What power structures were they arising in response to? And how did they challenge and 
change colonialist epistemologies?  
I have illuminated these questions through subaltern “contextual universalisms,” 
or universalizing assertions of rationality, democratic ideals, and individual freedom. 
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Each is articulated independently from, and challenges, colonial humanisms even though 
all are set in different temporal contexts, whether in a pre-colonial society, at the height 
of the colonial period in marginalized regions of the country, or at the height of the 
colonial period in a colonial metropolis. Each is contextually grounded in particular local 
cultures, material and institutional structures, or the physical body. In the process, each 
“contextual universalism” reflects one component of alternative indigenous modernities, 
whether it be a knowledge revolution such as Bhīma’s disavowals of caste, institutional, 
material structures such as the pre-colonial communal Zulu agricultural economy, or the 
intercultural contact that led Satthianadhan to denounce colonialist religious attitudes and 
make her universalizing arguments for individual freedom. And each component of these 
alternative modernities is expressed and developed through very particular literary 
devices that reinforce and enact socially progressive messages. 
Recuperating A Critical Humanism for Postcolonial Studies 
 
In testifying that humanist modernities in India and South Africa were not simply 
derivative discourses, these texts suggest ways of recuperating the universal human, often 
dismissed by postcolonial critics for its implication in creating unethical “colonialist 
modernities.” These postcolonial Foucauldian analyses claim that colonial power was so 
all-encompassing and totalizing that all universalizing modernities could only have been 
derived from the dominant colonial discourses. As I have demonstrated in my reading of 
Kamala, this model has led to colonial literatures being read as nothing but reflections of 
colonialist value systems, an approach that does not capture nuances in how power 
worked within the boundaries of the nation state, and the differences in how it percolated   176 
down to various colonized populations, areas, and cultures. My readings have shown that 
that the discourse of European colonial modernity is not the only discourse of modernity 
through which to view the colonial past, and that the “universal human” was a part of 
non-colonialist discourses of modernity as well. 
  
I have also responded to post-structuralist critics (such as Cheah) who dismiss the 
universal human because the “arbitrariness of its signs” produces radical differences in its 
social use. On the contrary, as my analyses of these texts indicate, the universal human 
has common referents in South African and Indian cultures. The imagining of universal 
human capacities and potentials suggest shared understandings of concepts such as 
“individual freedom” and “dignity” even though their exact constituents and the terms 
used to express them may vary according to cultural contexts. For instance, Bhīma 
understands rationality similar to Enlightenment thinkers as the ability to critically 
differentiate between rational and mythical, magical states of being, the Zulu praise poets 
understand democracy similarly to Enlightenment thinkers as the universal right to 
choose how, and by whom, you are governed, but unlike thinkers like J.S. Mill they 
ground their democratic thought in a consensus based process of decision making rather 
than the majoritarian democratic system prevalent in the West. Similarly, Satthianadhan 
imagines individual freedom as the ability to act without constraint just as Kant does but 
she grounds this agency in the affective experiences of the physical body rather than in a 
conscious will. Each of these subaltern thinkers, then, makes universalizing humanist 
assertions that have contextually grounded, similarly understood counterparts elsewhere.  
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These shared understandings of the universal human suggest the possibility of 
outlining a post-enlightenment idea of the “universal human,” derived from indigenous 
epistemologies, that does not conflate the core idea of the universal human with its 
misuses, and that is not limited by the parameters of Enlightenment conceptualizations of 
the “universal human.” In the process, I ask: Is “human rights and literature” a possible 
future direction for postcolonial studies? If so, how can the emerging field of human 
rights and literature add to existing conversations in postcolonial studies? A recuperated 
figure of the universal human, too often dismissed as imperialist because of its 
unfortunate appropriation by colonialist and capitalist structures of exploitation, lies at 
the heart of this rethinking because it highlights itself both as a regulative ideal and as the 
potential basis of grassroots alternative modernities grounded in progressive religious and 
cultural ideas. 
   
Producing Popular Resistance through Alternative Humanisms 
 
Indeed, as I have demonstrated, the subaltern authors of these texts produce their 
alternative modernities through a grassroots populism that defines itself through 
“indigenous” universalizing notions of rights. Importantly, these texts are examples of an 
“indigenous modernity” because they create movements of popular resistance through 
distinct local and intellectual cultures, very different from those used by colonialists or 
even by hegemonic nationalist groups in their own societies. Furthermore, the subaltern 
authors of these literary texts instantiate modern “contextual universalisms” through 
“traditional” aesthetic mediums, demonstrating that the development of universalizing   178 
humanist ideas was often closely tied to the literary forms through which they are 
articulated. 
Future Directions 
These insights suggest a number of fruitful directions for further research. My 
study of indigenous rationalities in Bhīma Bhoi’s devotional poetry demonstrates the 
need to examine indigenous texts from within their own contexts and local realities. 
When one views regional discourses, such as Bhīma’s anti caste critique, in relation to 
each other rather than simply as reflections of colonialist discourses, we end up with 
much more nuanced and accurate pictures of historical realities. These, in turn, lead to the 
question: “What would a genuinely non-chauvinist literary study look like in the Indian 
context, and what general themes (similar to "alternative" or "indigenous" modernity) 
would be highlighted if we de-emphasized literary histories of work in any one 
language?”
271 For instance, Bhīma’s message of rational social equality draws on 
centuries old, subcontinent-wide structures of feeling from the devotional bhakti 
movement that was expressed in multiple regional languages. This populist movement 
focused on inward love for god in opposition to religious orthodoxies and social 
hierarchies. Geographically spanning the entire subcontinent, and temporally stretching 
across centuries to include millions of marginalized peoples, the bhakti movement’s 
“gurus” included tailors, barbers, boatmen, weavers, and even maidservants. They wrote 
in the vernaculars (Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, Marathi, Gujarati) rather than in Sanskrit, 
the language of the gods and the preserve of the higher castes. 
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A “genuinely non-chauvinist literary study” would account for the connections 
between these different thinkers, all of whom were drawing on a rich indigenous 
intertextuality, and collectively producing a historical knowledge revolution. For 
instance, Bhīma was drawing on ideas about rational social organization from the time of 
the ancient Hindu epic, the Mahabharata, which was translated by low caste sage Sarala 
Das into the vernacular Oriya centuries before Bhīma was writing. The Mahabharata 
revolves around the question of who deserves the throne of Hastinapur, asking whether 
one earns one’s lot based on one’s actions or because of their place in the kinship, social 
or religious hierarchy. As Satya Mohanty has shown, Sarala Das makes a similar point in 
his Lakshmi Purana; the goddess Lakshmi has an egalitarian vision in which the worth of 
an individual is determined by the individual’s action, duty and work rather than static 
caste hierarchies.
272  Fast forwarding to the 15
th century all the way across the country to 
the northern desert state of Rajasthan, one finds that similar ideas are being expounded in 
medieval mystic Meerabai's bhakti poetry, a woman who gave up her royal householder 
life, and sang and danced her message of gender and caste equality across India followed 
by masses of devotees. She boldly asserted that even an “unlettered, ungainly, low caste, 
ill mannered and dirty desert tribe girl” could achieve salvation because of her religious 
“practice:” 
 
The plums tasted 
sweet to the unlettered desert-tribe girl- 
but what manners! To chew into each! She was ungainly,  
low-caste, ill mannered and dirty,  
but the god took the 
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fruit she'd been sucking.  
Why? She knew how to love.  
She might not distinquish 
splendor from filth 
but she'd tasted the nectar of passion.  
Might not know any Veda,  
but a chariot swept her away- 
now she frolics in heaven, esctatically bound 
to her god.  
The Lord of Fallen Fools, says Mira,  
will save anyone 
who can practice rapture like that- 
I myself in a previous birth 
was a cowherding girl 
at Gokul.
273 
 
Mira emphasizes that despite not knowing any Veda, the low caste girl is recognized by 
the divine. She elevates the girl’s spiritual practice above written scriptures, even going 
so far as to call the divine, the “Lord of Fallen Fools,” a God who contravenes caste 
stipulations by eating food “soiled” by a low caste girl. Furthermore, Mira allies her own 
religious practice with the rapturous, devoted “fallen.”   
 
Writing around the same time as Mirabai, but in a different region nonetheless, 
the medieval poet Kabir, who provided Bhīma with his blunt, questioning, “upside down 
language” in which he writes, was also making a similar point about the foolishness and 
irrationality of caste privilege: 
 
If you say you’re a Brahmin  
Born of a mother who’s a Brahmin,  
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Was there a special canal  
Through which you were born?
274 
 
By emphasizing the biological birth canal, Kabir makes a universalizing point about the 
equal rights due to every “human.”  
 
Sarala Das, Mirabai, Kabir, and then two centuries later, in 17
th century Sindh, 
another Sufi mystic, Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai, were all making remarkably similar points 
often in similar literary registers. Though writing in different vernaculars in different 
historical contexts, all of these poets emphasized a personal, non-hierarchical, 
relationship with god. All transferred their ideas to a mass following through vernacular 
languages, repeating refrains, and simple rhythms. All spoke through female 
protagonists/a feminine voice to express sensual desire for the Beloved that represented 
spiritual, meditative yearnings for the transcendental divine. In the process, all also 
conveyed “modern” messages about individual worth, selfhood and personal freedom in 
relation to women and lower castes. And Bhīma’s message would not have been the same 
without any of them. This rich, intertextual universe of regional literatures and populist 
anti-caste movements belie Chakrabarty’s assertion that “modern social critiques of 
caste, oppressions of women, ... of colonialism itself—are unthinkable except as a legacy 
of how Enlightenment Europe was appropriated in the subcontinent.”
275 Instead, further 
research into these "modern" subcontinental structures of feeling in varied localized 
manifestations prompt us to rethink the binaries of the “religious” and “secular” and 
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“tradition” and “modernity” through which we have often viewed pre-colonial and 
colonial Indian societies. 
 
The analysis of these indigenous humanisms in relation to one another also allows 
one to trace the relevance of politically charged literature to current movements in 
support of democratic cultures. For instance, while the communal agricultural economy 
that buttressed democratic behaviors between a South African chief and his subjects have 
been eradicated in the globalized economy, democratic praise poetry still survives. In 
fact, praise poetry to ANC leaders during the fight against apartheid was a major method 
through which mass anti-apartheid support was gathered. Liz Gunner has pointed out that 
on the day of the “largest political rally of the country” near Johannesburg in 1989, the 
Sunday Tribune paid tribute to released ANC political prisoners by stating that “today the 
freed leaders will be honored like kings…and one of the country’s most gifted imbongis 
wants to make sure the released men hear the story of the people’s suffering.”
276 Izibongo 
are, then, part of an emergent popular democratic culture, an important art form in 
contemporary political discourse. These contemporary poems bring up fertile questions 
such as: How does the izibongo form still structure South African relationships to 
democratic rule?  What role do they perform in creating and maintaining a public sphere? 
Did they manage to maintain their critical edge even as they were appropriated for the 
purposes of the larger black resistance movement against apartheid rule? What new 
institutional structures have been put into place to buttress the critical practices of 
imbongi in contemporary South Africa? How have new literary forms such as black 
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urban music changed the “traditional” form of the izibongo? And can contemporary 
izibongo still be regarded as “contextual universalisms,” as “indigenous humanisms that 
buttress visions of radical alternative modernities?” 
Finally, my analysis of indigenous humanisms as evoked by Satthianadhan’s 
affective literary devices suggest new ways of reading Anglophone postcolonial texts that 
do not focus exclusively on how they function as reflections of colonialist 
epistemologies. Thus a postcolonial, South African novel such as Zakes Mda’s Ways of 
Dying, set in the interregnum, can be read not just as resistance literature aimed only at 
countering colonialist social structures and knowledges but, as Mda himself points out, as 
an experiment in form that keeps alive alternative indigenous epistemologies. As Rita 
Barnard has noted, Ways of Dying uses a “multilayered, fantastic plot, that decisively 
breaches the generic constraints that the culture of resistance, with its demand for realist 
immediacy, had for years placed on the black writer.”
277 Indeed, I would argue, the novel 
impedes the developmental dynamic of the bildungsroman form, just as Kamala does, 
with indigenous literary devices; the novel uses development flashbacks, diverse 
anecdotes, and editorializing commentary to produce a collective concept of narrative 
akin to the izibongo form. Through the main character of a “traditional funeral orator,” 
the “novel” insists on a public, communal account of how each and every deceased 
person met his or her end, exploring, in the process, the political injustices carried out by 
rival political factions. While the task of Toloki the orator is, like the imbongi’s, one of 
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narrator, historiographer, and storyteller to the people, it is similarly one of democratic 
critique. As Rita Barnard notes, it always involves deliberately open ended debate about 
the conventions that should apply, whether they be factual accuracy, eulogy, self-
expression, communal solidarity, social critique, or consolation.
278 
A study of alternative indigenous modernities, then, provides fascinating future 
directions with which to transform Postcolonial Studies’ quest for epistemically just ways 
of exploring colonized societies. It lays out ways of recuperating a critical humanism 
from oft overlooked indigenous sources that produce a more accurate picture of 
“alternative modernities.” It does so through attention to carefully chosen regional 
literary devices that are integral to the humanist messages they articulate, and the populist 
movements they incite.  It supplies a theoretical path out of the cultural relativism vs. 
universalism binaries haunting postcolonial cultural studies.  It offers tools with which to 
analyze traces of “indigenous modernities” today without ignoring the globalized 
modernity of which they are a part. And finally, such a study suggests ways of reading 
literatures that remain alert to the rich complexity of indigenous literary forms, as well as 
the colonial intertextual universe that produced them.  
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